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Introduction
Electricity is bound to a grid infrastructure connecting producers and consumers at
different locations. While it is generally comprehensive that a single grid infrastruc-
ture suffices, there is also a common understanding in economics that in grid-bound
industries the grid infrastructure should be provided by one single firm. As a conse-
quence, regulation of the firm is required in order to prevent her from exploiting this
(natural) monopoly status. In contrast, the production of electricity is supposed to
be most efficient if many different, competing firms exist. Recognizing this, the tasks
of electricity generation and transmission have been separated, leading to grid firms,
which are regulated, and production firms competing in electricity markets. This so-
called unbundling entails complicating issues of organizing an electricity system, because
even though production and transmission are separated, they are still interdependent
by means of transmitting electricity from the producer to the consumer. Key to a suc-
cessful organization is the handling of information – on one hand in an adequate market
design, where the exchange of information must reflect the interdependence of the grid
and production firms to achieve efficient coordination, and on the other hand in the
regulation of the monopolistic grid firm, where information is crucial for designing an
adequate regulatory contract.
An adequate market design in order to coordinate the regulated grid firm and the com-
peting generation firms should reveal information about the scarcities of transmission or
production capacities as well as high demand in the system. Prices contain this informa-
tion, because they are the result of transactions between market participants, wherein
they reveal their respective value of electricity. Hence, locations where the price for
electricity is high indicate a high value of electricity and consecutively, a high value for
additional grid or production capacities. In turn, high prices provide incentives for the
market participants to take action. Prices, which reflect all available information, lead
to an efficient allocation of market activities. Mostly motivated by political reasons,
current market designs do not necessarily consider this basic economic principle and
thus, lead to distorted price signals and inefficient allocations. However, the distortion
might prove useful in case the market fails to process available information. Either way,
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the price does not fully capture all information in the market resulting in a trade-off
between the inefficiency induced by market design or by the market itself. Therefore,
the best way information is reflected in the market design is ambiguous and depends on
the specific circumstances.
Successful regulation depends on the distribution of information between the regulator
and the grid firm where the latter one is usually better informed about how to operate
and expand the infrastructure. A regulatory contract has to be designed such that the
regulated firm is not able to exploit her informational advantage. However, since it is
not possible to fully control and supervise the grid firm, occasionally some inefficiency
has to be accepted. The task for the regulator is then to minimize these inefficiencies
and provide incentives for the firm to behave socially optimal. Therein, the regulator
faces the trade-off between granting the firm a (costly) rent and giving the firm less
discretion. This in turn leads to misguided firm activities, e.g., excessive grid expansion,
due to the lack of information of the regulator. The trade-off and thus, an efficient
regulation is determined by the characteristics of the information – or more precisely –
the information asymmetries.
This thesis studies the described issues of handling information by analyzing the market
design – with a special focus on the information exchanged between the regulated grid
firm and the generation firms – and the regulation of the grid firm. The thesis consists
of four chapters, each based on a single paper to which the authors contributed equally:
1. Congestion management in power systems - Long-term modeling framework and
large-scale application (with Simeon Hagspiel and Lisa Just). EWI Working Paper
15/03, revised and resubmitted to the Journal of Regulatory Economics.
2. The relevance of grid expansion under zonal markets (with Tom Brown, Simeon
Hagspiel and Lisa Just). EWI Working Paper 15/07, submitted to The Energy
Journal.
3. Is an inefficient transmission market better than none at all? - On zonal and
nodal pricing in electricity systems. EWI Working Paper 15/05, submitted to The
Energy Journal.
4. Regulation of non-marketed outputs and substitutable inputs (with Simeon Hagspiel).
EWI Working Paper 15/06, in preparation for submission to the International
Journal of Industrial Organization.
In the following, a short overview of the different chapters is given, before the method-
ology and the results are critically discussed and compared.
2
1 Introduction
1.1 Outline
In Chapter 2, the market design regarding the exchange of information between com-
petitive generation and regulated grid firms is analyzed. Different approaches exist,
which handle the exchange in terms of congestion management and revealing scarcities
in the grid in different ways. In a nodal pricing regime, there is one price per grid
node, which contains all information on the scarcity of grid and production. While this
approach is favored by the theoretical literature as the most efficient design, alterna-
tive approaches with a uniform price in a zone containing several grid nodes have been
implemented, e.g., in Europe. Congestion within these zones is then handled by admin-
istrative measures requested from the grid firm. There are three main characteristics
along which the different design can be described: First, the geographical scope of the
price zone. Second, the way congestion in a zone is handled, i.e., by administrative
measures (e.g. redispatch) or more market based approaches such as local grid tariffs
for generation (generator- or g-component). Third, which information of grid capacities
between the zones is made available to the market. This chapter analyzes the differences
and performance of the market designs with different characteristics.
Our approach is two-fold: First, we develop a generalized and flexible economic mod-
eling framework as a decomposed inter-temporal equilibrium model for operation and
investment including generation, transmission and their inter-linkage. Second, we ap-
ply this model in a numerical simulation and provide a suitable solution algorithm for
large-scale problems. In the modeling framework, different organization of Transmission
System Operators (TSOs), market areas, redispatch, local grid payments for generators
as well as different calculation methods for cross-border capacities are implemented. This
allows to consistently analyze the long-term effects of different settings. The numerical
simulation allows to apply this theoretical framework to a real-world example, namely
the Central Western European (CWE) region, and to show the long-term effects and
inefficiencies of different market designs, amongst others the current European market
design and the efficient benchmark: nodal pricing.
With the formulation of the economic modeling framework we show that the decompo-
sition of the problem in a generation and transmission level, the various market designs
can be easily implemented by modifying the exchange of information between the two
levels. For instance, marginal transmission costs may be neglected within a price zone,
leaving investment decisions without considering the impacts on the grid. In such an
approach, nodal pricing is necessarily the first best benchmark, due to the unrestricted
exchange of information between the two levels. Any modification of the problem leads
to less efficient results. However, which restriction causes the most inefficiencies depends
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on the respective parameter setting and cannot be easily derived from the theoretical
framework. We analyze this issue further by applying the economic modeling framework
in a numerical solution. Again, the decomposition of the generation and transmission
level proves helpful for solving the problem. The iterative solution algorithm we propose
consists of updating information between the two levels until convergence is achieved.
This also allows the coupling with other models, such as the used Alternating Current
(AC) grid model for calculating the electricity flows in the transmission grid. Applying
the model to the CWE region, we analyze the inefficiencies that arise if the market
design is not first best. We consider 70 nodes and 174 power lines and simulate the
development of the electricity system up to the year 2030. Inefficiencies amount to up
to 4.6% of total system costs until 2030 compared to the efficient benchmark. The
main source of inefficiencies is the coordination of the TSOs’ activities, i.e., whether
they jointly or nationally optimize their grid, and low trading capacities offered to the
market caused by the implemented market coupling. Hence, considering the efforts for a
common European electricity market, policies should foster the cooperation of the TSOs
to improve efficiency.
Chapter 3 adds to the analysis of market designs of Chapter 2 by further analyzing
the particular market design of zonal pricing, which is currently applied in Europe. The
focus lays on the effects on the European electricity system and the achieving of the
European energy targets until 2030, if grid expansion is not or only partially possible.
The European electricity market design consists of bidding zones, usually aligned to
national borders, with a uniform price. The information contained in this uniform
price is correct if there is no congestion within the zone – an assumption, however,
that is often not valid. If there is congestion, the price signal is distorted and leads to
inefficient market results. Curative measures (e.g., redispatch) relieve congestion and
the inefficiencies in the short term, while grid expansion shall relieve congestion in the
long term. However, if this grid expansion is delayed or restricted due to, e.g., public
acceptance issues, the zonal market design fails to provide efficient long-term signals for
scarce transmission capacities. A blueprint of this development is the case of Germany,
where generation capacity is scarce at some locations due to the market design. Thus,
it needs to be explicitly contracted forward by the TSO outside of the market to relieve
local congestion, because the market participants only see an uniform price as a distorted
price signal.
To quantify these effects, we expand the model developed in Chapter 2 to incorporate
different levels of grid restrictions. The inter-temporal equilibrium model for operation
and investment including generation, transmission and their inter-linkage represents the
4
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current European market design, i.e., zonal pricing with redispatch. We gradually re-
strict the allowed levels of grid expansion per decade in Europe in different scenarios to
get insights into the functionality of zonal markets with restricted grid expansion.
We find severe effects if grid expansion is highly restricted. With no grid expansion
at all, 2% - 3% of load has to be curtailed. Even with a significantly higher allowed
grid expansion, the load cannot be served completely at all times. Most of the load
curtailment takes place in Southern Germany. Curtailed load indicates missing capacity
at some places, i.e., additional capacity would have to be contracted to prevent load
curtailment (as done, e.g., in Germany through the so-called grid reserve). Restricted
grid expansion also jeopardizes the EU 2030 climate targets due to a partial curtailment
of renewables. For instance, in the scenario with no grid expansion the renewables share
is 1.5 percentage points lower compared to any other scenario. In case of restricted
overall capacity for grid expansion, Direct Current (DC) lines prove to be valuable due to
possible point-to-point interconnections without extensive grid reinforcement elsewhere.
The results show the shortfalls of zonal market design if grid expansion is restricted,
which seems to be very likely in reality. Measures to prevent load curtailment require
either administrative intervention by contracting generation capacity outside the market,
a redefinition of zones or an implementation of locational price elements.
Chapter 4 proceeds with the analysis of market designs with different information han-
dling, but – in contrast to the previous chapters –, studies an environment wherein the
market can only partially process the available information. In efficient markets with
full availability of information, one price per grid node is most efficient. However, em-
pirical work has shown that such nodal pricing lacks efficiency if forward transmission
markets come into play. Those markets tend to be not fully efficient due to, for instance,
transaction costs or missing liquidity. In such situations, zonal market designs, which
have inherently distorted uniform prices might be advantageous if the distortion coun-
terbalances the induced inefficiencies. The trade-off between the two market designs is
discussed in this chapter.
First, a simple two node model to analyze the general trade-off is developed. The
model consists of two nodes and one transmission line including a spot and an energy
forward market. The outcomes for nodal and zonal pricing are compared with respect
to overall welfare. Next, the model is expanded by incorporating more nodes, loop
flows and an additional transmission forward market. This stochastic equilibrium model
allows to consistently analyze nodal pricing and zonal pricing with redispatch. The
market inefficiency on the forward market is introduced via a bid-ask-spread and risk
aversion of the market participants. Due to the analytical complexity, the model is
solved numerically and the welfare impacts of a broad variation of relevant parameters
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are analyzed. These parameters include supply, demand and grid parameters as well as
the parameters for the bid-ask-spread and risk aversion.
The analysis of efficient spot and forward markets confirms the results of the theoretical
literature on nodal pricing: It is the efficient benchmark and any other design can only be
as good as nodal pricing but never outperform it. In the analysis, this result is due to the
inherent inefficiency induced by a producer-based redispatch in the zonal pricing regime.
If consumers are allowed for redispatch, the outcome of both regimes is the same. These
findings hold for the simple two node example as well as the more complex stochastic
equilibrium model. Considering an inefficient transmission forward market for nodal
pricing, i.e., by introducing a positive bid-ask-spread, there are parameter constellations
for which zonal pricing shows a higher overall welfare than nodal pricing. Zonal pricing
outperforms nodal pricing in situations where there is little congestion, and supply costs
or demand elasticity are relatively low. The inefficiency of zonal pricing then causes
only small welfare losses, because it comes at relatively low costs. Another result is that
the inefficiency of transmission forward markets and reduced trading volume of forward
transmission contracts also impacts the trading volumes of the energy forwards, despite
these being traded at a central hub. These spillovers increase the negative welfare effect
of inefficiencies in the transmission forward market. In conclusion, one should consider
the possible inefficiency of nodal pricing regimes on the transmission forward market as
a relevant criterion in the discussion on nodal and zonal pricing or the best definition of
zones.
Chapter 5 studies the regulation of the grid firm in case the regulator and the regulated
firm have different levels of information. Usually, the firm is better informed about the
adequacy and efficiency of her actions, which leads to asymmetric information between
the regulator and the firm. The provision of uninterrupted electricity transmission is a
good example for this: While the output, i.e., a stable grid quality with no blackouts
might be easily observable, the efficient level and combination of inputs, i.e., grid ex-
pansion or sophisticated grid operation, is difficult to be judged by the regulator. In
this chapter, a theoretically optimal contract framework for the general case of such
information asymmetries is developed and compared to approaches applied in practice,
especially for electricity transmission.
We develop a theoretical principal-agent-model to determine the optimal regulatory
strategy in terms of a Bayesian menu of contracts. The setting of the regulatory problem
is such that one input and the output is observable, while the realization of the other
input and its cost are not observable. The information asymmetries are represented by
discrete distributions regarding the overall input levels as well as the marginal rate of
substitution between the inputs. The analysis of this novel setting is compared to a
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simpler non-Bayesian approach often applied in practice. Thereby, we bridge the gap
between the academic discussion and regulatory practice.
We find that the information asymmetries and shadow costs of public funding impede the
implementation of the first best solution. The expected social welfare necessarily includes
some additional rent for the firm. This rent is highest for the firm with an efficient
production technology, for which input levels are first best in the optimal solution. For
all other possible types, the observable input factor is distorted upwards in the optimal
solution and hence, input mix and level deviate from the first best. For some parameter
settings, it is optimal to offer the same contract for several types of the firm (bunching).
A cost-based regulatory regime – as an example for a regulatory approach applied in
practice for electricity transmission – may be close to the obtained second best solution
if a high overall input level is very probable and shadow cost of public funding are large.
This might indeed characterize the current situation so that the practical regulatory
approach may be close to the theoretical optimum.
1.2 Discussion on methodology and results
Each chapter highlights a specific aspect of how information is handled in the market
design and regulation in electricity systems. For each aspect a suitable methodology was
chosen. Chapters 2 - 4 are based on a fundamental modeling approach, which is preceded
by abstract economic formulations. The economic formulations in these chapters were
chosen to show the general effects, which are then analyzed in more detail with a complex
fundamental model. The fundamental approach is necessary due to the fact that the
electricity grid plays a major role in the analyzed issues requiring a representation of the
technical properties (loop flows etc.). In Chapter 5, the issue of regulation is analyzed
with a highly stylized principal-agent-model, which was chosen due to the possibility to
reflect the relevant information as well as to focus on the contractual relationship of the
regulator and the regulated firm.
The approach of Chapters 2 and 3 rely on rather strong assumptions: market partic-
ipants are assumed to behave fully rational and have perfect foresight. Furthermore,
competitive, efficient markets and perfectly incentivized regulated firms are assumed.
While some assumptions (e.g, competitiveness or perfect foresight) might not jeopardize
the general conclusions, others (e.g., efficient markets) certainly do, as is shown in Chap-
ter 4. Furthermore, the applied methodology in the numerical solution approach impacts
the obtained results. The underlying problem is highly non-linear due to the technical
properties of the electricity grid. It is not shown analytically, that the applied methodol-
ogy converges to a unique, global equilibrium, although the numerical behavior suggests
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that this might be the case. In addition, the chosen convergence threshold is rather
high regarding the obtained efficiency deltas of the different market designs. Related to
this is the assumption of inelastic demand, necessary to achieve numerical tractability.
While today this might be rather justified, it is doubtful whether this assumption will
hold in the future. Certainly, all the general assumptions and the numerical solution
approach impact the results and may alter the magnitude of the efficiency deltas and
also the order obtained. Hence, the results and conclusions should be interpreted with
care considering these shortfalls.
Some of the methodological shortfalls of Chapters 2 and 3 were picked up in Chapter
4, namely the assumptions of perfect foresight, efficient markets and elastic demand.
Comparing the results of Chapters 2 and 3 to Chapter 4 shows that the assumptions
are indeed critical. Introducing inefficient markets in Chapter 4, and thus, altering a
central assumption of the previous chapters, makes the conclusion about the efficiency
of the market design more ambiguous. Still, also this chapter keeps the assumptions of
fully rational behavior, competitive markets as well as perfect regulation. Again, the
solution approach to achieve a global equilibrium is not proven analytically, although
the numerical results suggest again a robust equilibrium.
Chapter 5 focuses on the issue of information in a contract framework, where information
about technical properties is less relevant than the distribution and asymmetry of the
information. The applied theoretical principal-agent-model is able to capture several
dimensions of information asymmetry. However, this comes at the costs of a high degree
of abstraction. The Bayesian solution approach assumes common knowledge of the
distributions and the level of information asymmetry. Although this is a necessary
assumption for the model to solve it analytically, it is rather doubtful when it comes to an
implementation of such regulatory contracts. This chapter elaborates on the incentives
for the grid firm, which was assumed to be perfectly incentivized and behaving socially
optimal in the former chapters. Looking at the insights from Chapter 5, namely the
upwards distorted grid expansion from the efficient level, shows that the assumption of
a perfectly incentivized grid firm is highly discussable. The results on grid expansion
and operation would be most probably altered, if the impacts of the contract framework
are included.
The discussion of the chosen methodology and the impacts on the results and conclusions
shows that general conclusions require careful judgment about the relevance and effects
of the underlying assumptions. This has to be especially taken into account if the results
are transferred from the scientific sphere to a more practical application. Nevertheless,
this thesis provides a consistent analysis of different aspects and thus, contributes to
further advancements in the field of market design and regulation of electricity systems.
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Congestion management in power systems
– Long-term modeling framework and large-
scale application
2.1 Introduction
The liberalization of power systems entails an unbundling of generation and grid ser-
vices to reap efficiency gains stemming from a separate and different organization. While
there is competition between generating firms, transmission grids are considered a nat-
ural monopoly and are operated by regulated transmission system operators (TSOs).
However, strong inter-linkages remain between these two parts of the power system:
From a transmission perspective, TSOs are responsible for non-discriminatory access
of generating units to transmission services while maintaining a secure grid operation.
They are thus strongly influenced by the level and locality of generation and load. Fur-
thermore, due to Kirchhoff’s laws, operation and investment decisions of one TSO may
affect electricity flows in the area of another TSO. From a generation firms’ perspec-
tive, activities are impacted by restrictions on exchange capacities between markets or
operational interventions by the TSOs to sustain a reliable network.
An efficient regulatory design of those inter-linkages between generation and grid will
positively affect the overall efficiency of the system, for instance by providing locational
signals for efficient investments into new generation or transmission assets. To ensure
an efficient coordination of short (i.e., operational) and long-term (i.e., investment) ac-
tivities in the generation and grid sectors, congestion management has been identified
to be of utmost importance (e.g., Chao et al. (2000)). Different regulatory designs and
options are available to manage congestion, including the definition of price zones as well
as various operational and investment measures. Because it is able to deliver undistorted
and hence efficient price signals, nodal pricing is a powerful market design to bring along
efficiency. This was shown in the seminal work of Schweppe et al. (1988) and Hogan
(1992). Nevertheless, many markets deviate and pursue alternative approaches, e.g., due
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to historical or political reasons. For instance, most European countries deploy national
zonal market areas with uniform electricity prices. Implicitly, several challenges are
thus imposed upon the system: First, in zonal markets, intra-zonal network congestion
remains unconsidered by dispatch decisions. However, if a dispatch induces intra-zonal
congestion (which is typically often the case), it might be necessary to reconfigure the
dispatch, known as re-dispatch. Alternatively, the dispatch can be impacted by charging
grid costs directly to generators in order to avoid congestion in the market clearing pro-
cess (a so-called generator- or g-component, also known as grid connection charge). Such
charges reflect the locational scarcity of the grid, and are thus conceptually similar to
nodal prices, depending on the calculation method applied (see Brunekreeft et al. (2005)
for a comprehensive discussion). Second, cross-border capacity needs to be managed.
Whereas historically, cross-border capacities have often been auctioned explicitly, many
market areas are now turning to implicit market coupling based on different allocation
routines, such as net-transfer capacities (NTC) or flow-based algorithms (Brunekreeft
et al. (2005), Oggioni and Smeers (2012), Oggioni and Smeers (2013)).1
The literature has investigated various regulatory designs to manage congestion in power
systems from different perspectives. Static short-term efficiency of nodal pricing – as
shown by Schweppe et al. (1988) – was confirmed, e.g, by van der Weijde and Hobbs
(2011) who compare nodal pricing and NTC based market coupling in a stylized mod-
eling environment. Furthermore, several papers have quantified the increase in social
welfare through a switch from zonal to nodal pricing for static real world case studies
(see for example: Green (2007), Leuthold et al. (2008), Burstedde (2012), Neuhoff et al.
(2013)). Similarly, Daxhelet and Smeers (2007) show that generator and load compo-
nents reflecting their respective impact on congestion have a positive effect on static
social welfare (as well as its distribution), while Oggioni and Smeers (2012) investigate
different congestion management designs in a six node model and find that a single TSO
or multi-lateral arrangements for counter-trading between several TSOs may improve
efficiency. Oggioni et al. (2012) and Oggioni and Smeers (2013) show that in a zonal
pricing system, the configuration of zones as well as the choice of counter-trading designs
have a significant impact on efficiency.
A second line of literature deals with the dynamic long-term effects of congestion man-
agement, i.e., the investment perspective. On the one hand, issues of timing (e.g., due
to uncertainty or commitment) in settings consisting of multiple players (such as gen-
eration and transmission) have been addressed. Ho¨ﬄer and Wambach (2013) find that
long-term commitment of a benevolent TSO may lead to inefficient investment decisions
due to the locational decisions of investments in generation. In contrast, Sauma and
1Under implicit market coupling, cross-border capacities and prices are implicitly taken into account
during the joint clearing process of coupled markets.
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Oren (2006) and Rious et al. (2009) formulate the coordination problem between a gen-
eration and a transmission agent as a decomposed problem, and find that a prospective
coordinated planning approach as well as transparent price signals entail efficiency gains,
though some inefficiencies remain and the first best is not realized. On the other hand,
imperfect simultaneous coordination (e.g., due to strategic behavior or hidden informa-
tion) has been investigated by Huppmann and Egerer (2014) for the case of multiple
TSOs being active in an interconnected system. They find that a frictionless coordi-
nated approach outperforms the system outcome with strategic TSOs maximizing social
welfare within their own jurisdiction.
With this paper, we contribute to the above literature with a generalized and flexible
economic modeling framework for analyzing the short as well as long-term effects of
different congestion management designs in a decomposed inter-temporal equilibrium
model including generation, transmission, as well as their inter-linkages. Specifically,
with our framework we are able to represent, analyze and compare different TSO or-
ganizations, market areas (i.e., nodal or zonal pricing), grid expansion, redispatch or
g-components, as well as calculation methods for cross-border capacity allocation (i.e.,
NTC and flow-based). A major advantage of our analytical and numerical implemen-
tation is its flexibility to represent different congestion management designs in one con-
sistent framework. We are hence able to identify and isolate frictions and sources of
inefficiencies by comparing these different regulatory designs. Moreover, we are able
to benchmark the different designs against a frictionless welfare-optimal result, i.e., the
”first best”. In order to exclusively focus on the frictions and inefficiencies induced by the
congestion management designs, we do not address issues of timing, such as uncertainty
or sequential moving. Instead, we assume perfect competition, perfect information, no
transaction costs, utility-maximizing agents, continuous functions, inelastic demand and
an environment where generation and grid problems are solved simultaneously. As an
additional contribution, we calibrate and numerically solve our model for a large-scale
problem. Specifically, we investigate a detailed representation of the Central Western
European (CWE) region.2 To tackle the complex nature of the optimization problem, we
develop a numerical solution algorithm based on decomposition, while a detailed analy-
sis of the convergence behavior suggests that the results obtained are robust. Thereby,
we offer a sound indication on how different congestion management designs perform in
practice, and provide empirical evidence that nodal pricing is the efficient benchmark
while alternative designs imply inefficiencies of up to 4.6% until 2030.
The paper proceeds as follows: In Section 2, we analytically develop our modeling frame-
work. In Section 3, a numerical solution method to solve this framework is proposed.
2The CWE region is one of seven regional initiatives to bring forward European market integration.
The countries within this area are Belgium, France, Germany, Luxemburg and the Netherlands.
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In Section 4, we apply the methodology to a detailed representation of the CWE region
in scenarios up to the year 2030. Section 5 concludes and provides an outlook on future
research.
2.2 Economic framework
In order to develop a consistent analytical modeling framework for different congestion
management designs, we start with the well-known model for an integrated optimization
problem for planning and operating a power system.3 By design, this model does not
contain any frictions and inefficiencies. Hence, the results obtained are necessarily first
best and may serve as the efficient benchmark for alternative settings. Moreover, it
corresponds to the concept of nodal pricing as introduced by Schweppe et al. (1988).4
To depict various congestion management designs, we make use of the possibility to
separate an integrated optimization problem into multiple levels (or, in other words,
subproblems). Even though the model structure is then different, it can be shown that
both formulations of the problem yield the same results. However, in the economic
interpretation we can take advantage of the separated model structure representing un-
bundled generation and transmission sectors. On the generation stage, competitive firms
decide about investments in and dispatch of power plants, whereas the transmission stage
consists of one or multiple TSOs that efficiently expand and operate transmission grid
capacities.5 Lastly, with generation and transmission separated, we are able to introduce
six practically relevant congestion management designs through the manipulation of the
exchange of information between and among the two levels, and show how they deviate
from the first best.
Even though the modeling framework would allow to study an extensive range of conges-
tion management designs, we restrict our attention to four settings (and two additional
variations) that are both, relevant in practical applications and sufficiently different
from each other. Specifically, our settings vary in the definition of market areas (nodal
or coupled zonal markets), the regulation and organization of TSOs (one single TSO for
all zones or several zonal TSOs), the way of managing congestion besides grid expan-
sion (redispatch and g-component) and different alternatives for cross-border capacity
allocation (NTC vs. flow-based market coupling). We consider Net Transfer Capacity
(NTC) and flow-based market coupling as cross-border capacity allocation algorithms
3Such a model is typically applied to represent the optimization problem of a social planner or an
integrated firm optimizing the entire electricity system, including generation and transmission.
4One main difference in our model is the assumption of an inelastic demand which was necessary to
formulate and solve the model as a linear program. We will elaborate on this issue in Section 2.2.1.
5Efficient in this context means that the TSO(s) are perfectly regulated to expand and operate the
grid at minimal costs.
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because they have been used extensively in the European context (see, e.g., Glachant
(2010)). NTCs are a rather simplified version of cross-border trade restrictions, widely
neglecting the physical properties of the grid as well as its time-varying characteristics.
Under flow-based market coupling, cross-border transmission capacities are calculated
taking into account the impact of (cross-border) line flows on every line in the system
(e.g., Oggioni and Smeers (2013)), hence providing a much better consideration of the
physical grid properties which is crucially important in case of meshed networks. As
a consequence, more capacity can generally be offered for trading between markets,
and a better usage of existing infrastructures is achieved. The analyzed settings are
summarized in the following Table 2.1.
Market area and coupling TSO scope TSO measures
I Nodal One TSO Grid expansion
II - NTC Zonal, NTC-based coupling One TSO Grid expansion, zonal redispatch
II - FB Zonal, Flow-based coupling One TSO Grid expansion, zonal redispatch
III - NTC Zonal, NTC-based coupling Zonal TSOs Grid expansion, zonal redispatch
III - FB Zonal, Flow-based coupling Zonal TSOs Grid expansion, zonal redispatch
IV Zonal Zonal TSOs Grid expansion, zonal g-component
Table 2.1: Analyzed congestion management designs
Noticeably, despite the separated generation and transmission levels, agents are in all
settings assumed to act rationally and simultaneously while taking into account the
activities of the other stage.6 Furthermore, we assume perfect competition on the gen-
eration stage and perfect regulation of the TSOs in the sense that TSO activities are
aligned with social objectives. TSOs as well as generators are price taking, with an
independent institution (e.g., the power exchange) being responsible for coordinating
the activities of the different participating agents and for market clearing.7 Impor-
tantly, while in the first best design all information is available to all agents, alternative
congestion management designs may induce an adverse (e.g., aggregated) availability
of information. The solution of the problem is an intertemporal equilibrium which is
unique under the assumption of convex functions. We will thoroughly discuss issues of
convexity in the context of the numerical implementation in Section 2.3. Noticeably,
with the above assumptions, our general modeling approach can be thought of as a way
to compare today’s and future performances of different congestion management designs
based on today’s state of the system, today’s information horizon, as well as rational
expectations about future developments and resulting investment decisions.8
6I.e., sequential moving and issues of timing are not considered.
7By assuming perfect competition and an inelastic demand, we are able to treat the general problem
as a cost minimization problem. This assumption is commonly applied for formulation of electricity
markets in the literature. An alternative formulation with a welfare maximization approach would be
possible, but wouldn’t impact the general conclusions.
8In our numerical application, this approach is supplemented with discounted future cash flows. See
Section 2.4 for further details.
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For the sake of readability (and in contrast to the large-scale application presented
in Section 2.4), we make some simplifications in the theoretical framework: dispatch
decisions are realized in several points of time, but invest decisions are undertaken only
once. Furthermore, we neglect different types of generation technologies that may be
available at a node. This simplification does not change any of the conclusions drawn
from the theoretical formulation.9
For developing the economic modeling framework in the following subsections, we will
deploy parameters, variables and sets as depicted in Table 2.2 in the Appendix.
2.2.1 Setting I – First Best: Nodal pricing with one TSO
By design, nodal pricing avoids any inefficiency by covering and exchanging all infor-
mation present within the problem – leading to a welfare optimal electricity system. It
hence represents the first best setting in our analysis of different congestion management
designs. With the assumption of a social planner or perfect competition and regulation,
nodal prices can be derived from locational marginal costs (of generation and capacity)
in a market clearing that implicitly considers the physical properties of the electricity
network (specifically, loop flows). Abstracting from economies of scale and lumpiness of
investment, it can be shown that an efficient and unique equilibrium exists under nodal
prices (Caramanis (1982), Joskow and Tirole (2005), Rious et al. (2009)). In line with
these findings, we assume constant marginal grid costs as well as continuous generation
and transmission expansion.10 Another assumption in our formulation is an inelastic
(yet time-varying) demand. The reason for assuming an inelastic demand is mainly
triggered by the excessive computational burden that would be induced by an elastic
demand in the numerical solution approach (an inelastic demand allows us to formulate
and solve the model as a linear instead of a non-linear program). As a drawback, the
assumption of an inelastic demand differs from the formulation in Schweppe et al. (1988)
and leads to the artifact that demand can never set the price. However, scarcity rents
to cover capacity costs are still possible under perfect information and competition (in-
cluding entry and exit of generators). For instance, consider the bid of a peak load plant
during a single peak load hour when it is dispatched and pivotal. The bid will consist
of the variable costs plus the long-term marginal costs of the capacity. If the bid was
lower, the peak load plant would leave the market due to an overall loss. If the bid was
9To include multiple instances in time for investments, the formulation could easily be adapted by
adding an index to all parameters, variables and equations related to installed capacities (generation
and transmission). In the same vein, an additional index could be inserted to account for different types
of generation technologies.
10This assumption is certainly more critical for transmission investments which require a certain
magnitude to be realized. Generation investment might also be lumpy, but smaller plant sizes are
possible.
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higher, another peak load plant would enter the market due to the possibility of making
a profit. This forces the peak load plant to bid its true variable plus marginal capacity
costs. Once accepted, this bid can be interpreted as the resulting market prices under
capacity scarcity. Lastly, note that off-peak hours can also have capacity components in
prices if there is a diversified mix of generation technologies, characterized by different
cost structures.
The following optimization problem P1 is similar to the formulation of an integrated
problem for operating generation and transmission as in Schweppe et al. (1988), except
for the major change of demand being inelastic. In this formulation, a social planner
or an integrated firm minimizes total system costs of the operation and investment of
generation and transmission.
P1 Integrated Problem
min
Gi,Gi,t,Ti,j,t,P i,j
X =
∑
i
δiGi +
∑
i,t
γi,tGi,t +
∑
i,j
µi,jP i,j (2.1a)
s.t. Gi,t −
∑
j
Ti,j,t = di,t ∀i, t |λi,t (2.1b)
Gi,t ≤ Gi ∀i, t (2.1c)
|Ti,j,t| = |Pi,j,t(P k,l, Gk,t, dk,t)| ≤ P i,j ∀i, j, t |κi,j,t (2.1d)
Ti,j,t = −Tj,i,t ∀i, j, t (2.1e)
Indices i, j, k, l represent nodes in the system. Generation Gi,t, generation capacity
Gi, trade Ti,j,t and transmission capacity P i,j are optimization variables. Additional
capacities can be installed at the costs of δi for generation and µi,j for transmission.
Nodal prices are derived from the dual variables λi,t of the equilibrium constraint which
states that the demand level di,t at node i can be either satisfied by generation at
the same node or trade between nodes (Equation (2.1b)). Equations (2.1c) and (2.1d)
mirror that generation is restricted by installed generation capacities, and physical flows
by installed transmission capacities. Furthermore, trades from node i to node j are
necessarily equal to negative trades from node j to node i (Equation (2.1e)). As the
market clearing fully accounts for the transmission network in the nodal pricing regime,
trade between adjacent nodes is equal to physical flows on the respective line, i.e.,
Ti,j,t = Pi,j,t (Equation (2.1d)).
Load flows on transmission lines are based on Kirchhoff’s law, which we represent based
on a linearized load flow approach.11 Thereby, flows are impacted by generation (Gk,t)
11We will use the PTDF approach shown in the Appendix in our numerical implementation in Section
2.3, as this enables a linearization of the generally non-linear load flow problem, given a fixed transmission
network (cf. Hagspiel et al. (2014)).
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and demand (dk,t), i.e., power balances of all nodes in the system, as well as by the
physical properties of the transmission system, represented by installed transmission
capacities P k,l. Thus, there is a functional dependency of flows and trades on generation,
demand, and line capacities throughout the system, i.e., Ti,j,t = Ti,j,t(P k,l, Gk,t, dk,t).
As has been shown, e.g., by Conejo et al. (2006), an integrated optimization problem can
be decomposed into subproblems which are solved simultaneously, while still represent-
ing the same overall situation and corresponding optimal solution. In our application,
we take advantage of this possibility to represent separated generation and transmission
levels in problem P1’. The generation stage P1’a states the market clearing of supply
and demand while respecting generation capacity constraints. As in P1, the same nodal
prices are obtained by the dual variable λi,t of the equilibrium constraint (2.2b). Instead
of including the explicit grid expansion costs in the cost minimization, the objective func-
tion of the generation stage now contains transmission costs which assign transmission
prices κi,j,t to trade flows between two nodes i and j. These prices are derived from the
dual variable of the equilibrium constraint on the transmission stage (Equation (2.2g)).
We assume that the TSO is perfectly regulated to minimize costs of grid extensions
accounting for the physical feasibility of the market clearing as determined on the gen-
eration stage while considering all grid flows and related costs (problem P1’b). As trade
is a function of P , which in turn is the decision variable in the transmission problem,
the market clearing conditions need to reoccur in the transmission problem.
P1’a Generation
min
Gi,Gi,t,Ti,j,t
X =
∑
i
δiGi +
∑
i,t
γi,tGi,t +
∑
i,j,t
κi,j,tTi,j,t (2.2a)
s.t. Gi,t −
∑
j
Ti,j,t = di,t ∀i, t |λi,t (2.2b)
Gi,t ≤ Gi ∀i, t (2.2c)
Ti,j,t = −Tj,i,t ∀i, j, t (2.2d)
P1’b Transmission
min
P i,j
Y =
∑
i,j
µi,jP i,j (2.2e)
s.t. Gi,t −
∑
j
Ti,j,t = di,t ∀i, t (2.2f)
|Ti,j,t| = |Pi,j,t(P k,l, Gk,t, dk,t)| ≤ P i,j ∀i, j, t |κi,j,t (2.2g)
Ti,j,t = −Tj,i,t ∀i, j, t (2.2h)
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As can be seen, all terms of P1 reappear in P1’, however, allocated to two separated
levels. Mathematically, the equivalence of P1 and P1’ is shown in the Appendix, where
the first order conditions of both formulations are compared.
2.2.2 Setting II: coupled zonal markets with one TSO and zonal redis-
patch
In zonal markets, a number of nodes are aggregated to a market with a uniform price.
In contrast to nodal pricing, coupled zonal markets only consider aggregated cross-
border capacities between market zones during market clearing (instead of all individual
grid elements). Thus, the obtained prices for generation do not reflect the true total
costs of the entire grid infrastructure. This is due to the fact that zonal prices only
reflect those cross-border capacities that limit activities between zonal markets. Cross-
border capacities can be allocated in different ways. We consider Net Transfer Capacity
(NTC) and the more sophisticated flow-based market coupling as cross-border capacity
allocation algorithms (see Oggioni and Smeers (2013)). Under the latter regime, more
capacity can generally be offered for trading between markets, and a better usage of
existing infrastructures is achieved.
Because intra-zonal congestion is neglected in the zonal market-clearing, it needs to be
resolved in a subsequent step by the TSO. Besides the expansion of grid capacities, in
Setting II we provide the TSO with the opportunity of zonal redispatch. The TSO
may instruct generators located behind the bottleneck to increase production (positive
redispatch), and another generator before the bottleneck to reduce production (negative
redispatch).12 We assume here a perfectly discriminating redispatch: the TSO pays
generators that have to increase their production their variable costs, and in turn receives
the avoided variable costs of generators that reduce their supply. As the generator with
positive redispatch was not part of the original dispatch, it necessarily has higher variable
costs than the generator that reduces supply. Thus, the TSO has to bear additional
costs that are caused by the redispatch which amount to the difference between the
variable costs of the redispatched entities. Assuming further that the TSO has perfect
information about the variable costs of the generating firms, redispatch measures of
the TSO have no impact on investment decisions of generating firms as the originally
dispatched generation capacity is still able to cover capital costs from the spot market
result. Hence, additional costs for the economy are induced by inefficient investment
decisions of those generators that are not aligned with the overall system optimum due
to missing locational price signals.
12Redispatch is always feasible due to the fact that the TSO can foresee congestion and hence, coun-
teract by expanding line capacities.
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In the formulation of problem P2a zonal pricing is represented by the zonal market
indices n,m, each containing one or several nodes i. Market clearing, depicted by the
equilibrium Equation (2.3f), now takes place on zonal instead of nodal markets. The
corresponding dual variable λm,t represents zonal prices, which do not include any grid
costs except for cross-border capacities. This is indicated by the term
∑
m,n,t κm,n,tTm,n,t
instead of the nodal formulation (with κi,j,t) above. Transmission prices are determined
on the transmission stage (Equation (2.3j)). However, contrary to nodal pricing, these
prices are calculated based on some regulatory rule (e.g., NTC or FB) and are thus
inherently incomplete since they do not represent real grid scarcities.13 In addition to
grid expansion, the TSO may relieve intra-zonal congestion and optimize the situation
by means of redispatch measures Ri,t at costs of γi,tRi,t.
P2a Generation
min
Gi,Gi,t,Tm,n,t
X =
∑
i
δiGi +
∑
i,t
γi,tGi,t +
∑
m,n,t
κm,n,tTm,n,t (2.3a)
s.t.
∑
i∈Im
Gi,t −
∑
n
Tm,n,t =
∑
i∈Im
di,t ∀m, t |λm,t (2.3b)
Gi,t ≤ Gi ∀i, t (2.3c)
Tm,n,t = −Tn,m,t ∀m,n, t (2.3d)
P2b Transmission
min
P i,j ,Ri,t
Y =
∑
i,j
µi,jP i,j +
∑
i,t
γi,tRi,t (2.3e)
s.t.
∑
i∈Im
Gi,t −
∑
n
Tm,n,t =
∑
i∈Im
di,t ∀m, t (2.3f)
|Ti,j,t| = |Pi,j,t(P k,l, Gk,t, Rk,t, dk,t)| ≤ P i,j ∀i, j, t |κi,j,t (2.3g)∑
i∈Im
Ri,t = 0 ∀m, t (2.3h)
0 ≤ Gi,t +Ri,t ≤ Gi ∀i, t (2.3i)
κm,n,t = g(κi,j,t) (2.3j)
Tm,n,t = −Tn,m,t ∀m,n, t (2.3k)
13Note that the duality of the problem would also allow for an alternative formulation of the cross-
border transmission constraint by means of quantity constraints instead of prices. Hence, the cost of
transmission in the objective function of the generation stage (
∑
m,n,t κm,n,tTm,n,t) would disappear and
an additional constraint for trading would be implemented (|Tm,n,t| ≤ Cm,n,∀m,n, t). The restriction
of trading volumes Cm,n,t would be calculated on the transmission stage P2b via a constraint Cm,n =
h(P i,j) instead of the prices κm,n,t. These prices would then be the dual variable of the volume constraint
on the generation stage, and necessarily coincide with κm,n,t.
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The following two examples illustrate the fundamental differences between Setting I and
II.
Example for 2 nodes and 2 markets: If the electricity system consists of 2 nodes
and 2 markets (Figure 2.1, left hand side), Setting I and II are identical: There is only
one element i ∈ Im, such that Equation 2.3h fixes variable Ri to zero. Equation 2.3i
is then no longer relevant, and the cost term of redispatch in the objective function
(
∑
i,t γi,tRi,t) becomes zero. The only difference remaining between 1’b P2b is then
Equation 2.3j. However, due to I = M , it follows that κm,n,t = κi,j,t, which, inserted on
the generation level, yields equivalence of problems P1’ and problem P2 for the chosen
example.
Example for 3 nodes and 2 markets: Figure 2.1, right hand side, shows an electricity
system consisting of two markets m and n, where m includes one node (1) and n two
nodes (2, 3) at a point in time t. Function g for calculating the transmission price κm,n,t
(Equation (2.3j)) between the markets has to be defined, e.g., by averaging the single
line prices κm,n,t = (κ1,2,t + κ1,3,t)/2. Still, the TSO cannot supply the locational fully
differentiated prices κ1,2,t, κ1,3,t and κ2,3,t to the market, and hence, efficient allocation
of investments is (partly) achieved between the markets, but not within the markets.
Redispatch does not fully solve this problem, because it is revenue-neutral and does not
affect the investment decision.
1 2
𝜅12 1 2
𝜅𝑚𝑛
3
𝜅13 𝜅23
market𝑚 market 𝑛
𝜅12
Figure 2.1: Two simple examples. Left: 2 nodes, 2 markets. Right: 3 nodes, 2
markets
Overall, Settings I and II differ in the way grid costs are reflected on the generation
stage. Specifically, Setting II lacks locational differentiated prices, thus impeding ef-
ficient price signals κi,j,t for the generation stage. Of course, the level of inefficiency
depends substantially on the regulatory rule determining the calculation of prices based
on a specification of function g(κi,j,t). In general, it is clear that the closer the specifica-
tion of g reflects real-time conditions and the more it enables the full usage of existing
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grid infrastructures, the more efficiently the general problem will be solved. While we
limit our analysis in this section to this general finding, we will discuss two possible
specifications often implemented in practice (NTC and flow-based market coupling) in
the empirical example in Section 2.4. Given the inefficiency induced by the specification
of function g, the question remains whether and how redispatch measures may help to
relieve the problem. We find that the resulting inefficiency cannot be fully resolved
by redispatch because the latter remains a zonal measure (Equation (2.3h)). Hence,
the TSO cannot induce an efficient usage of generation and transmission across zonal
borders. Furthermore, investments into generation capacities are not influenced by re-
dispatch and only zonal prices as well as their costs are considered.14 Hence, the setting
lacks locational signals for efficient generation investments within zonal markets.
2.2.3 Setting III: coupled zonal markets with zonal TSOs and zonal
redispatch
In this setting, we consider zonal markets with zonal TSOs being responsible for grid
expansion as well as a zonal redispatch. Thus, the problem on the generation stage
remains exactly the same as in the previous setting (i.e., P3a = P2a). However, the
transmission problem changes, such that now multiple zonal TSOs are considered. Each
TSO solves its own optimization problem according to the national regulatory regime
(in our case corresponding to a cost-minimization within the zones). Formally, problem
P3b, now consists of multiple separate optimization problems for each zonal TSO, with
the objective to minimize costs from zonal grid as well as from zonal redispatch mea-
sures. However, cross-border line capacities are also taken into account. As these are
by definition located within the jurisdiction of two adjacent market areas, the two cor-
responding TSOs have to negotiate about the extension of these cross-border capacities.
In fact, cross-border capacities built by two different TSOs may be seen as a Leontief
production function, due to the fact that the line capacities built on each side are perfect
complements. Corresponding costs from inter-zonal grid extensions are assumed to be
shared among the TSOs. Due to the fact that situations may arise where an agreement
on specific cross-border lines between neighboring TSOs cannot be reached (which would
imply that an equilibrium solution cannot be found), we assume the implementation of
a regulatory rule that ensures the acceptance of a unique price for each cross-border line
by both of the neighboring TSOs. For instance, the regulatory rule may be specified
such that both TSOs are obliged to accept the higher price offer, or, equivalently, the
lower of the two capacities offered for the specific cross-border line.
14For obtaining a unique equilibrium we assume that costs differ over all nodes, such that decisions
for generation and investments are unambiguously ordered.
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As a consequence, grid capacities, especially cross-border capacities, are extended inef-
ficiently as they do not result from an optimization of the entire grid infrastructure. In
addition – just as in the previous setting – inefficient investment incentives for genera-
tion and grid capacities are caused by the lack of locational differentiated prices. Hence,
overall, system outcomes in Setting III must be inferior or at most equal to those of
Setting II.15
The mathematical program as well as further technical details of Setting III can be
found in the Appendix.
2.2.4 Setting IV: coupled zonal markets with zonal TSOs and
g-component
In this last setting, we again consider coupled zonal markets with zonal TSOs. However,
instead of having the possibility to perform a zonal redispatch (as in Setting III ), zonal
TSOs may now determine local, time-varying prices for generators, i.e., a g-component,
at each node belonging to its zone to cope with intra-zonal congestion. A g-component
charges grid costs directly to generators in order to avoid congestion in the market
clearing process reflecting the impact of generators on the grid at each node and each
instant of time. Thus, grid costs are being transferred to the generating firms which
consider them in their investment and dispatch decision. In other words, TSOs are
able to provide locationally differentiated prices (and hence, generation and investment
incentives) for generators within their zone. Noticeably, we do not consider an interna-
tional g-component here as this would yield the same results as a nodal pricing regime
due to generators considering the full set of information concerning grid costs. How-
ever, two frictions that may cause an inefficient outcome of this setting remain. When
determining nodal g-components, zonal TSOs only consider grid infrastructures within
their zone, and not within the entire system. Furthermore, as in Setting III, the desired
expansion of cross-border lines, which is here assumed to be solved by some regulatory
rule ensuring successful negotiation, may deviate between/across neighboring TSOs.
The mathematical program as well as further technical details of Setting IV can be
found in the Appendix.
15The only mathematical difference of problem P3b compared to P2b is that the transmission level
is partitioned into several optimization problems that are solved separately from each other. Hence,
compared to problem P2b where the transmission level is solved comprehensively, this represents a more
restrictive problem that must be inferior (or at most equal) to the one of P3b.
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2.3 Numerical solution approach
Our approach to numerically solve the problem depicted in the previous section builds
on the concept of decomposition. In fact, it follows the approach already applied in
the context of Setting I (Section 2.2.1), where we decomposed the integrated problem
into two separate levels that are solved simultaneously and showed that they can – in
economic terms – be interpreted as generation and transmission levels. Algorithmically,
according to Benders (1962), decomposition techniques can be applied to optimization
problems with a decomposable structure that can be advantageously exploited. The idea
of decomposition generally consists of splitting the optimization problem into a master
and one or several subproblems that are solved iteratively. For the problem we are deal-
ing with, namely the simultaneous optimization of generation and grid infrastructures
under different congestion management designs and a varying number of TSOs, decom-
posing the overall problem entails two major advantages: First, the decomposition allows
to easily implement variations of the generation and transmission levels including the
underlying congestion management design. Hence, the model can be flexibly adjusted
to represent the various settings described in the previous section. Second, the itera-
tive nature of the solution process resulting from the decomposition allows to readily
update PTDF matrices every time changes in the grid infrastructure have been made,
according to Equation (2.15) and the PTDF calculation procedure presented in the Ap-
pendix. This iterative update of the grid properties, as applied in Hagspiel et al. (2014)
and Ozdemir et al. (2015), successively linearizes the non-linear optimization problem
to ensure a consistent representation of generally non-linear grid properties, and allows
for solving a corresponding linear problem.16 In turn, linear problems can be solved
effectively for global optima using standard techniques, such as the Simplex algorithm
(e.g., Murty (1983)).
Even though the PTDF update ties in nicely with the iterative solution of the decom-
posed problem, it also imposes a particular challenge stemming from the non-linearity in
the PTDF calculation (see Appendix). Specifically, despite the successive linearization
and iterative solution, the non-linearity of the transmission expansion problem remains.
Hence, neither the existence and uniqueness of a global optimum of the problem, nor the
convergence of the solution algorithm can generally be guaranteed (e.g., Bazaraa et al.
(2006)). This would change, however, if the problem was convex. Then, there would
be a unique equilibrium, corresponding to a global optimum. Furthermore, deploying
a Benders-type decomposition, the algorithm would preserve convexity and guarantee
that the iterative solution converges towards this global optimum (Benders (1962) and,
16Accordingly, in our model PTDF is depicted as a parameter that is updated in each iteration instead
of a variable.
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e.g., Conejo et al. (2006) for a general overview). Unfortunately, to the best of our
knowledge, a formal proof of the (non-)convexity of the transmission expansion problem
is still missing. Meanwhile, it would also be beyond the scope of this paper to approach
this challenging problem. As an alternative, we build on numerical experience that has
been gained by two papers that are closely related to ours in terms of the algorithmic
approach: The analysis in Hagspiel et al. (2014) is closest to our application as they
deploy the same successive PTDF update to co-optimize generation and transmission
assets (including operation and investment). They show that the algorithm converges
in a large number of configurations, including small analytically tractable test systems
as well as large-scale applications. Furthermore, they do not detect issues of multi-
ple equilibria in their analysis. In a very similar vein, Ozdemir et al. (2015) develop
a methodology based on successive linear programming and Gauss-Seidel iteration to
jointly optimize transmission and generation capacities. They report that even though
they cannot guarantee convergence or global optimality either, their approach shows
good performance. In the course of preparing the results presented in this paper, we
were able to confirm the above findings in several model runs where we varied starting
values over a broad range and did not find evidence neither against convergence nor
against uniqueness of our optimum. Hence, even though not guaranteed, empirical evi-
dence indicates that we are facing a numerical problem that we are able to reliably solve
with our algorithm while converging towards an optimal solution. In our application,
the obtained solution represents an intertemporal equilibrium without uncertainty. In-
terestingly, in economic terms, the iterative algorithm to solve the decomposed problem
can be readily interpreted as a price adjustment by a Walrasian auctioneer, also know
as tatonnement procedure (e.g., Boyd et al. (2008)).
With some minor modifications, we can directly follow the (economically intuitive) for-
malization developed in the previous section and implement separate optimization prob-
lems representing the different tasks of generation and grid as well as the various settings
(I-IV ). We follow the Benders decomposition approach described in Conejo et al. (2006),
while considering the transmission capacities as complicating variables. We define the
generation stage as the master problem, whereas the subproblem covers the transmis-
sion stage.17 The principle idea of the solution algorithm is to solve the simultaneous
generation and transmission stage problem iteratively, i.e., in a loop that runs as long as
some convergence criterion is reached. In this process, optimized variables and marginal
values are exchanged between the separated generation and grid levels reflecting the con-
figuration of congestion management and TSO organization. For the settings described
in the previous section, prices, which are iterated and thus adjusted, differ with respect
17Noticeably, the model could be inverted such that the master problem represents the grid sector
which would, however, not change any of the results obtained.
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to the information they contain and hence determine to which degree efficiency can be
reached. Compared to nodal pricing (Setting I ), the other settings provide prices or
products that describe the underlying problem only incompletely – and hence, entail an
inefficient outcome.
The numerical algorithm to solve the nodal pricing model is sketched below. Parameters
that save levels of optimal variables for usage in the respective other stage are indicated
by (·). It should be noticed that for the sake of comprehensibility, we still represent a
simplified version of a more complete power system model that would need to account
for multiple instances in time for investments, multiple generation technologies, etc.
However, the extension is straightforward and does not change the principle approach
depicted here.
Information passed from the transmission to the generation stage is captured by α,
for which a benders cut (lower bound constraint) is added in each iteration u up to
the current iteration v (Equation (2.4e)). This benders cut consists of total grid costs
Y (u) as well as the marginal costs each unit of trade Ti,j,t is causing in the grid per
node, denoted by κ
(u)
i,j,t. Both pieces of information are provided in the highest possible
temporal and spatial resolution. As these components occur in the objective function
of the generation stage (via α), the optimization will try to avoid the additional costs
it is causing on the transmission stage, e.g., by moving power plant investments to
alternative locations. The variable α is needed to correctly account for the impact of
the transmission on the generation stage. On the transmission stage, the TSO is coping
with the exchange (i.e., trade) of power stemming from the dispatch situation delivered
by the master problem, thereby determining the marginal costs the trade is causing
on the transmission stage, i.e., κ. Power flows are calculated by linearized load-flow
equations represented by PTDF matrices mapping. The TSO then expands the grid
such that it supports the emerging line flows at minimal costs.
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v = 1; convergence=false
While(convergence=false) {
Master problem: generation
min
Gi,Gi,t,Ti,j,t,α
X =
∑
i
δiGi +
∑
i,t
γi,tGi,t + α (2.4a)
s.t. Gi,t −
∑
j
Ti,j,t = di,t ∀i, t (2.4b)
Gi,t ≤ Gi ∀i, t (2.4c)
Ti,j,t = −Tj,i,t ∀i, j, t (2.4d)
Y (u) +
∑
i,j
κ
(u)
i,j,t · (Ti,j,t − T (u)i,j,t) ≤ α ∀u = 1, ..., v − 1|v > 1 (2.4e)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
G
(v)
i,t = Optimal value of Gi,t ∀i, t (2.4f)
Sub-problem: transmission
min
P i,j ,Ti,j,t
Y =
∑
i,j
µi,jP i,j (2.4g)
s.t. |Pi,j,t| =
∣∣∣∣∣∑
k
PTDF
(v)
k,i,j · (G(v)k,t − dk,t)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ P i,j ∀i, j, t |κ(v)i,j,t (2.4h)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Y (v) = Optimal value of Y (2.4i)
PTDF (v) = PTDF matrix calculated based on P i,j (2.4j)
if(convergence criterion < threshold; convergence=true)
v = v + 1
};
As regards the representation of settings II-IV, only very few modifications are needed
compared to the nodal pricing regime (Setting I ). The numerical algorithmic implemen-
tation of the various settings and modifications directly follows the procedure discussed
in Section 2.2 and is thus not discussed again in detail here.18
18Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness and reproducibility, we have included one more complete
model formulation illustrating the main differences of the other settings in the Appendix.
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2.4 Large-scale application
In this section, we apply the previously developed methodology to a detailed representa-
tion of the power sector in the Central Western European (CWE) region up to the year
2030. The application demonstrates the suitability of the modeling framework for large-
scale problems and allows to assess and quantify the welfare losses in the considered
region caused by different congestion management designs.
Given its historical, current and foreseen future development, the CWE region appears
to be a particularly timely and relevant case study for different congestion management
designs. In order to increase the market integration of European electricity markets to-
wards an internal energy market, the European Union (EU) has declared the coupling of
European electricity markets, which are organized in uniform price zones, an important
stepping stone (see, e.g., Glachant (2010)). As for the cross-border capacity allocation,
after a phase of NTC (Net Transfer Capacities) based market coupling, the CWE region
is currently implementing a flow-based market coupling which is expected to increase
the efficiency of the utilization of transmission capacities as well as overall social welfare
(Capacity Allocating Service Company (2014)). Even though nodal pricing regimes have
often been discussed for the European power sector (see, e.g., Ehrenmann and Smeers
(2005) or Oggioni and Smeers (2012)), it can be expected that uniform price zones that
correspond to national borders will remain. In fact, zonal markets coupled via a flow-
based algorithm have been declared the target model for the European power sector
(ACER (2014)).
In each zonal market, the respective zonal (i.e., national) TSO is responsible for the
transmission network. Thereby, TSOs are organized and regulated on a national level,
such that they can be assumed to care mainly about grid operation and expansion
planning within their own jurisdiction. Although there are an umbrella organization
(ENTSO-E) and coordinated actions, such as the (non-binding) European Ten-Year-
Network-Development-Plan (TYNDP), the incentives of the national regulatory regime
to intensify cross-border action might fall short of effectiveness. At the same time,
Europe is heavily engaged in the large-scale deployment of renewable energies, hence
causing fundamental changes in the supply structure. Generation is now often built with
respect to the availability of primary renewable resources, i.e., wind and solar irradiation,
and not necessarily close to load. This implies that the current grid infrastructure is
partly no longer suitable and needs to be substantially redesigned, rendering an efficient
congestion management even more important than before.
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2.4.1 Model configuration and assumptions
The applied model for the generation stage belongs to the class of partial equilibrium
models that aim at determining the cost-optimal electricity supply to customers by
means of dispatch and investments decisions based on a large number of technologi-
cal options for generation. As power systems are typically large and complex, these
models are commonly set up as a linear optimization problem which can efficiently
be solved. Our model is an extended version of the linear long-term investment and
dispatch model for conventional, renewable, storage and transmission technologies as
presented in Richter (2011) and applied in, e.g., Ja¨gemann et al. (2013) or Hagspiel
et al. (2014). In contrast to previous versions, the CWE region, i.e., Belgium, France,
Germany, Luxembourg and Netherlands, is considered with a high spatial (i.e., nodal)
resolution. In order to account for exchanges with neighboring countries, additional
regions are defined, but at an aggregated level: Southern Europe (Austria, Italy and
Switzerland), South-West Europe (Portugal and Spain), North-West Europe (Ireland
and UK), Northern Europe (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden), and Eastern Eu-
rope (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia). Figure 2.2 depicts the
regional coverage and aggregation as they are represented in the model. In total, the
model represents 70 nodes (or markets) and 174 power lines (AC and DC).
The model determines a possible path of how installed capacities will develop and how
they are operated in the future assuming that electricity markets will achieve the cost-
minimizing mix of different technologies which is obtained under perfect competition and
the absence of market failures and distortions. Among a number of techno-economic con-
straints, e.g., supply coverage or investment decisions, the model also includes a number
of politically implied constraints: nuclear power is phased-out where decided so, and then
only allowed in countries already using it; a CO2-Quota is implemented corresponding
to currently discussed targets for the European energy sector, i.e., 20% reduction with
respect to 1990 levels in 2020, and 40% in 2030 (European Commission (2013b, 2014b));
nation-specific 2020 targets for renewable energy sources are assumed to be reached until
2020 whereas from 2020 onwards there are no further specific renewable energy targets.
At the same time, endogenous investments into renewable energy technologies are always
possible.
The utilized model for the transmission stage is based on PTDF matrices which are
calculated using a detailed European power flow model developed by Energynautics (see
Ackermann et al. (2013) for a detailed model description). The number of nodes (70)
corresponds to the nodal markets implemented in the generation market model and
represents generation and load centers within Europe at an aggregated level. Those
nodes are connected by 174 high voltage alternating current (AC) lines (220 and 380kV)
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as well as high voltage direct current (HVDC) lines. Even though the model is generally
built for AC load flow calculations, it is here used to determine PTDF matrices for
different grid expansion levels. Details on how the PTDF matrices are calculated can
be found in the Appendix.
Figure 2.2: Representation of the CWE and neighboring regions in the model
As a starting point, the optimization takes the situation of the year 2011, based on a
detailed database developed at the Institute of Energy Economics at the University of
Cologne which in turn is largely based on the Platts WEPP Database (Platts (2009)).
From these starting conditions, the development for the years 2020 and 2030 is opti-
mized.19 As for the temporal resolution, we represent the operational phase by nine
typical days representing weekdays and weekend as well as variations in and interde-
pendencies between demand and power from solar and wind. One of the typical days
represents an extreme day during the week with peak demand and low supply from wind
and solar. Specific numerical assumptions for the generation and transmission model
can be found in the Appendix.
As in Settings II-IV zonal markets are being considered, assumptions about the cross-
border price function g(κi,j,t) are necessary. For the NTC-based coupling of market
19Technically, we implement the optimization routine up to 2050, but only report results until 2030.
This is necessary to avoid problematic results at the end of the optimization timeframe.
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zones, we define function g(κi,j,t) = 1.43 · κi,j,tP i,j∑
i,j P i,j
∀i, j ∈ Im,cb for each market border.
The function consists of the weighted average of cross-border line marginals multiplied
by a security margin. The security margin is the inverse of the ratio of NTC capacity
to technical line capacity and has been derived heuristically by comparing currently
installed cross-border grid capacities with NTC values reported by ENTSO-E for the
CWE region. For flow-based market coupling, we set this security margin to one, in order
to account for enhanced cross-border capacities provided to the power market.20 In the
case of zonal TSOs, we have made the following two assumptions: Differing interest of
TSOs regarding cross-border line extensions are aligned by taking the smaller one of the
two expansion levels.21 The costs of cross-border lines are shared half-half by the two
TSOs concerned, i.e., σi,j = 0.5.
2.4.2 Results and discussion
As usual in a Benders decomposition, we trace convergence based on the difference
between an upper (i.e., the objective value of the integrated problem with solution values
of the current iteration) and a lower bound (i.e., the objective of the master problem
with the same solution values). We found that all settings undershoot a convergence
threshold of 2.5% within 20 to 60 iterations (corresponding to a solution time of 2
to 7 days).22 For practical reasons, we let all settings solve for one week and – after
having double-checked that the convergence threshold of 2.5 % is met – take the last
iteration to obtain our final results. The convergence threshold is chosen to keep the
solution process computationally treatable, but is also based on empirical observations
as well as expected convergence behavior. In fact, a lower convergence criterion increases
computational time significantly, while further improvements on the objective value and
optimized capacities are hardly observable.
To illustrate the convergent behavior of our problem, Figure 2.3, left hand side, shows
the development of the optimality error (relative difference between the upper and lower
bound of the optimization), along with the (absolute) rate of change of the lower bound
obtained during the iterative solution of the nodal pricing setting. The lower bound is
20Of course, this is just a simple representation of the cross-border capacity allocation. However, a
more detailed representation is rather complex and would go beyond the scope of this paper. For more
sophisticated models of flow-based capacity allocation, the reader is referred to Kurzidem (2010).
21Equation (2.24m) in the Appendix. Note that this assumption may influence the equilibrium solution
of the coordination between the TSOs. Due to the fact that the minimum of the line capacities is chosen,
the solutions for the TSOs are no longer continuous. Hence, some equilibria might be omitted during
the iterative solution of the problem. We accept this shortfall in our numerical approach for the sake of
the large-scale application. The general approach, however, remains valid, and a process for determining
all equilibria could be implemented in the numerical solution method (e.g., through randomized starting
values).
22All models were coded in GAMS 24.2.2 and solved with CPLEX 12.6 on a High Performance Com-
puter with two processors (1600 and 2700Mhz) and physical/virtual memory of 98/150GB.
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observed to change only slightly, reaching change rates smaller than 0.01% after some
40 iterations. Moreover, as can be derived from the interpolation curves presented in
Figure 2.3, left hand side, the relative error decreases at much faster rates with a ratio
of approximately 200 for an estimated exponential trend and an iteration count of 60.
Based on the fact that in a Benders decomposition the lower bound is non-decreasing
(i.e., change rates are always positive as demonstrated in Figure 2.3, left hand side),
and the empirically observed behavior of the lower bound, it can be concluded that the
error further decreases mainly due to changes in the upper bound. Hence, we argue that
the lower bound can be taken as a good approximation of the optimal objective value
as soon as our convergence criterion is met. To support this argument and to deepen
our insights, we closely analyzed optimized levels of the variables, observing that they
reach fairly stable levels in the last iterations before reaching the convergence criterion.23
As an example, the right hand side of Figure 2.3 shows aggregated AC line capacities
obtained in the final runs of the nodal pricing setting.
Based on the interpolation curves estimated from the observed changes in the optimal-
ity error, a 1% threshold is expected to be reached after around 150 iterations. The
estimated increase of the lower bound and hence, the improvement of the optimal solu-
tion, will then be around 0.21% higher compared to our obtained value. At around 300
iterations, the optimal solution will deviate by about 0.24% from our obtained value,
and further improvements of the optimal solution would be negligible. Considering the
extensive computational burden as well as the expected limited improvements, we do
not consider a smaller convergence threshold and rather accept some level of uncertainty
regarding the different levels of optimality achieved in the different settings.
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Figure 2.3: Development of lower bound, optimality error and aggregated AC line
capacities during the iteration in Setting I
Costs are reported as accumulated discounted system costs.24 In the generation sector,
costs occur due to investments, operation and maintenance, production as well as ramp-
ing, whereas in the grid sector, investment as well as operation and maintenance costs
23Note that this argument is also supported by the analysis of convergence in a very similar setting
published in Hagspiel et al. (2014).
24The discount rate is assumed to be 10% throughout all calculations.
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are considered. Overall costs of electricity supply can be considered as a measure of
efficiency and are reported in the following Figure 2.4 for the different settings. Besides
the absolute costs, which are subdivided into generation and grid costs, the relative cost
increase with respect to the overall costs of the nodal pricing setting is also depicted.
Considering the optimality error in the obtained solution, it should be stressed that the
exact differences reported here do not necessarily persist after full convergence. However,
based on the above discussion about convergence, the general conclusions and order of
magnitude are expected to remain valid.
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Figure 2.4: Total costs and relative performance of the different settings
As expected, nodal pricing (Setting I ) is most efficient, with total costs summing up
to 899.0 bn. e2011 (874.3 bn. for generation and 24.7 bn. for the grid). Overall,
costs increase by up to 4.6% relative to Setting I for the other settings. Thereby,
NTC-based market coupling induces highest inefficiencies of 3.8% and 4.6% for one
single TSO or zonal TSOs, respectively, both with the possibility to do redispatch on a
national basis (Setting II-NTC and Setting III-NTC ).25 Hence, offering few amounts of
trading capacity to the generation market, as implied by NTC-based market coupling,
induces significant inefficiencies. In fact, by increasing trading capacities via flow-based
market coupling, system costs can be lowered and inefficiencies amount to 2.5% for the
single TSO, respectively 3.5% for zonal TSOs compared to nodal pricing (Setting II-
FB and Setting III-FB). Hence, efficiency gains of 1.1-1.3 % of total system costs can
be achieved by switching from NTC to flow-based market coupling. In turn, enhanced
trading activities induced by flow-based market coupling entail greater TSO activity,
both in the expansion as well as in the redispatch. For this reason, TSO costs are higher
for flow-based than for NTC-based market coupling. However, these additional costs
25Since topology control (as, e.g., in Kunz (2013) is not considered, costs of redispatch could possibly
be lower. However, since topology control would also be available in the market clearing of the nodal
pricing, efficiency gains would persist for all regimes. Hence, the reported differences between the
inefficiencies should be similar.
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are overcompensated by lower costs in the generation sector. The net effect of a switch
from NTC to flow-based market coupling is beneficial for the overall system.
Somewhat surprisingly, the national g-component (Setting IV ) hardly performs better
than the same setting with redispatch (Setting III-FB). Hence, the optimal allocation
of power generation within market zones is hardly influenced by grid restrictions within
that zone. In contrast, the optimal allocation induced by nodal prices throughout the
CWE region entails substantial gains in efficiency due to reduced system costs. The
setting that comes closest to nodal pricing consists of flow-based coupled zonal markets
with a single TSOs and induces an inefficiency of 2.5% in comparison to nodal pricing
(Setting II-FB vs. Setting I ).
Even though the share of TSO costs on total costs is very small compared to the share of
generation costs in all settings (1.3-2.7%)26, the amount of grid capacities varies greatly
between the different settings. Figure 2.5 shows the aggregated high voltage (HV) AC
and HVDC line capacities.
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Figure 2.5: Aggregated line capacities AC and DC
Grid capacities are generally lower in the case of zonal TSOs where they only agree on
the smaller of the two proposed expansion levels for cross-border lines (Setting III-FB
and Setting III-NTC ). In these cases, overall AC grid capacities increase from 331GW
in 2011 to 398GW (Setting III-NTC ) respectively 418GW (Setting III-FB) in 2030, cor-
responding to an increase of 20-28%. In case of a single TSO, cross-border along with
overall line expansions are significantly higher compared to zonal TSOs, with 2030 lev-
els reaching 519GW (Setting II-NTC ) to 724GW (Setting II-FB). Especially in Setting
II-FB, the TSO is obliged to cope with inefficiently allocated generation plants by ex-
cessively expanding the grid, while not being able to avoid those measures with suitable
price signals. DC line expansions appear to be crucial for an efficient system devel-
opment, especially towards the UK where large wind farms help to reach CO2-targets
and to supply the UK itself as well as the continent with comparatively cheap electric-
ity. Thereby, the high DC expansion level in the nodal pricing regime is remarkable.
Whereas in zonal markets prices are ”averaged” across the zone, nodal prices reveal the
26The rather minor role of grid costs compared to costs occurring in the generation sector has already
been identified, e.g., in Fu¨rsch et al. (2013).
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true value of connecting specific nodes via DC-lines and thus enable efficient investments
in those projects. In consequence, in the nodal pricing regime, DC line capacities are
about double as high as in the other settings. This helps to reduce overall costs to a
minimum (Setting I ).
Besides the overall level of grid and generation capacities, their regional allocation also
differs between the various settings, mainly due to differences in the (local) availability
of transmission upgrades. As has been seen, higher grid expansion levels result from a
single TSO (Setting I and Setting II ), enabling a better utilization of renewable energies
at favorable sites (i.e., sites where the specific costs of electricity generation are lowest).
In Figure 2.6, we exemplarily illustrate this effect based on a cross-border line between
France and Germany (line 80 in our model). However, the same effect is observable for
other interconnections, e.g., between France and Belgium. Higher grid capacities allow
the use of high wind speed locations in Northern France and thus foster more expansion of
wind capacities in this area. In case of zonal TSOs (Setting III and Setting IV ) only low
amounts of wind capacity are built in France (e.g., in node FR-06) as these areas cannot
be connected with the rest of the system. To still meet the European CO2-target, PV
power plants are built in the southern part of Germany (e.g., in node DE-27). Obviously,
these locations are non-optimal with respect to other options as they are not used in
the setting with one TSO. Thus, implemented market designs significantly influence the
amount and location of renewable energies within the system.27
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Figure 2.6: Exemplary grid expansion and regional allocation of renewable energies
2.5 Conclusions
In the context of liberalized power markets and unbundled generation and transmission
services, the purpose of this paper was to develop a modeling framework for different
regulatory designs regarding congestion management including both, the operation as
well as the investment perspective in the generation and transmission sector. We have
27Conventional capacities are also affected. However, the effect is less pronounced as the differences
between the site-specific costs of generation are smaller.
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presented an analytical formulation that is able to account for different regulatory de-
signs of market areas, a single or zonal TSOs, as well as different forms of measures to
relieve congestion, namely grid expansion, redispatch and g-components. We have then
proposed an algorithm to numerically solve these problems, based on the concept of de-
composition. This technique has shown to entail a number of characteristics that work
to our advantage, especially flexible algorithmic implementation as well as consistency
of the grid flow representation through PTDF update.
Calibrating our model to the CWE region, we have demonstrated the applicability of our
numerical solution algorithm in a large-scale application consisting of 70 nodes and 174
lines along with a detailed bottom-up representation of the generation sector. Compared
to nodal pricing as the efficient benchmark, inefficiencies induced by alternative settings
reach additional system costs of up to 4.6%. Major deteriorative factors are TSOs
activities restricted to zones as well as low trading capacities offered to the market.
These findings may serve as a guideline for policymakers when designing international
power markets. For instance, our results confirm ongoing efforts to implement flow-
based market coupling and to foster a closer cooperation of TSOs in the CWE region.
In fact, we find that such a regulatory design could come close to the nodal pricing
benchmark, with an efficiency difference of only 2.5%. Reported cost differences might
be impacted by numerical imprecision in the solution algorithm, although empirical
observations of the convergence behavior suggest that the general effects as well as
the order of magnitude persist. Noticeably, the magnitude of these results should be
interpreted as the lower bound of efficiency gains, since we focus on frictions in the
congestion management only.
More generally, we find that a single TSO (or enhanced coordination between the zonal
TSOs) is key for an efficient development of both, grid and generation infrastructures.
Whereas the expansion of grid infrastructure is immediately affected, the generation
sector indirectly takes advantage of increased grid capacities and hence, can develop
more efficiently. Better allocation of generation units with respect to grid costs through
high resolution price signals gains importance for larger geographical areas and larger
differences between generation costs and expansion potentials (such as wind or solar
power). This has been found for the CWE region, and may prove even more important
for the whole of Europe. It should be noted, however, that efficiency gains need to be put
into the context of transaction costs occurring from the switch to a different congestion
management design. In addition, socio-economic factors such as acceptance for grid
expansion are not considered in the analysis, but might also play a role considering the
large differences of necessary grid quantities.
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Limitations of our approach that leave room for extensions and improvement stem from
the fact that we assume linear transmission investments, and do not consider strategic
behavior of individual agents, imperfectly regulated TSOs, or uncertainty about future
developments (e.g., delays in expansion projects). The assumption of an inelastic de-
mand probably reduces the magnitude of the measured inefficiencies, since demand does
not react to any price changes and hence only supply-side effects are captured. Al-
gorithmically, the effectiveness of our solution process could be further improved, e.g.,
through better usage of numerical properties of the problem (such as gradients, etc.).
Nevertheless, in its present form, our framework may serve as a valuable tool to assess
a number of further relevant questions, such as the tradeoff between different flexibility
options (such as grids, storages or renewable curtailment), the impact of different forms
of congestion management in other European regions, or the valuation of grid expansion
projects.
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2.6 Appendix
Notation list
Abbreviation Dimension Description
Model sets
i ∈ I, j ∈ J, k ∈ K, l ∈ L Nodes, I,J,K,L = [1, 2, ...]
m,n ∈M Zonal markets, M = [1, 2, ...]
i ∈ Im, j ∈ Jm Nodes that belong to zonal
market m, Im ⊂ I, Jm ⊂ J
i ∈ Im,cb, j ∈ Jm,cb Nodes that belong to zonal market m and are
connected to a another zone n by a cross-border
line, Im,cb ⊂ Im, Jm,cb ⊂ Jm
t ∈ T Point in time for dispatch decisions (e.g., hours)
Model parameters
δi EUR/kW Investment and FOM costs of generation capacity
in node i
γi,t EUR/kWh Variable costs of generation capacity in node i
µi,j EUR/kW Investment costs of line between node i and node j
di,t kW Electricity demand in node i
PTDFk,i,j − Power Transfer Distribution Factor (impact of the
power balance in node k on flows on line i, j)
σi,j % Cost share for an interconnector capacity between
node i and node j, i ∈ Im,cb, j ∈ Jm,cb
Model primal variables
Gi kW Generation capacity in node i, Gi ≥ 0
Gi,t kW Generation dispatch in node i, Gi,t ≥ 0
Ti,j,t, Tm,n,t kW Electricity trade from node i to node j,
or market m to market n
X EUR Costs of generation
Y EUR Costs of TSO
P i,j kW Line capacity between node i and node j,
P i,j ≥ 0 ∀ i, j 6= j, i
Pi,j,t kW Electricity flow on line between node i and node j
Ri,t kW Redispatch in node i
α EUR Helping variable to include transmission costs of
the current iteration in the master problem
Model dual variables
κi,j,t, κm,n,t EUR/kW price for transmission between nodes (i and j)
or zones (m and n)
λi,t, λm,t EUR/kW nodal or zonal price for electricity
Table 2.2: Model sets, parameters and variables
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Derivation of the load flow equations by means of PTDFs
Power Transfer Distribution Factors (PTDFs) are a well-established method to account
for load flows in meshed electricity networks by means of linearization. They can be
derived from the network equations in an AC power network that write as follows:28
Pi = Ui
∑
j∈I
Uj(gi,j cos(ϕi − ϕj) + bi,j sin(ϕi − ϕj)) (2.5)
Qi = Ui
∑
j∈I
Uj(gi,j sin(ϕi − ϕj)− bi,j cos(ϕi − ϕj)) (2.6)
Pi,j = U
2
i gi,j − UiUjgi,j cos(ϕi − ϕj)− UiUjbi,j sin(ϕi − ϕj) (2.7)
Qi,j = − U2i (bi,j + bshi,j) + UiUjbi,j cos(ϕi − ϕj)− UiUjgi,j sin(ϕi − ϕj). (2.8)
Pi and Qi represent the net active and reactive power infeed (i.e., nodal power balances),
and Pi,j and Qi,j the active and reactive power flows between node i and j. Voltage
levels U and phase angles ϕ of the nodes as well as series conductances g and series
susceptances b of the transmission lines determine active and reactive power flows in a
highly nonlinear way.
In order to linearize the above equations, a number of assumptions are made:
• All voltages are set to 1 p.u.
• Voltage angles are all similar (and hence, sin(ϕi − ϕj) ≈ ϕi − ϕj).
• Reactive power is neglected (i.e., Qi = Qi,j = 0).
• Losses are neglected and line reactances are much larger than their resistance, such
that x r ≈ 0.
Under these assumptions and using Kirchoff’s power law, the network equations can be
simplified to
Pi,j ≈ 1
xi,j
(ϕi − ϕj) (2.9)
Pi ≈
∑
j∈Ωi
1
xi,j
(ϕi − ϕj), (2.10)
with Ωi representing the nodes adjacent to i. If there are multiple nodes and branches,
this can be written in a more convenient matrix notation as P˜i = B˜ · Θ˜, with P˜i being
28The following is based on Andersson (2011), even though the general approach can be found in most
electrical engineering textbooks.
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the vector of net active nodal power balances Pi, Θ˜ the vector of phase angles, and B˜
the nodal admittance matrix with the following entries:
B˜i,j = − 1
xi,j
(2.11)
B˜i,i =
∑
j∈Ωi
1
xi,j
. (2.12)
By deleting the row and column belonging to the reference node (thus assuming a zero
reference angle at this node), the previously singular matrix B˜ becomes B, the vector
of phase angles Θ, and the vector of net active nodal power balances Pi. We can now
solve for Θ by matrix inversion:
Θ = B−1 · Pi. (2.13)
Defining Hki = 1/xi,j , Hkj = −1/xi,j and Hkm = 0 for m 6= i, j (with k running over the
branches i, j), Equation (2.9) can be rewritten in matrix form as Pi,j =H ·Θ. Inserting
Θ from Equation (2.13) finally yields
Pi,j =H ·Θ =H ·B−1 · Pi = PTDF · Pi (2.14)
The elements of PTDF are the power transfer distribution factors that constitute a
linear relationship between nodal power balances and load flows. Note that the size of
the PTDF matrix is determined by the size of the system, with the number of matrix
lines corresponding to the number of transmission lines, and the number of matrix
columns representing the number of nodes. The matrix entry PTDFk,i,j represents the
impact of the power balance in node k on power flows on line between node i and j. Also
note that PTDF essentially depends (only) on the line impedances xi,j in the system
that in turn depend primarily on the respective line capacities P i,j . Hence, as done,
e.g., in Hogan et al. (2010), we apply the law of parallel circuits to adjust line reactances
when altering transmission capacities, i.e.,
xi,j =
P
0
i,j
P i,j
x0i,j , (2.15)
where {P 0i,j , x0i,j} is a point of reference taken from the original configuration of the
transmission network. Overall, this yields a functional dependency of power flows on
nodal balances (determined by generation Gk and load dk in all nodes) as well as line
capacities P k,l of all lines in the system, i.e., Pi,j = Pi,j(P k,l, Gk, dk).
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Equivalence of Problem P1 and P1’
To show the equivalence of the optimal solution of P1 and P1’, we compare the prob-
lems by means of their Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT)conditions. If they are equal, the
optimal solution has to be equal, too (e.g., Bazaraa et al. (2006)). For the deriva-
tions, note that trade is a function of line capacity, generation and demand, i.e., Ti,j,t =
Ti,j,t(P k,l, Gk,t, dk,t), and that Ti,j,t = −Tj,i,t. The following is the Lagrangian function
belonging to Problem P1 :
L(Gi, Gi,t, Ti,j,t, P i,j , λi,t, τi,t, κi,j,t) =
∑
i
δiGi +
∑
i,t
γi,tGi,t +
∑
i,j
µi,jP i,j
+
∑
i,t
(λi,t(Gi,t −
∑
j
Ti,j,t − di,t) + τi,t(Gi,t −Gi))
+
∑
i,j,t
(κi,j,t(|Ti,j,t| − P i,j))
(2.16)
The corresponding KKT conditions are:
∂L
∂Gi
= δi −
∑
t
τi,t ≤ 0, Gi ≥ 0, Gi( ∂L
∂Gi
) = 0 ∀i (2.17a)
∂L
∂Gi,t
= γi,t + λi,t(1−
∑
j
∂Ti,j,t
∂Gi,t
) + τi,t +
∑
j
κi,j,t
∂Ti,j,t
∂Gi,t
≤ 0, (2.17b)
Gi,t ≥ 0, Gi,t( ∂L
∂Gi,t
) = 0 ∀i, t
∂L
∂P i,j
= µi,j −
∑
t
λi,t
∂Ti,j,t
∂P i,j
+
∑
t
κi,j,t(
∂Ti,j,t
∂P i,j
− 1) ≤ 0, (2.17c)
P i,j ≥ 0, P i,j( ∂L
∂P i,j
) = 0 ∀i, j
∂L
∂κi,j,t
= |Ti,j,t| − P i,j ≤ 0, κi,j,t ≥ 0, κi,j,t( ∂L
∂κi,j,t
) = 0 ∀i, j, t (2.17d)
∂L
∂τi,j
= Gi,t −Gi ≤ 0, τi,j ≥ 0, τi,j( ∂L
∂τi,j
) = 0 ∀i, j (2.17e)
∂L
∂λi,t
= Gi,t −
∑
j
Ti,j,t − di,t = 0 ∀i, t (2.17f)
∂L
∂Ti,j,t
= κi,j,t − λi,t + λj,t = 0 ∀i, j, t (2.17g)
The Langragian functions for P1’ are:
L′a(Gi, Gi,t, Ti,j,t, λi,t, τi,t) =
∑
i
δiGi +
∑
i,t
γi,tGi,t +
∑
i,j,t
κi,j,tTi,j,t
+
∑
i,t
(λi,t(Gi,t −
∑
j,t
Ti,j,t − di,t) + κi,j,t(Gi,t −Gi))
(2.18)
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L′b(P i,j , κi,j,t) =
∑
i,j
µi,jP i,j +
∑
i,t
(λi,t(Gi,t −
∑
j,t
Ti,j,t − di,t)) +
∑
i,j,t
(κi,j,t(|Ti,j,t| − P i,j))
(2.19)
The KKT conditions of P1’a are:
∂L′a
∂Gi
= δi −
∑
t
τi,t ≤ 0, Gi ≥ 0, Gi( ∂L
∂Gi
) = 0 ∀i (2.20a)
∂L′a
∂Gi,t
= γi,t + λi,t(1−
∑
j
∂Ti,j,t
∂Gi,t
) + τi,t +
∑
j
κi,j,t
∂Ti,j,t
∂Gi,t
≤ 0, (2.20b)
Gi,t ≥ 0, Gi,t( ∂L
∂Gi,t
) = 0 ∀i, t
∂L′a
∂τi,j
= Gi,t −Gi ≤ 0, τi,j ≥ 0, τi,j(∂L
′a
∂τi,j
) = 0 ∀i, j (2.20c)
∂L′a
∂λi,t
= Gi,t −
∑
j
Ti,j,t − di,t ∀i, t (2.20d)
∂L′a
∂Ti,j,t
= κi,j,t − λi,t + λj,t = 0 ∀i, j, t (2.20e)
The KKT conditions of P1’b are:
∂L′b
∂P i,j
= µi,j −
∑
t
λi,t
∂Ti,j,t
∂P i,j
+
∑
t
κi,j,t(
∂Ti,j,t
∂P i,j
− 1) ≤ 0, (2.21a)
P i,j ≥ 0, P i,j( ∂L
∂P i,j
) = 0 ∀i, j
∂L′b
∂κi,j,t
= |Ti,j,t| − P i,j ≤ 0, κi,j,t ≥ 0, κi,j,t( ∂L
∂κi,j,t
) = 0 ∀i, j, t (2.21b)
Comparing the KKT conditions of problem P1 to the ones of P1a and P1b, we can
conclude that the problems are indeed equivalent.
Model of Setting III: coupled zonal markets with zonal TSOs and zonal
redispatch
Mathematically, the model of Setting III, representing coupled zonal markets with zonal
TSOs and zonal redispatch, is formulated as follows:
P3a Generation
min
Gi,Gi,t,Tm,n,t
X =
∑
i
δiGi +
∑
i,t
γi,tGi,t +
∑
m,n,t
κm,n,tTm,n,t (2.22a)
s.t.
∑
i∈Im
Gi,t −
∑
n,t
Tm,n,t =
∑
i∈Im
di,t ∀m, t |λm (2.22b)
Gi,t ≤ Gi ∀i, t (2.22c)
Tm,n,t = −Tn,m,t ∀m,n, t (2.22d)
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P3b Transmission
min
P i,j∈Im ,Ri∈Im,t
Ym =
∑
i,j∈Im µi,jP i,j +
∑
i,j∈Im,cb σi,jµi,jP i,j
+
∑
i∈Im,t γi,tRi,t ∀m (2.22e)
s.t.
∑
i∈Im Gi,t −
∑
n Tm,n,t =
∑
i∈Im di,t ∀m, t (2.22f)
|Ti,j,t| = |Pi,j,t(P k,l, Gk,t, Rk,t, dk,t)| ≤ P i,j ∀t, i, j ∈ Im |κi,j∈Im(2.22g)∑
i∈Im,tRi,t = 0 (2.22h)
0 ≤ Gi,t +Ri,t ≤ Gi ∀t, i ∈ Im (2.22i)
κm,n,t = g(κi,j,t) (2.22j)
Tm,n,t = −Tn,m,t ∀m,n, t (2.22k)
In problem P3, there are now separate optimization problems for each zonal TSO (in-
dicated by Ym), with the objective to minimize costs from zonal grid and cross-border
capacity extensions as well as from zonal redispatch measures (Equation (2.22e)). For
the redispatch, TSOs have to consider the same restrictions as in the previous setting
(Equations (2.22h) and (2.22i)). TSOs are assumed to negotiate about the extension of
cross-border capacities according to some regulatory rule that ensures the acceptance of
a unique price for each cross-border line by both of the neighboring TSOs. For instance,
the regulatory rule may be specified such that both TSOs are obliged to accept the
higher price offer, or, equivalently, the lower of the two capacities offered for the specific
cross-border line. Corresponding costs from inter-zonal grid extensions are assumed to
be shared among the TSOs according to the cost allocation key σi,j . According to Equa-
tion (2.22j), prices for transmission between zones that are provided to the generation
stage (κm,n,t) are determined just as in the previous Setting II with only one TSO,
depending on the type of market coupling, i.e., the specification of function g. The only
difference is that line-specific prices κi,j,t may now deviate from Setting II as they result
from the separated activities of each zonal TSO (specifically, from Equation (2.22g), i.e.,
the restriction of flows on intra-zonal and cross-border lines).
Model of Setting IV: coupled zonal markets with zonal TSOs and g-
component
Mathematically, the model of Setting IV, representing coupled zonal markets with zonal
TSOs and g-component, is formulated as follows:
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P4a Generation
min
Gi,Gi,t,Tm,n,t
X =
∑
i
δiGi +
∑
i,t
γi,tGi,t +
∑
i,j,t
κi,j,tTi,j,t (2.23a)
s.t.
∑
i∈Im
Gi,t −
∑
n
Tm,n,t =
∑
i∈Im
di,t ∀m, t |λm (2.23b)
Gi,t ≤ Gi ∀i, t (2.23c)
Tm,n,t = −Tn,m,t ∀m,n, t (2.23d)
P4b Transmission
min
P i,j∈Im,Im,cb
Ym =
∑
i,j∈Im
µi,jP i,j +
∑
i,j∈Im,cb
σi,jµi,jP i,j ∀m (2.23e)
s.t.
∑
i∈Im
Gi,t −
∑
n
Tm,n,t =
∑
i∈Im
di,t ∀m, t (2.23f)
|Ti,j,t| = |Pi,j,t(P k,l, Gk,t, dk,t)| ≤ P i,j ∀t, i, j ∈ Im, Im,cb |κi,j∈Im,Im,cb,t (2.23g)
Tm,n,t = −Tn,m,t ∀m,n, t (2.23h)
Problem P4a is almost identical to P2a (and P3a), with the exception of one term in
the objective function (2.23a). With a g-component, generators pay nodal instead of
zonal prices for transmission (κi,j,t instead of κm,n,t), depending on the impact of their
nodal generation level on the grid infrastructure (by means of Ti,j,t = Ti,j,t(Gk,t, dk,t)).
These prices are determined by the zonal TSOs via their flow-restriction (2.23g).
Numerical algorithm for NTC-coupled zonal markets, zonal TSOs, and
zonal redispatch
In the previous section, we have shown the numerical implementation of the nodal pricing
regime. For the sake of clarifying the major changes needed to represent the alternative
Settings II-IV, we here present the model for m zonal (instead of nodal) markets that are
coupled via NTC-based capacity restrictions, along with multiple zonal TSOs (instead
of only one), all having the possibility to deploy zonal redispatch as an alternative to
grid expansion. Hence, the model corresponds to Setting III with NTC-based market
coupling. Compared to nodal pricing, no more nodal or time-specific information about
grid costs is provided. Instead, an aggregated price κ
(v)
m,n,t for each border is calculated
via a function gNTC and passed on to generation level. The model with flow-based
market coupling works in the same way, only that the price κ
(v)
m,n,t is calculated via a
different function gFB.
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v = 1; convergence=false
While(convergence=false) {
Master problem: generation
min
Gi,Gi,t,Tm,n,t,α
X =
∑
i
δiGi +
∑
i,t
γi,tGi,t + α (2.24a)
s.t.
∑
i∈Im
Gi,t −
∑
n
Tm,n,t =
∑
i∈Im
di,t ∀m, t (2.24b)
Gi,t ≤ Gi ∀i, t (2.24c)
Tm,n,t = −Tn,m,t ∀m,n, t (2.24d)∑
m
Y (u)m +
∑
m,n,t
κ
(u)
m,n,t · (Tm,n,t − T (u)m,n,t) ≤ α ∀u = 1, ..., v − 1|v > 1 (2.24e)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
G
(v)
i,t = Optimal value of Gi,t ∀i, t (2.24f)
Sub-problem: transmission
min
P i,j∈Im,Im,cb ,Ri∈Im,t,Tm,n,t
Ym =
∑
i,j∈Im
µi,jP i,j +
1
2
∑
i,j∈Im,cb
µi,jP i,j +
∑
i∈Im,t
Ri,tγi,t ∀m(2.24g)
s.t. |Pi,j,t| =
∣∣∣∣∣∑
k
PTDFk,i,j · (G(v)k,t +Rk,t − dk,t)
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ P i,j ∀i, j, t |κ(v)i,j,t(2.24h)
0 ≤ Ri,t +G(v)i,t ≤ Gi ∀i, t ∈ Im (2.24i)∑
i∈Im
Ri,t = 0 (2.24j)
−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
Y ∗m = Optimal value of Ym(2.24k)
PTDF (v) = New PTDF matrix calculated based on P i,jκm,n,t = gNTC(κ
(v)
i,j,t) (2.24l)
P i,j∈Im,cb = P i,j∈In,cb = min
{
P i,j∈Im,cb ;P i,j∈In,cb
}
(2.24m)
if(convergence criterion < threshold; convergence=true)
v = v + 1
};
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Numerical assumptions for the large-scale application
Country 2011 2020 2030
Belgium 87 98 105
Germany 573 612 629
France 466 524 559
Luxembourg 7 8 8
Netherlands 113 128 137
Eastern 276 328 366
Northern 387 436 465
Southern 450 528 594
Southwest 317 378 433
United Kingdom 400 450 481
Table 2.3: Assumptions for the gross electricity demand [TWh]
To depict the CWE region in a high spatial resolution, we split the gross electricity
demand per country among the nodes belonging to this country according to the per-
centage of population living in that region.
Technology 2020 2030
Wind Onshore 1253 1188
Wind Offshore (<20m depth) 2800 2350
Wind Offshore (>20m depth) 3080 2585
Photovoltaics (roof) 1260 935
Photovoltaics (ground) 1110 785
Biomass gas 2398 2395
Biomass solid 3297 3295
Biomass gas, CHP 2597 2595
Biomass solid, CHP 3497 3493
Geothermal 10504 9500
Compressed Air Storage 1100 1100
Pump Storage 1200 1200
Lignite 1500 1500
Lignite Innovative 1600 1600
Coal 1200 1200
Coal Innovative 2025 1800
IGCC 1700 1700
CCGT 711 711
OCGT 400 400
Nuclear 3157 3157
Table 2.4: Assumptions for the generation technology investment costs [e/kW]
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Fuel type 2011 2020 2030
Nuclear 3.6 3.3 3.3
Lignite 1.4 1.4 2.7
Oil 39.0 47.6 58.0
Coal 9.6 10.1 10.9
Gas 14.0 23.1 25.9
Table 2.5: Assumptions for the gross fuel prices [e/MWhth]
Grid Technology Extension costs FOM costs
AC overhead line incl. compensation 445 e/(MVA*km) 2.2 e/(MVA*km)
DC overhead line 400 e/(MW*km) 2.0 e/(MW*km)
DC underground 1250 e/(MW*km) 6.3 e/(MW*km)
DC submarine 1100 e/(MW*km) 5.5 e/(MW*km)
DC converter pair 150000 e/MW 750.0 e/MW
Table 2.6: Assumptions for the grid extension and FOM costs
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The relevance of grid expansion under zonal
markets
3.1 Introduction
The market design of the European single market for electricity consists of regional
bidding zones, usually aligned to national borders. There is one uniform price per
zone, while implicitly neglecting scarce transmission capacities within these zones. In
reality, however, this simplification is often inconsistent with physical realities and hence,
represents and inherent market incompleteness. In the short term, this incompleteness
is adressed by an administrative redispatch of generation facilities: After the market
clearing, generators causing bottlenecks are requested to reduce their generation, while
others increase their generation in order to achieve physical feasibility in the transmission
grid. An increase in generation is remunerated with the estimated variable costs, partly
covered by the saved variable costs of the decreased generation. If the cost estimations
were correct and the redispatch measure succeeded in finding the least cost alternative,
the short-term market outcome would be optimal, i.e., statically efficient.29
In the long term, functionality of zonal markets shall be ensured by sufficient expansion
of the grid infrastructure. In practice, however, grid expansion is often insufficient or
at least delayed, e.g., due to public opposition or extensive approval processes.30 At
the same time, due to the uniform price for all market participants, the resulting intra-
zonal scarcity in transmission capacities is not taken into account in the investment
decisions of generation. In fact, even though the (zonal) market should ensure that
sufficient capacity is installed to meet demand on a zonal level, the spatial allocation of
generation units might not allow to transport electricity to the customers due to missing
grid capacities. Thus, missing grid expansion might severly jeopardize the long-term
29In practice, this result will probably not be entirely realized due to ramping constraints of redis-
patched power plants.
30See, e.g., the monitoring of the Ten Year Network Development Plan (ENTSO-E, 2015), where
about 30 % of the projects are reported delayed or rescheduled, or Monitoringbericht (2013) for the case
of Germany, where over 50 % of the projects are reported delayed.
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functionality of zonal markets. Especially, although redispatch might induce efficient
market outcomes in the short term, it does not suffice to heal the incompleteness of the
market design to achieve long-term, i.e., dynamic, efficiency as locational price signals
are not considered.31 As we will show, this might induce severe inefficiencies in the
market outcome, which are increasing with the level of grid restriction.
In Europe, the effect of misallocation of generators and missing transmission capacity
is particularly relevant due to fundamental changes in the supply and demand struc-
ture caused by strong climate protection efforts.32 A substantial shift from conventional
to renewable generation, which is usually far away from current generation and load
centers, increases the importance of sufficient grid infrastructure. A blueprint for the
described dynamics in a zonal market design with an increasing share of renewables is
the case of Germany, where short-term intra-zonal congestion is removed using redis-
patch measures. In order to avoid situations where redispatch would be necessary but
no generation capacities are available at the right location, the German Transmission
System Operators (TSO) contract generation capacity in advance at locations, which
are expected to be relevant for future congestion relieve. This so-called grid reserve
ensures locally sufficient generation capacity. Table 3.1 illustrates the development of
the renewables share, redispatch measures as well as the grid reserve quantity. As can
be seen, redispatch measures broadly increased with an increasing share of renewables,
caused by missing transmission grid capacities. Meanwhile, also the grid reserve quan-
tities increase. This development clearly shows the effect and the deficits of the zonal
market design.
Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 (Q1/2)
Renewable share of gross 16.6 20.2 22.8 23.9 25.8 -
electricity demand [%]
Redispatch volume [GWh] - - 4956 4604 5197 5253
Redispatch costs [Mio. e] 48 129 165 115 139 252.5
Grid reserve [GW] - 1.6 2.5 2.5 3.1 6.7-7.8
Table 3.1: Development of renewable share, redispatch measures and grid reserve in
Germany33
The German case illustrates that the zonal market design may lead to severe effects,
if grid expansion cannot be realized. Hence, in this paper, we analyze the relevance of
grid expansion in the European zonal market design in the light of the EU’s 2030 energy
31See (Burstedde, 2012) for a detailed discussion of the (in-)efficiencies of several redispatch designs.
32The European Union (EU) formulated an ambitious 2030 energy strategy, including a EU domestic
reduction of greenhouse gases (GHG) by 40 % compared to 1990, a share of 27 % renewable energy, and
a 27 % reduction in energy consumption compared to 2005 (European Commission, 2014a).
33Sources: Bundesnetzagentur (2012), Bundesnetzagentur (2013a), Bundesnetzagentur (2013b), Mon-
itoringbericht (2013), Bundesnetzagentur (2014), Baake (2014), Bundesnetzagentur (2015a), Bundesnet-
zagentur (2015b), AGEB (2015)
48
3.2 Introduction
strategy. For this, we build on a long-term fundamental model of the European electricity
market developed in Bertsch et al. (2015), allowing the representation of the European
flow-based coupled zonal markets with redispatch. The model includes a generation
dispatch, power flows, as well as generation and grid investments. Extending their
approach, we implement restrictions for grid expansion per decade that are gradually
tightened. Although, several authors analyzed optimal grid expansion in a European
context (e.g., Schaber et al. (2012), Fu¨rsch et al. (2013) or Hagspiel et al. (2014)), we
are not aware of any literature analyzing the impacts of restricted grid expansion in the
European zonal market design.
Our results show that restricted grid expansion together with the inherent incomplete-
ness of the market design has significant effects. We restrict grid expansion per decade
from zero, i.e., no grid expansion at all, to 30 TWkm throughout 6 different scenarios.
In case of restrictions ranging from 0-15 TWkm of grid expansion per decade, load can-
not be served completely and load curtailment levels amounts up to 2 % (3 %) for 2020
(2030). Also with less restricted grid expansion, load curtailment is still above 0.2 % for
scenarios 15 TWkm in 2020. In 2030, however, significant load curtailment only occurs
for the scenarios of restrictions of up to 5 TWkm. The most load curtailment takes
place in Southern Germany. Thereby, curtailment indicates that generation is missing
at some locations, entailing the need to either provide additional generation capacity
outside of the market (e.g., by means of a grid reserve as in Germany), or to curtail load.
Furthermore, no grid expansion jeopardizes the achievement of the EU 2030 climate tar-
gets: the share of renewables is 1.5 percentage points lower than in any other scenario,
resulting from a curtailment of up to 7.7 % of photovoltaic (PV) generation and over
3 % of wind generation. Missing grid expansion hence results in higher CO2 emissions
in the power sector and implies the need to shift CO2 emissions from the power sector
to other, probably more expensive sectors. DC lines are found to be of particular value
for the integration of renewables as they allow point-to-point transfers from renewables
generation to load sites.
Overall, the results demonstrate the shortfalls of the zonal market design in the light of
restricted grid expansion which is a scenario that appears to be very likely. The more
restricted grid expansion is, the more administrative intervention will be needed to
prevent the expensive and politically unwanted curtailment of load, e.g., by contracting
capacity outside the market. Alternatively, a redefinition of zones or introduction of
locational price elements may be a suitable way to effectively reduce the amount of
administrative intervention.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces the model and numerical as-
sumptions. Results are presented in Section 3. Section 4 concludes.
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3.2 Methodology
3.2.1 Model
To simulate the development of the electricity system with a flow-based coupling of zonal
markets, we follow the approach described in Bertsch et al. (2015) and combine a cost-
minimizing dynamic linear investment and dispatch market model with a model of the
AC grid using a linear PTDF representation of the load-flow. To deal with the non-linear
dependence of the PTDFs on the grid impedances, the models are solved iteratively by
updating PTDF matrices until convergence is achieved as proposed in Hagspiel et al.
(2014). The iterative solution algorithm is based on two stages that are solved sequen-
tially. First, the generation market equilibrium is determined by minimizing generation
and investment costs while meeting an (inelastic) demand and considering inter-zonal
transmission capacities. This implies that the zonal market for electricity supply and
demand (including both, operation and investment) only considers interconnectors (and
no intra-zonal grid congestion). The solution represents the result of perfect competition
in the electricity market under flow-based market coupling. Technologies for balancing
supply and demand in each zone are conventional and renewable generation technologies
as well as storage. In the second stage, transmission capacities are expanded and gen-
eration is redispatched across borders given the market results of the first stage. This
represents one perfectly incentivized Transmission System Operators (TSO) (or several
perfectly coordinated and incentivized TSOs) for all considered markets with the objec-
tive of minimizing its (their) costs while keeping the system stable, i.e., matching zonal
demand and supply while ensuring that no line is overloaded. At the transmission level,
either AC or DC interconnections are available. While the DC interconnections allow
direct transfers of electricity between neighboring regions, the utilization of the AC grid
is subject to loop flows represented by the PTDF.
Equations (3.1a)-(3.1l) state a simplified yet representative formulation of the prob-
lem:34,35 At the generation stage, total costs X are minimized such that an exogenously
defined demand d per zone m,n ∈ M is met at all points in time t. Zonal demand is
determined by aggregating nodal demand levels di,t for all nodes within a zone i ∈ Im.36
Costs for generation technologies consist of the variable costs γi,t for generation Gi,t and
the yearly fixed and (annualized) investment costs δi,y for the generation capacity Gi,y.
34A more detailed representation of the market model (generation stage) may be found in Richter
(2011) or Ja¨gemann et al. (2013), while the AC grid model (transmission stage) is described in Hagspiel
et al. (2014).
35A detailed overview containing all parameters, variables and sets is depicted in Table 3.5 in the
Appendix.
36In the numerical simulation, we use interdependent hours and type days and scale the volumes to
yearly quantities. Furthermore, costs are discounted to the starting year. Several generation technologies
with different characteristics such as peak or base load exist at each node. However, for the sake of
simplification we omit these model properties in this formulation.
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Both types of costs may change over time (note that y represents instances of invest-
ment, e.g., years, while t are dispatch situations, e.g., hours). Generation at a node is
restricted by the installed capacity (Equation 3.1c). To balance supply and demand in
zone m, generation in that zone may be complemented by trades Tm,n,t from other zones
n. Thereby, each trade from zone m to zone n equals the negative trade from zone n to
zone m and is in turn restricted by inter-zonal transmission capacities Pm,n,t (Equation
3.1d).
The second stage consists of minimizing costs Y occurring at the transmission level due
to grid expansion and redispatch. The grid can be expanded by adding line capacity
between two nodes at costs µi,j,y, while redispatch quantities Ri,t have the same vari-
able costs γi,t as in the generation stage. Negative redispatch quantities can be only
as high as generation levels obtained at the first stage, while positive redispatch quan-
tities are restricted by generation capacities (Equation 3.1g). The sum of all (positive
and negative) redispatch measures has to amount to zero (Equation 3.1h) to keep the
system balanced. Generation (including generation and redispatch), demand as well as
the existing infrastructure induce power flows on transmission lines that are restricted
by transmission capacities Pm,n,y (Equation 3.1i).
37 The exchange between the gener-
ation and the transmission stage takes place via the inter-zonal transmission capacities
Pm,n,t.
38 Thereby, function g determines those inter-zonal transmission capacities for
each dispatch time t (that are provided to the generation market, i.e., the first stage of
the model) based on grid capacities P i,j,y, generation Gi,t, demand di,t, redispatch Ri,t
and a flow-based market coupling regime (see, e.g., Aguado et al. (2012)). The expan-
sion of transmission capacities P i,j,y times line length li,j per decade b is restricted by
some value z. The model is re-run with stepwise changes of capacity restriction levels z,
thus allowing a fine-grained identification of the effects of limited grid expansion.39 Due
to the functional relationship of trades and transmission capacities, the market clearing
condition has to reoccur on the transmission stage (Equation 3.1f). Trades from zone
m to n are again equal to the negative trade from zone n to m (Equation 3.1l).
Generation
min
Gi,y ,Gi,t,Tm,n,t
X =
∑
i,y
δi,yGi,y +
∑
i,t
γi,tGi,t (3.1a)
s.t.
∑
i∈Im
Gi,t −
∑
n
Tm,n,t =
∑
i∈Im
di,t ∀m, t (3.1b)
Gi,t ≤ Gi,y ∀i, t (3.1c)
Tm,n,t = −Tn,m,t ≤ Pm,n,t ∀m,n, t (3.1d)
37In our case power flows are represented by PTDFs that are treated as a parameter while solving
the transmission stage, such that Equation (3.1i) becomes a linear constraint. However, we account for
non-linearities in the load flow equations by updating PTDFs based on the new transmission capacities
when iterating with the AC grid model.
38Note that this approach differs from Bertsch et al. (2015), where the exchange worked via transmis-
sion capacity marginals.
39Note that we use j, k and q as alias for i in order to represent different nodes in the formulation.
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Transmission
min
P i,j,y ,Ri,t
Y =
∑
i,j,y
µi,j,yP i,j,y +
∑
i,t
γi,tRi,t (3.1e)
s.t.
∑
i∈Im
Gi,t −
∑
n
Tm,n,t =
∑
i∈Im
di,t ∀m, t (3.1f)
0 ≤ Gi,t +Ri,t ≤ Gi,y ∀i, t (3.1g)∑
i
Ri,t = 0 ∀t (3.1h)
|Pi,j,t(P k,q,y, Gk,t, dk,t, Rk,t)| ≤ P i,j,y ∀i, j, t (3.1i)
Pm,n,t = g(P i,j,y, Gi,t, di,t, Ri,t) (3.1j)∑
y∈b
P i,j,yli,j ≤
∑
y∈b−1
P i,j,yli,j + z ∀b (3.1k)
Tm,n,t = −Tn,m,t ∀m,n, t (3.1l)
3.2.2 Numerical assumptions
The geographical scope of the simulation, as shown in Figure 3.1, contains a high-
resolution nodal representation of the Central Western European (CWE) region, and an
aggregated representation of the neighboring countries.40 The CWE region consists of
5 zonal markets where nodes within the zones are aggregated and zones correspond to
national borders (Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Germany and France) that are
coupled via inter-zonal transmission capacities offered to the market. These transmis-
sion capacities are determined based on actual power flows (flow-based market coupling).
Physical feasibility of the dispatch on the grid level is ensured by a cross-border redis-
patch. To account for trades with neighboring countries, 5 satellite regions are included:
Southern Europe (Italy, Austria41 and Switzerland), Eastern Europe (Czech Republic,
Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia), Northern Europe (Sweden, Norway, Finland
and Denmark), South West Europe (Spain and Portugal) and North West Europe (UK
and Ireland). The transmission grid of the CWE region is represented by 65 nodes, while
the transmission grids of the satellite regions are represented via one node per region.
In total, 174 grid connections and 70 nodes are represented in the model.
The existing electricity system including power plants42 and transmission grids43 as of
40With this simplification we neglect that a detailed representation of all countries would probably
impact congestion in the CWE region.
41Although Austria is currently in the same bidding zone as Germany, we treat it as part of the
Southern Europe. This has two main reasons: First, numerical complexity is reduced and second, the
effect on the results in case Austria is included with higher granularity is expected to be limited.
42The data for the power plants stems from the power plant database developed at the Institute of
Energy Economics at the University of Cologne. This database comprises nearly all European power
plants greater than 10 MW and is constantly updated by publicly available sources (e.g., the power plant
list of the German regulator) and the Platts WEPP database (Platts, 2009).
43The grid model was developed based on the publicly available map and data on the European
transmission grid infrastructures from ENTSO-E.
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Figure 3.1: Representation of the CWE and neighboring regions in the model
2011 was used as the basis for the simulations of the years 2020 and 2030.44 Existing
generation capacities are shut down after reaching the end of their technical lifetime (the
model is also allowed to shut down plants earlier if economically beneficial). Investments
into new generation capacities (conventional as well as renewables) are subject to polit-
ical constraints (e.g., no nuclear investments in Germany) or technical restrictions (e.g.,
areas for renewable sites). The transmission grid topology mainly consists of AC lines,
but also includes some DC lines (existing ones plus the projects planned in the 2012
version of the Ten Year Network Development Plan of the European Network of Trans-
mission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E, 2012)). Costs of future years are
discounted to 2011-values with a discount rate of 10 %.45 Years are represented by nine
typical days including different demand levels, wind and solar infeed, distinguished by
weekday and weekend.46 The typical days are coupled to account for seasonal storage,
and include one day to cover extreme weather events.
CO2 emissions are constrained according to the European targets shown in Table 3.2
representing a yearly reduction of 2.2 % (compared to 2005) up to 2050 (European
Commission (2014a)). If the restriction of CO2 emissions cannot be fulfilled, the model is
442040 and 2050 are also included in the simulation to control for end time effects. Years in between
are accounted for via scaling of the simulated years.
45This value was chosen to represent typical returns on investment. Note that the costs of capital
for investments in the electricity sector are hard to estimate, but considering the rate of return for
regulated investments (e.g., around 9 % for grid expansion projects in Germany) this seems to be a fair
assumption.
46Typical days are constructed such that they represent statistical features of electricity demand as
well as of solar and wind resources along with their multivariate interdependencies found in the original
data. Local weather conditions are included through the use of detailed wind speed and solar radiation
data (EuroWind, 2011)
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allowed to emit additional CO2, for which costs of 100 EUR/t CO2 are assumed.
47 These
additional emissions can be interpreted as shifting CO2 abatement from the power sector
to other sectors of the EU Emissions Trading System (ETS). Although not explicitly
modeled, this might imply an increase in CO2 emission costs if more expensive abatement
technologies have to be developed.
Year 2020 2030 2040 2050
compared to 2005 -21 % -43 % -65 % -87 %
Table 3.2: Assumptions for CO2 reductions [%]
We assume there is no explicit target for either the share or capacity of renewables in ad-
dition to the CO2 mechanism, meaning that renewables are deployed endogenously due
to CO2 restrictions. However, we will report the deployment of renewables and discuss
the implications for the European 27 % renewables goal in total energy consumption in
Section 3. Despite the goals on energy efficiency, the electricity consumption is projected
to increase, e.g., due to electrification of heating processes and transportation. Electric-
ity demand is taken from the EU energy road map (European Commission (2013a)).
As the most important trigger in our analysis, we model different levels of severity for
the restriction of grid expansion, as indicated in Table 3.3. Numbers correspond to
the allowed grid expansion z in TWkm per decade. While grid expansion is entirely
forbidden in Scenario 0, the amount of allowed grid expansion increases throughout the
different scenarios. Within Scenario 30, where grid expansion is restricted to 30 TWkm
per decade, the restriction is not binding any more, hence Scenario 30 represents an
unrestricted scenario. To understand the orders of magnitude, a restriction of 5 TWkm
would mean that, e.g., 2 lines, each with 5 GW and 500 km length can be built in a
decade. Note that the restriction is imposed as a constraint on the sum of AC and DC
lines.
Max. grid expansion 0 5 10 15 20 30
Table 3.3: Scenarios of allowed grid expansion per decade [TWkm/10a]
Due to the imposed constraint on grid expansion, the model may become unable to
fully serve demand (except for Scenario 30 where grid restrictions are not binding).
Due to missing local price signals, the market equilibrium might lead to an allocation of
generators far away from load centers. Specifically, if transmission capacities are limited,
and the congestion in the grid cannot be fully resolved by redispatching generation, load
has to be curtailed to ensure technical feasibility. This would indeed be an equilibrium
situation under the assumed incomplete market design. In our model, we allow to curtail
47We consider energy efficiency measures as an alternative CO2 abatement option (see, e.g., McKin-
sey&Company (2009))
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load with a value of lost load (VOLL) of 7.41 e per kWh (Growitsch et al., 2015). This
rather high value forces the model to curtail load as a last resort to ensure feasibility.48
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Impacts of missing grid expansion
3.3.1.1 Redispatch and curtailed load
Figure 3.2 shows the yearly curtailed load in all scenarios, i.e., the load that could not
be supplied after adjusting the dispatch with a physically feasible redispatch and grid
expansion. Scenario 0 shows the highest level of curtailed load as no grid expansion is
allowed and redispatch measures are insufficient. In the CWE region, around 2 % of
total load are curtailed in 2020 and nearly 3 % in 2030 if no grid expansion is allowed. All
other scenarios result in load curtailment of below 0.5 % in all years. With an increase
of the allowed grid expansion, less load curtailment is necessary and thus the amount of
curtailed load decreases.
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Figure 3.2: Curtailed load in different scenarios
Due to increasing wind capacities built up in the North of Germany without taking into
the ability to transport this generation to load centers in the South, the most severe load
curtailment takes place in Southern Germany. However, due to the meshed grid load
also has to be curtailed in the BeNeLux-countries and the neighboring regions. Figure
3.3 shows the regional distribution and severity of load curtailment in Scenario 0 for
2030. The distribution in the other scenarios is similar, but lower. Noticeably, load
curtailment increases over time in Scenario 0, while it decreases in all other scenarios.
This is due to the inter-temporal effect of grid expansion (cf. Section 3.3.2.2).
The overall quantity of redispatch measures shows a similar behavior over the scenarios
as the curtailed load, and are highest for the most restricted case (Figure 3.4). However,
48Note that load curtailment is only one possible interpretation of this measure. One could also think
of the corresponding results as quantities that have to be contracted outside of the market (e.g., by a
reserve as in Germany).
55
3 The relevance of grid expansion under zonal markets
None
Figure 3.3: Geographical distribution of load curtailment in Scenario 0 for 2030
the decline in redispatch with a less restricted grid expansion is not as steep as for
curtailed load. This can mainly be explained by the significantly lower overall costs of
redispatch, which are only the difference of the variable costs of the redispatched power
plants. Even without any restriction posed on grid expansion, a relatively small amount
of redispatch measures is still part of the optimal solution when weighed against grid
extension costs. The distribution of redispatch, however, shows no distinct pattern.
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Figure 3.4: Redispatch measures in different scenarios
Figures 3.5 and 3.6 show the number of hours, in which transmission lines are at 100
% utilization after redispatch indicating the importance of specific transmission lines.
As can be seen, the line load decreases with increasing grid expansion. However, in
2030 the pattern for this decrease differs over the scenarios. Different lines are expanded
throughout the scenarios and hence, lead to different utilization rates induced by the
meshed grid and corresponding loop flows. The line load at the borders of the CWE
region shows the importance of the Scandinavian and Iberian countries for the electricity
flows in Europe.
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Figure 3.5: Line load after redispatch measures in different scenarios 2020
Figure 3.6: Line load after redispatch measures in different scenarios 2030
3.3.1.2 Fulfillment of the EU 2030 targets
In case of no grid restrictions (Scenario 0 ), the amount of CO2 emissions that have to
be reduced by other sectors (than the power sector) within the EU-ETS amounts to 176
mt CO2 in 2020 and 391 mt CO2 per year in 2030. These numbers should be interpreted
with care, as feedback loops with other sectors covered by the EU ETS that are induced
by an increasing CO2-price are not considered here. However, the general result that
CO2 emissions are shifted to other sectors should probably hold.
According to the need to curtail load, also the curtailment of renewables decreases
dramatically as the restriction of grid expansion is relaxed (Figure 3.7). In 2030, 7.7 %
of available PV generation is curtailed in the case of no grid expansion, which drops to
just 0.4 % if 5 TWkm/10a are allowed. The drop for onshore wind from 3.3 % to 1.4 %
is less dramatic. Furthermore, the regional distribution of curtailment differs. With no
grid expansion, curtailment of offshore wind only occurs on the North Coast of France in
2030. For PV and onshore wind, curtailment is concentrated in Southern Germany, and
along the North and West Coasts of France, where there are significant grid bottlenecks.
The curtailment of renewables impacts the overall renewables quota only in the most
restricted scenario and only in 2030. While the renewables quota for all other scenarios
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Figure 3.7: Curtailment of renewables for the different scenarios
is around 44 % in 2030, for Scenario 0 the quota is about 1.5 % percentage points lower
due to the curtailment.
3.3.1.3 Total system costs
Total system costs are a measure for the overall efficiency of the system. Intuitively,
a system with more constrained grid expansion induces higher system costs. For the
different scenarios, we find that no grid expansion at all increases total system costs
by 138 % compared to the unrestricted case. Figure 3.8 shows the dependence of total
system costs on grid expansion. It can be seen that even a small amount of grid expansion
decreases total system costs drastically.
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Figure 3.8: Total system cost decrease with grid expansion
To further analyze this result, Table 3.4 shows the composition of total systems costs
(discounted to e2011). The main variation between the scenarios results from differences
in the costs of curtailed load between the scenarios where grid expansion is restricted.
The increase of costs aligned to load curtailment arises from sub-optimal siting of gener-
ators. Due to the market design which is unable to uncover scarcities in the grid within
a bidding zone by means of appropriate price signals, investments are made based on
supply site characteristics only. As a result, there is not enough generation capacity
available at every node and it is furthermore not possible to import sufficient capacity
without grid expansion. This in turn leads to situations where redispatch measures
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trying to overcome internal grid restrictions in each bidding zone are not sufficient any
more. Hence, load has to be curtailed at high costs. In the most extreme scenario with
no grid expansion at all, this leads to the additional effect that the implemented CO2
quota cannot be fulfilled anymore by the electricity sector, meaning that some other
sectors have to increase their CO2 reduction efforts.
Max. grid expansion [TWkm/10a] 0 5 10 15 20 30
Generation [Bn. e] 940.7 938.1 932.5 930.6 930.2 929.5
Grid (including redispatch) [Bn. e] 8.2 8.1 7.9 9.7 10.2 10.7
Load curtailment [Bn. e] 1.169.9 211.5 93.5 65.7 0 0
CO2 shift to other sectors [Bn. e] 120 0.6 0 0 0 0
Total [Bn. e] 2238.3 1158.2 1033.9 1006.1 940.9 940.2
Table 3.4: Total system costs of scenarios (in e2011 up to 2030)
Remarkable – while looking at the results on total system costs – is the fact that grid
expansion costs are rather low compared to any other cost factor and almost negligible
if generation and grid costs are compared. The non-monotonous trend of the grid costs
over the scenarios can be explained by the included redispatch costs, which depend on
the optimization of the generation and not the transmission level.
3.3.2 Development of grid capacities
3.3.2.1 DC and AC capacities
Figure 3.9 shows the grid expansion in the different scenarios for the period from 2011 to
2020 as well as between 2020 and 2030 for AC, DC, as well as the aggregated grid expan-
sion, measured in TWkm. Between 2011 and 2020, the total grid expansion restrictions
are binding for the system in Scenario 0 through 20, whereas between 2020 and 2030
grid restrictions are binding only for the Scenarios 0 through 15. Thus, for Scenario 30,
grid expansion is not restricted in any decade, which means that the investments made
in this scenario are system optimal, such that Scenario 30 can serve as a benchmark
with respect to cost efficiency (see above).
To put the total grid expansion into context, the starting grid from 2011 for the CWE
region has a capacity of 70.8 TWkm, split between 68.0 TWkm for AC and 2.8 TWkm
for DC. In Scenario 30, which has a total of 32.9 TWkm of grid expansion between 2011
and 2030, this represents a grid capacity expansion of 46.4 %.49
In Figure 3.9 and 3.10, it can be seen that the AC network is extended significantly
more than the DC network. One reason is that there are simply more AC connections
49In the optimal grid scenario considered by Hagspiel et al. (2014), the grid for the entire ENTSO-E
area was extended by 48 % between 2011 and 2030.
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Figure 3.9: Capacity development in TWkm for the period 2011-2020 (left) and
2020-2030 (right)
Figure 3.10: Total capacity development for 2011-2030 (left) and the share of DC in
the total network expansion (right)
available to the optimizer to extend; only DC connections that already exist and those
planned in the TYNDP 2012 are fed into the initial network topology for optimization.
Another reason is that DC lines are more expensive because of the costs of the AC-DC
converter stations at each end of the line. 50 However, these results also indicate that
DC lines are prioritized when the grid restrictions are enforced. The share of DC in
the total network expansion decreases monotonically as the grid restrictions are relaxed
(see Figure 3.10). In absolute terms, for the total period 2011-2030, the DC expansion
increases, peaks at just over double the existing DC capacity, and then decrease as the
grid restrictions disappear. In Figure 3.9 it can be seen that DC capacity increases as
the overall capacity limit increases in each decade, but only as long as the overall grid
restriction for AC and DC is binding. When grid restrictions are no longer binding for
a decade (Scenario 30 for 2011-2020 and Scenario 20 for 2020-2030), the DC capacity
drops as cheaper AC lines are prioritized over extending DC lines. This shows that DC
lines help the system to deal with the grid expansion restrictions and to compensate
missing AC lines. A reason for preferring DC to AC is that the power flow is more
controllable, so that power transfers can be directed over long distances, rather than
spreading out in the AC network in ”loop flows”, which overload wide areas of the AC
network. This underlines the importance of DC lines for example to integrate renewable
50See Table 3.9 in the Appendix for the transmission cost assumptions
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energies into the system. As a result, whenever grid restrictions are in place, DC lines
allow a better system optimum.
3.3.2.2 Inter-temporal effects
In Figure 3.9, an interesting interplay between grid expansion during the two decades
2011-2020 and 2020-2030 can be seen. The less restricted grid expansion are, the more
transmission lines are built in the first decade between 2011 and 2020. Grid expansion
in the second decade increases first and then decreases, which shows that it is more
valuable for the system to have lines installed early, i.e., by 2020. This higher value
may be due to the fact that the lines built in the first decade are used for a longer time.
The effects also become visible when looking at the imposed grid expansion restrictions:
The 2011-2020 restriction is binding longer (up to and including Scenario 20 ) than the
2020-2030 restriction (up to and including Scenario 15 ), which shows the inter-temporal
effect of grid expansion and thus, the optimality of building the grid earlier. The inter-
temporal effect is strong enough that the total grid expansion from 2011 to 2030 is lower
in Scenario 30 than Scenario 20 (see Figure 3.10), because of the suboptimal binding
grid restriction in Scenario 20 for the decade 2011-2020.
3.3.2.3 Geographical distribution
Figure 3.11 shows the geographical distribution of the grid expansion for three scenarios
including the optimal grid from Scenario 30. Noticeably, many of the grid expansion
are concentrated in France and its borders with other countries. This results from the
good wind resources in France, that are located particularly along its coastline. The
electrical load along the coast is weak, so network extensions are needed to transport
the wind power to load centers elsewhere in Europe. These good wind resources are
currently under-exploited, but represent the cheapest option to decrease CO2 emissions
in the CWE region.
Setting 15 Setting 30Setting 5
Figure 3.11: Maps of grid expansion for scenarios 5, 10 and 30
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There are also grid bottlenecks within Germany, which are overcome with both new
AC lines and DC lines along the planned corridors from North to South Germany. The
controversial DC line within corridor D, planned by the German TSOs to carry wind
and solar power from East to South Germany (Bavaria), is extended in each scenario
where grid expansion is allowed; Corridor A ranging from the North Sea to Southern
Germany is also expanded in Scenario 15.
3.3.2.4 Inter- vs. intra-zonal grid expansion
In the grid model for the CWE region in 2011, 30 % of the grid capacity measured in
TWkm is made up of cross-border lines (this is higher than the actual grid, because of
the way countries at the boundary of the CWE region have been aggregated to single
nodes, lengthening cross-border lines). However, interconnectors make up 42 % of all
grid expansion in Scenario 30, meaning that interconnector capacity is more valuable
on average than internal, national grid connections. This is particularly due to the
possibility to exploit cheaper generation sites and being then able to transport it to
load centers within Europe using interconnector capacities. Between 2011 and 2030,
interconnector capacity rises by 65 %. There is some overlap between the distribution
of grid expansion calculated here and the European Commission’s Projects of Common
Interest51, particularly for the internal DC lines in Germany and the strengthening
of interconnectors between Spain and France and between Germany and Switzerland.
However, grid expansions in Figure 3.11 are much more heavily concentrated in France
and its interconnectors, due to the significant expansion of wind power in France in the
scenarios presented here. Similarly, the dominance of grid expansion in France is not
reflected in the 2012 or 2014 TYNDP.
3.3.3 Generation and generation capacities
The total generation capacities and total dispatch in the CWE region in 2030 are shown
in Figure 3.12 for each scenario. Overall, there is very little change in installed capacities
as grid restrictions are lifted. Comparing Scenario 0 to Scenario 30, there is an increase
of wind capacity of 17 GW, which takes place exclusively in France as inland sites with
lower capacity factors than the coast are exploited. This raises the wind capacity in
France from 55 GW to 72 GW in 2030. This better use of cheap wind resources in
France is also reflected in the grid expansion (see Figure 3.11). There is a small drop in
solar capacity of 3.8 GW in the British Isles, as grid expansion allow PV to be replaced
by cheaper wind generation. In each scenario the offshore wind capacities are identical,
amounting to 42.6 GW in 2020 and 42.0 GW in 2030.
51https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/infrastructure/projects-common-interest
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Figure 3.12: Total generation capacity (left) and yearly dispatch (right) in 2030 for
the different grid restriction scenarios
More change is visible in the yearly dispatch of each technology. Between Scenario 0 and
Scenario 30 there is a 53 TWh/a increase in wind generation, almost exclusively due
to the extra wind capacity in France but also due to reduced curtailment of renewables
in France, the Netherlands and Germany, as grid bottlenecks ease. Solar generation
increases by 6 TWh/a despite the lower capacity, due to lower renewable curtailment
in France and particularly in Germany. Gas generation is reduced by 63 TWh/a and
replaced by CO2-free renewable generation as well as lignite generation, primarily from
Central Eastern European countries (increasing by 31 TWh/a). This substitution of gas
with lignite as grid capacity increases is induced by lower fuel costs of lignite than gas,
which outweigh its higher CO2 emissions per kWh. There is also 8 GWh/a more coal
generation in the Iberian peninsular, enabled by the grid expansion between Spain and
France.
The distribution of generation capacity is in general very insensitive to grid expansion be-
cause of the way the grid and market are coupled. In the initial dispatch and generation
capacity optimization the internal grid constraints of each country are not visible; the
internal bottlenecks only become apparent in the next step, as redispatch is performed
in each bidding zone. However, the redispatch does not directly affect the optimality of
the investment and dispatch decisions in the market. The only impact stems from the
indirect effect of altered interconnection capacities, which become visible in the scenarios
with little grid expansion.
The capacity and generation of pumped hydro storage and hydro storage dams remains
nearly constant throughout all scenarios, which shows that the role of these types of
storage in the system is not influenced by restrictions on grid expansion. Thus, storage
is no substitute for grid expansion. Pump storage capacity is highest in the Southern
region (Switzerland, Austria and Italy) whereas hydro storage capacity is highest in
Northern Europe (mainly Norway) followed by the southern region (22 and 14 GW).
However, as the potential in these countries is already mostly exhausted, there are no
capacity expansion in these regions. Nevertheless, the value of storage is demonstrated
when looking at the United Kingdom (UK) where pump storage capacity increases from
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3 to 6 GW when grid expansion are highly restricted and to only 5 GW in the less
restricted scenarios. At the same time the good and until now not exhausted wind
resources in the UK are explored and thus wind capacities increase from 10 GW in 2011
to roughly 72 GW in 2030 throughout all scenarios. As exports to other countries are
limited, other sources of demand to absorb this wind generation are needed. Therefore,
storage is built. Thus, for the very special case of the UK, storage is a substitute to
extending the DC connections (which are limited) to the rest of the CWE region. In
addition, grid bottlenecks in France prevent imports of wind power from the UK, which
may also drive the expansion of storage capacity in the UK when grid expansions are
restricted.
3.4 Conclusion
We investigated the effect of restricted grid expansion for the EU’s 2030 energy strategy
under the current market design. In case of grid restrictions, this market design is
inherently incomplete due to the zonal markets that fail to provide efficient locational
price signals. As a case study, we analyzed the development of the European electricity
system with focus on the Central Western European region. The analyzed scenarios
for the restricted grid expansion reach from no expansion at all to non-restricted grid
expansion. To compute the outcomes, we used a linear model covering the generation
as well as the transmission level with endogenous investment and dispatch decisions for
both levels. Our modeling approach allowed us to explicitly represent the incompleteness
of the zonal market design, which applies a flow-based market coupling along national
borders with redispatch after market clearing.
We found that the incompleteness of the market design leads to a misallocation of
generation capacities and the inability of the system to transport electricity to where it
is needed. If further measures are not taken, load has to be curtailed to ensure system
stability. Although load curtailment, as a proxy for the relevance of measures in our
simulation, decreases sharply if some grid expansion is allowed, we still see curtailment,
even for an allowed grid expansion of 15 TWkm per decade. Affected regions are mainly
those that are characterized by poor conditions for renewables and far away from (new)
generation sites. Most severe load curtailment appears in Southern Germany. The
restriction on grid expansion has a visible effect on European climate targets only if
no or very little grid expansion is allowed. With no grid expansion, the renewables
share is 1.5 percentage points lower compared to the other scenarios. As a consequence,
conventional generation with higher CO2 emissions has to jump in, such that the indirect
effect of rising CO2 abatement costs appears. One approach to deal with restricted grid
expansion is the utilization of DC instead of AC lines. When overall grid expansion is
restricted, DC can bring advantages by directing long-distance power flows, which would
otherwise cause loop-flows in the AC network causing wide-spread overloading.
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Generally, in the context of restricted grid expansion, an adaptation of the current
market design should be considered. As has been shown, the prevailing market design
is inherently incomplete, which may have severe consequences, especially when facing
substantial changes in the supply structure. Hence, additional measures are needed,
such as administrative intervention to ensure sufficient levels of generation capacity
outside the market (as it is currently handled in Germany by means of a grid reserve for
redispatch), different shapes of price zones, or via an implementation of locational price
elements into the market. Moreover, the issue of the right location should also play a
role when designing renewable support schemes, since they are the main driver of the
changing infrastructure.
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3.5 Appendix
Abbreviation Dimension Description
Model sets
i, j, k, q ∈ I Nodes, I = [1, 2, ...]
m,n ∈M Zonal markets, M = [1, 2, ...]
i ∈ Im Nodes that belong to zonal market m, Im ⊂ I
t ∈ T Points in time where dispatch decisions are made,
e.g. hours , T = [1, 2, ...]
y ∈ Y Points in time where investment decisions are made,
e.g. years, Y = [1, 2, ...]
b ∈ B Decades of grid expansion restriction, B = [1, 2, ...]
Model parameters
δi,y EUR/kW Investment and FOM costs of generation capacity in
node i at time y
γi,t EUR/kWh Variable costs of generation capacity in node i at time t
µi,j,y EUR/kW Investment costs of line between node i and node j
at time y
di,t kW Electricity demand in node i at time t
li,j km Length of line between node i and node j
z TWkm Grid Expansion Limit per decade
Model primal variables
Gi,y kW Generation capacity in node i at time y, Gi,y ≥ 0
Gi,t kW Generation dispatch in node i at time t, Gi,t ≥ 0
Tm,n,t kW Electricity trade from market m to market n at time t
X EUR Costs of generation
Y EUR Costs of TSO
P i,j,y kW Line capacity between node i and node j at time y,
P i,j.y ≥ 0
Pm,n,t kW Capacity between market m and node n at time t
determined by function g, Pm,n,t ≥ 0
Pi,j,t kW Electricity flow on line between node i and node j
at time t
Ri,t kW Redispatch in node i at time t
Table 3.5: Model sets, parameters and variables
To depict the CWE region in a high spatial resolution, we split the gross electricity
demand per country among the nodes belonging to this country according to the per-
centage of population living in that region.
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Country 2011 2020 2030
Belgium 87 98 105
Germany 573 612 629
France 466 524 559
Luxembourg 7 8 8
Netherlands 113 128 137
Eastern 276 328 366
Northern 387 436 465
Southern 450 528 594
Southwest 317 378 433
United Kingdom 400 450 481
Table 3.6: Gross electricity demand (without own consumption and pump storage)
[TWh]
Technology 2020 2030
Wind Onshore 1253 1188
Wind Offshore (<20m depth) 2800 2350
Wind Offshore (>20m depth) 3080 2585
Photovoltaics (roof) 1260 935
Photovoltaics (ground) 1110 785
Biomass gas 2398 2395
Biomass solid 3297 3295
Biomass gas, CHP 2597 2595
Biomass solid, CHP 3497 3493
Geothermal 10504 9500
Compressed Air Storage 1100 1100
Pump Storage 1200 1200
Lignite 1500 1500
Lignite Innovative 1600 1600
Coal 1200 1200
Coal Innovative 2025 1800
CCGT 711 711
OCGT 400 400
Nuclear 3157 3157
Table 3.7: Generation technology investment costs [e/kW]
Fuel type 2011 2020 2030
Nuclear 3.6 3.3 3.3
Lignite 1.4 1.4 2.7
Oil 39.0 47.6 58.0
Coal 9.6 10.1 10.9
Gas 14.0 23.1 25.9
Table 3.8: Assumptions for the gross fuel prices [e/MWhth]
Grid Technology Extension costs FOM costs
AC overhead line incl. compensation 445 e/(MVA*km) 2.2 e/(MVA*km)
DC overhead line 400 e/(MW*km) 2.0 e/(MW*km)
DC underground 1250 e/(MW*km) 6.3 e/(MW*km)
DC submarine 1100 e/(MW*km) 5.5 e/(MW*km)
DC converter pair 150000 e/MW 750.0 e/MW
Table 3.9: Assumptions for the grid extension and FOM costs
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Is an inefficient transmission market bet-
ter than none at all? - On zonal and nodal
pricing in electricity systems
4.1 Introduction
Liberalization in electricity markets has led to an unbundling of formerly vertically in-
tegrated utilities. Consequentially, electricity generation and grid operation are tasks
performed by separated entities. Still, since the balance of electricity production and
consumption is crucial for system stability, generator schedules must respect the phys-
ical constraints of the transmission infrastructure to circumvent any imbalances caused
by congestion. Different approaches for dealing with the transmission constraints have
therefore been proposed and implemented. In some parts of the USA nodal pricing was
introduced (e.g., by PJM or NYISO) providing one price for every grid node and hence
explicit scarcity signals for transmission in the price differences between these nodes.
Meanwhile, several countries in Europe opted for a national zone with a uniform price
where transmission constraints are invisible in the market. Possible violations of the
intra-zonal transmission constraints in these zones is usually being handled administra-
tively by a Transmission System Operator (TSO). E.g., by reallocating the production
of power plants (a so-called redispatch) after the market clearing with respect to con-
gestion.
In the process of creating an internal European market for electricity, the European
TSOs are obligated to deliver a review of these zones with respect to their performance.
In this context, the umbrella group of the European regulators, ACER, issued a report
which states that the ”European electricity target model envisages [...] properly defined
bidding zones”, but recognizes that ”[...] the meaning of ’properly defined bidding zones’
is not straightforward and needs deeper consideration.”(ACER, 2014).
The scientific literature focusing on this topic (e.g., Harvey and Hogan (2000), Bjørndal
and Jørnsten (2001)), however, essentially is rather straightforward, stating that the only
properly defined bidding zones are actually nodes. It is argued that such a nodal pricing
is superior over any zonal pricing approach, because hiding transmission scarcities from
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the market leads to inherent inefficiencies. A zonal aggregation could not be as efficient
as a nodal pricing approach wherein the real value of transmission capacities is visible
to market participants. Considering complete and competitive markets, Green (2007)
provides empirical evidence for this argument for England and New Wales, and Bertsch
et al. (2015) for the Central Western European region.
A more efficient market due to a larger market area with more participants is an opposed
argument brought up in favor of zonal pricing. A larger market area should increase
liquidity and reduce market power (e.g., CAISO (2000)). For the spot market however,
Harvey and Hogan (2000) and Hogan (1999) show exemplarily that nodal pricing handles
market power issues efficiently, while a zonal pricing approach might lead to perverse
incentives and increasing congestion. Possible market power, but also liquidity, i.e., the
possibility for traders to quickly buy or sell an asset while having a minor impact on price,
is determined by the physical constraints in the spot market. A zonal pricing regime
pretends more intense competition or better liquidity by allowing physically infeasible
trades within a zone. Resolving these physically not viable trades brings up the need
for curative measures, e.g., redispatch. In the end, market power is shifted from the
spot market to the redispatch and infeasible trades, simulating liquidity, have to be
administratively undone. It is not clear, why this should be (more) efficient in any case.
Hogan (1999) states that an administrative pricing rule, i.e., neglecting transmission
scarcities by averaging prices, does not alter the physical realities, which in the end
determine the characteristics of the spot market - an argument also recognized in ACER
(2014).
Empirical work (e.g., Bartholomew et al. (2003), Kristiansen (2005), Siddiqui et al.
(2005), Deng et al. (2010), Adamson et al. (2010)) however, has shown that nodal
pricing regimes can lack efficiency in forward markets for transmission rights. In a nodal
pricing regime, energy forwards are usually traded at central hubs, while (financial)
transmission rights are defined from every node to this hub. The market for these
transmissions rights might not be efficient if market participants have poor expectations
about the prices, transaction costs are high or liquidity is low due to few participants.
If the forward market for these transmission rights is not efficient, an aggregation of
nodes to zones and hence, a reduced number of transmission rights to be traded, might
be advantageous. An aggregation of nodes to bidding zones implicitly hedges all risks of
transmission constraints and socializes the costs via the curative measures in the spot
market. The remaining question and the issue addressed in this paper is therefore: Under
which circumstances does the inefficiency of a transmission forward market (in a nodal
pricing regime) matter more than the inefficiencies induced by neglecting transmission
(in a zonal pricing regime)?
To show the general effects of the two inefficiencies of the different pricing regimes, a
simple two node model with two producers, a retailer and a transmission system opera-
tor with a spot and forward market is developed. On the forward market a transmission
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right for hedging against the risk of congestion can be traded, while on the spot market
only energy is considered. The TSO clears the market in a welfare optimal way while
ensuring physical feasibility. For performing comparative statics of nodal and zonal
pricing, a more complex model incorporating more nodes, loop flows as well as energy
and transmission forwards is used. The spot and forward market model by Bessem-
binder and Lemmon (2002) and de Maere d’Aertrycke and Smeers (2013) serves as a
base. The stochastic equilibrium model by de Maere d’Aertrycke and Smeers (2013)
incorporates missing liquidity in a nodal pricing system via a volume constraint for for-
ward transmission contracts. I extend their model by a zonal pricing approach and a
producer-only redispatch. Furthermore, an exogenous bid-ask-spread to model effects of
inefficiencies such as missing liquidity, transaction costs etc. is implemented. Compared
to a volume-constrained approach, this allows to solve for unique prices of transmission
forward contracts and hence, a unique equilibrium, which is essential for comparing the
two pricing regimes. A consistent numerical setting (proposed by Chao and Peck (1998))
is chosen and a systematic numerical analysis performed by varying the influencing fun-
damental factors such as grid restrictions, supply and demand properties as well as the
bid-ask spread and risk aversion.
The contribution to the literature is twofold: First, a consistent model for comparing
the effects of inefficiencies in nodal and zonal pricing regimes is developed. Second,
comparative statics for an established numerical framework is performed to identify
relevant circumstances regarding the comparison of both pricing regimes.
With no inefficiencies in transmission forward markets, the arguments of the theoretical
literature can be confirmed and it can be concluded that nodal pricing performs always
better than zonal pricing. The relative performance of zonal pricing improves with
decreasing congestion and is equal to nodal pricing in case of no congestion at all. In
addition, smaller supply cost differences and a more inelastic demand work in favor
of zonal pricing. In the case of an inefficient transmission forward market, situations
appear wherein zonal pricing performs better than nodal pricing. The total number of
such cases increases with increasing bid-ask-spread and risk aversion.
The results show that efficiency of transmission right markets does in fact matter. Hence,
for finding ’properly defined bidding zones’, the efficiency of forward markets for trans-
mission should be one criterion. With a zonal pricing in place this could mean that,
e.g., the geographical coverage of a zone should be defined as a trade-off between the
inefficiencies of a zonal pricing and a nodal pricing regime. The respective measure or a
possible change of pricing mechanisms, however, has to include political considerations
and transaction costs of system adaption.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces a simple model. The model used
for comparative statics, the numerical framework and results are presented in Section 3.
Section 4 concludes.
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4.2 A simple model
Within this section, a simple two node model for comparing a zonal pricing regime with
a redispatch of producers and a nodal pricing regime with an inefficient transmission
forward market is established. This allows to identify some general effects, which also
apply to larger models. At first, the differences in the spot market outcomes with and
without congestion are shown. Next, the differences considering a an additional forward
market are analyzed.
4.2.1 Spot market outcomes without congestion
Consider an electricity system with two nodes and a single time period. A producer with
constant marginal costs of c1 is located at node 1 and a producer with constant marginal
costs of c2 is located at node 2. Both producers have infinite production capacities, but
producer 2 has higher costs, i.e., c1 < c2. The final consumer demand is located at
node 2 and represented by some demand function Dl(pr) with ∂D
l(pr)
∂pr < 0. A retailer
buys electricity at price ps from the producers and sells it to the final consumers at
price pr, which is the (weighted) average price of all possible spot market realizations
pr = E(ps).52 Producers and retailers are considered as price-takers. The transmission
capacity between the nodes k is considered to be larger than the maximum demand,
i.e., no congestion occurs. With no congestion, the market outcomes for nodal (NP) and
zonal pricing (ZP) are the same as indicated in Figure 4.1. Only the producer at node
1 is dispatched, the spot price is ps = c1 and the retail price is p
r = ps = c1 resulting in
a demand of q∗ = Dl(c1).
Profits are zero for producers and the retailer. Hence, total welfare for the case with no
congestion (noc) is determined only by the consumer rent:
WNP,snoc = W
ZP,s
noc =
∫ ∞
c1
Dl(pr)dpr (4.1)
4.2.2 Spot market outcomes with congestion
Now consider that transmission capacity is limited due to a higher demand (i.e., k <
Dh(c2)). For ensuring physical feasibility, a benevolent transmission system operator
(TSO) is introduced. In the zonal pricing regime, the TSO performs a redispatch of
the producers after the market outcome until the transmission constraints are fulfilled.
In the nodal pricing regime, the TSO clears the market considering the transmission
constraint. The spot market outcomes now differ for the pricing regimes.
52In this case there is only one realization and therefore pr = ps, but generally there is more than one
possible spot market outcome as will be shown later.
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Figure 4.1: Spot market result without congestion
4.2.2.1 Nodal pricing outcome
The TSO clears the market with a cost-minimal dispatch considering the transmission
constraint. The producer at node 1 now generates electricity up to k, whereas the
producer at node 2 produces from k to q∗ = Dh(c2) (Figure 4.2). The prices reflect the
marginal costs at the respective nodes with ps1 = c1 and p
r = ps2 = c2.
Das ist eine tolle Grafik und hier steht ein inte essanter Text.
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Figure 4.2: Spot market result for nodal pricing with congestion
It is assumed that the TSO receives the profit resulting from the price difference between
the nodes and the quantity transmitted from node 1 to node 2. Profits of the TSO and
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welfare in this congested case (con) are
piNP,stso = (c2 − c1)k (4.2)
WNP,scon = pi
NP,s
tso +
∫ ∞
c2
Dh(pr)dpr (4.3)
4.2.2.2 Zonal pricing outcome
In the zonal pricing regime, the market outcome is calculated as in the case of no
congestion, i.e., prices are pr = ps = c1, demand is q
∗ = Dh(c1) and profits are zero for
producers and the retailer. However, this outcome is technically not feasible, because
the producer at node 1 would export more than k to node 2. The TSO now redispatches
the two producers until technical feasibility is achieved. For this, the TSO reduces the
quantity of the producer at node 1 to k and increases the production of the producer at
node 2 to D(c1) − k. In Figure 4.3 the left graph shows the spot market outcome and
the right graph shows the real dispatch. For the quantity from k to q∗ the producer at
node 2 is dispatched, but still, electricity is traded at ps = c1.
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Figure 4.3: Spot market result for zonal pricing with congestion
The additional costs result in a negative TSO profit. Profit and welfare are
piZP,stso = (c1 − c2)(Dh(c1)− k) (4.4)
WZP,scon = pi
ZP,s
tso +
∫ ∞
c1
Dh(pr)dpr (4.5)
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4.2.2.3 Comparing the spot market outcomes
Comparing WNP,scon and W
ZP,s
con yields:
∆Wcon = W
NP,s
con −WZP,scon
= (c2 − c1)k +
∫ ∞
c2
Dh(pr)dpr − (c1 − c2)(Dh(c1)− k)−
∫ ∞
c1
Dh(pr)dpr
=
∫ c1
c2
Dh(pr)dpr︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+ (c2 − c1)Dh(c1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(4.6)
and see immediately that ∆W has to be always larger than zero if ∂D
l(pr)
∂pr < 0, i.e., if
demand decreases in price. In the zonal pricing market outcome demand is too high
due to neglecting the transmission capacities. This inherent inefficiency is induced by
only allowing producers for redispatch. In Figure 4.4 the striped area marks the welfare
delta induced by the inefficiency.
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Figure 4.4: Comparison of spot m rket results with congestion
If demand is allowed for redispatch, both regimes would lead to the same outcome. The
same would be the case, if demand is inelastic. This means the more inelastic demand
and the more negligible the cost differences of the nodes, the smaller is the welfare delta
between the two regimes.
4.2.3 Forward market outcome
A forward market is considered, on which a transmission forward can be traded. The
transmission forward or financial transmission right (FTR) is defined as the right to
75
4 Is an inefficient transmission market better than none at all?
collect the congestion rent, i.e., the price differences, between two nodes or zones. There
are two possible spot market outcomes at the time trade takes place at the forward
market, namely the ones described above with either no congestion (noc) (probability
µ) or congestion con (probability 1 − µ). Empirical literature (e.g., Viehmann (2011))
has found that market participants in electricity markets show risk averse behavior.
Hence, producers and and the retailer are assumed to be risk averse in the sense that
they require additional capital for possible losses. The TSO is considered to be risk
neutral.53
In zonal pricing, the market participants do not see any transmission capacity in the
spot market outcome and hence, there is no forward market for transmission. The prices
ps and pr are always the same, regardless of congestion. Producers and retailers -despite
being risk averse- have no desire to hedge any possible spot market realization due to
the variance of their profits being zero. Overall welfare in the forward market for zonal
pricing is:
WZP,f = µWZP,snoc +(1−µ)WZP,scon = µ
[∫ ∞
c1
Dl(pr)dpr
]
+(1−µ)
[
pistso +
∫ ∞
c1
Dh(pr)dpr
]
(4.7)
In the nodal pricing regime, the forward market outcome is different. The producer
at node 1 gets always the same price regardless of congestion. The producer at node
2 and the retailer however, face two possible price realizations. The expectation value
of the profits are still zero, but the retailer has a loss with probability 1 − µ due to
the fixed retail price. Risk aversion of the retailer is indicated by some function U(pi)
describing the additional capital requirements of losses with U(pi) < pi ∀ pi < 0 and
U(pi) = pi ∀ pi ≥ 0. Hence, the retailer is willing to give up some profit from the case
of no congestion to hedge against the possible losses. This can be done with the TSO
offering a FTR x at price pf,bid which allows the consumption of the congestion rent.
The retailer can buy this FTR at price pf,ask. The profit functions change to
piNP,fr = µU(pi
s
r,noc) + (1− µ)U(pisr,con) + pf,askx (4.8)
piNP,ftso = (1− µ)pitso,con − pf,bidx (4.9)
The FTR is independent of the realization of either the congested or the uncongested
case since it is an option to consume the congestion rent in case of congestion. The risk
averse retailer is willing to give up some profit from the uncongested case in order to
reduce her losses in the congested case. The risk neutral TSO will take over all risk
of the retailer, if pf,ask = pf,bid. The bid-ask-spread is equal to zero if there are no
transaction costs and the traded contract is fully liquid. However, it can be greater than
53Of course, also a risk averse TSO could be assumed. The reason for the assumption of risk neutrality
is due to making the pricing regimes comparable: In the zonal pricing regime, neglecting transmission
capacities could be interpreted as a risk neutral administrative hedge against congestion risks. Hence,
an equivalent assumption becomes necessary in the nodal pricing regime.
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zero if the asset lacks liquidity or transaction costs occur, i.e., pf,ask < pf,bid. In this
case, the TSO is not able to fully take over the risk of the retailer, who is left with some
unhedged losses.
Overall welfare in the forward market for nodal pricing is:
WNP,f =µ
[
U(pisr,noc) +
∫ ∞
c1
Dl(pr)dpr
]
+ (1− µ)
[
U(pisr,con) + pi
s
tso +
∫ ∞
c2
Dh(pr)dpr
]
− pf,bidx+ pf,askx (4.10)
The comparison of the welfare in the forward markets yields:
∆W f = WNP,f −WZP,f = ∆Wcon + (1− µ)
[
U(piNP,sr,con ) + pi
NP,s
tso,con
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Costs of unhedged risks
− (pf,bid − pf,ask)x︸ ︷︷ ︸
Bid-ask-spread inefficiency
(4.11)
In addition to the spot market welfare delta, there are two new parts stemming from
the possibly unhedged loss of the retailer and the possible bid-ask-spread. Both terms
work in favor of zonal pricing since they can at largest be zero, if pf,ask = pf,bid. In
case the bid-ask-spread is larger than zero, the retailer cannot fully hedge the losses by
buying FTRs from the TSO. Hence, both terms become negative and reduce the delta
between nodal and zonal pricing. In case of a positive bid-ask-spread the question which
regime performs better depends on whether this inefficiency is larger than the inefficiency
induced by the producer-only redispatch of the zonal pricing regime, included in ∆Wcon.
From the analysis of the spot market outcome it was already obtained that smaller
cost differences and a more inelastic demand improve the relative performance of zonal
compared to nodal pricing. From the forward market analysis it can be concluded that
a higher bid-ask-spread and higher costs of unhedged risks work in the same direction
and may even (over)compensate the inefficiencies of zonal pricing in the spot market.
4.3 Comparative statics
In order to further investigate the trade-off obtained in the simple model, more details
of the electricity grid are now considered. There are two main characteristics which
deserve special consideration, namely the spatial distribution and correlation of demand
as well as different grid configurations. Flows in electricity grid can usually not be
directed from node to another and hence, an injection of electricity anywhere in the grid
impacts electricity flows on all lines. This becomes especially relevant in combination
with changing demand patterns. Therefore, a model incorporating more nodes, the
spatial distribution of demand, loop flows, more possible spot market outcomes and a
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forward market for transmission rights and energy is developed. With this model, a
numerical analysis with a broad variation for the named characteristics is performed.
The often applied setting by Chao and Peck (1998) is used as consistent numerical base.
4.3.1 A slightly more complicated model
For the general formulation of the model I follow Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002) and
de Maere d’Aertrycke and Smeers (2013) and extend their nodal pricing formulation to
incorporate zonal pricing with a producer-only redispatch. Furthermore, an alternative
modeling approach for inefficency of the transmission forward market is chosen by im-
plementing a bid-ask-spread instead of constraining the trading volume of transmission
forwards.
4.3.1.1 Market participants and TSO
The market participants are denoted by N consisting of producers NP and retailers NR.
There is either one producer or one retailer at any node ν. Furthermore, an arbitrary
number of nodes can be in one market area m,n of all markets M . Producers have a
cost function consisting of a fixed component a and variable costs b depending on the
quantity sold in the spot market area. In line with Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002)
a quadratic cost function is assumed.
cν(qν) = aνqν +
bν
2
q2ν (4.12)
Producers sell their production in the spot market at price psm and hence their profit is
pisν = p
s
mqν − cν(qν). (4.13)
Retailers buy production at the spot market price psm and sell it to the consumers at a
fixed price prm. Their profit is
pisν = (p
r
m − psm)qν . (4.14)
The linear inverse demand function pν(qν) of the consumers at node ν is subject to
an exogenous shock caused by, e.g., changing weather conditions.54 The shocks are
indicated in the demand function by realizations ω of the exogenous random variable
aν .
pν(qν) = a
ω
ν − bνqν . (4.15)
54This basically corresponds to the different cases in the simple model.
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The fixed price prm is assumed to be the average price resulting from the market clearing
with all possible realizations of aν plus some markup, i.e., p
r
m =
∑Ω
ω prob
ωpωm + µ with∑
ω prob
ω = 1. The markup is the profit the retailer gets from selling electricity to the
final consumers. To a certain extent the markup works as an insurance for having a fixed
retail price and a volatile spot price. Retailer profit can be negative for some realizations
aων depending on the properties of the random variable aν and the markup. To hedge
themselves against the volatility of the spot market and possible losses, producers and
retailers have the possibility to buy or sell contracts c ∈ C with a price pfc and a quantity
xc,ν on the forward market.
55 The underlyings of the forward contracts can either be
based on energy sold in the spot market (psm, q
s
m) or on the right to collect congestion
rent, which is defined as the price difference and the traded quantities between two spot
markets (∆psm,n,∆q
s
m,n).
56 The right to collect congestion rent corresponds to a financial
transmission right. The forward prices are pf,bidc for going long and p
f,ask
c for going short.
The corresponding forward contract quantities xbidc,ν and x
ask
c,ν are not dependent on the
realization ω. The difference between the prices indicates the bid-ask-spread. This differs
from the formulation in de Maere d’Aertrycke and Smeers (2013), where the tradeable
volume was limited to represent an inefficient transmission forward market. Treating
this inefficiency as a bid-ask-spread yields the nice property that the forward price of
each contract for bid or ask is equal for all players. For the later solution this implies
that only one equilibrium exists, which is then arbitrage free if the bid-ask-spread is
exogenous.57
The profit of a producer or retailer in the forward market for one possible realization of
the spot market is
Πων =
C∑
c=1
((ps,ωc − pf,bidc )xbidc,ν + (pf,askc − ps,ωc )xaskc,ν ) + pis,ων (4.16)
The profit realization Πων in the forward market depends on the loss or profit in the spot
market pis,ων . Possible losses in the spot market is costly in the sense of some sort of
additional capital requirement. Hence, market participants try to hedge against losses in
the spot market by giving up some possible profits.58 A producer or retailer optimizes
the overall profit in the forward market by buying forward contracts considering the
55Note that the prices are the same for all market participants while the quantities are individual.
56Due to loop flows the traded quantities are not necessarily the physical flows!
57This is not shown analytically, but the numerical analysis and the behavior of the solution algorithm
for a wide range of starting points indicate that the equilibrium is unique.
58For modeling this, de Maere d’Aertrycke and Smeers (2013) propose a weighted sum of the expecta-
tion of losses and a conditional value at risk (CVaR) as a coherent risk measure (E-CVaR). The condi-
tional value at risk defines the expected value above some value at risk. I follow their definition, but drop
the time variable since only one time period is considered: E-CVaRα,β = (1−β)E[−Πν ]+βCVaRα(Πν).
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additional costs of possible losses indicated by Uων (Π
ω
ν ):
59
max
xν
{∑
ω
probω
[
(1− βν)Πων − βνα−1ν Uων (Πων )
]}
(4.17)
The weight β defines the relative importance of expected losses versus the additional
capital requirements needed for the average losses above some value at risk (specified by
the quantile above α). This means a lower α requires more risk capital and a higher β
puts more emphasis on these capital requirements.
As stated in the simple model, the TSO has some profit in the spot market due to the
collected congestion rent, i.e., the price differences times the traded energy minus the
redispatch costs R.
pistso =
1
2
M∑
m
M∑
n
|∆psm,n||qm,n| −R. (4.18)
Considering the forward market, the TSO has the additional role to emit financial trans-
mission rights and to act as the ultimate counter-party for trading these contracts. Emis-
sion is limited by the actual transmission capacities available in the spot market. The
TSO is only allowed to trade FTRs but no energy forward contracts, leading to the
profit for each realization of the spot market:
Πωtso =
C∑
c=1,c/∈ce
((ps,ωc − pf,bidc )xbidc,tso + (pf,askc − ps,ωc )xaskc,tso) + pis,ωtso (4.19)
The optimization problem for the TSO is the same as for the other market participants,
stated in Equation 4.17.
4.3.1.2 The spot market
The forward and spot market are sequential. Producers, Retailers and the TSO do not
know the exact market outcome of the spot market, but do know all possible outcomes
and the respective probability distribution. Furthermore, a competitive spot and forward
market is considered, with producers and retailers as price takers and the TSO as the
welfare-maximizing market clearer. This allows to first compute all possible spot market
outcomes and then solve for the equilibrium on the forward market.
59Function Uων (Π
ω
ν ) is defined as in the simple model, i.e., U
ω
ν (Π
ω
ν ) < Π
ω
ν ∀ Πων < 0 and Uων (Πων ) =
Πων ∀ Πων ≥ 0.
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Spot market clearing
max
qν
[ ∑
ν∈NR
qν∫
0
pν(qν)dqν −
∑
ν∈NP
qν∫
0
cν(qν)dqν
]
(4.20a)
s.t.
∑
ν∈m
qν +
∑
−m
(qm,−m − q−m,m) = 0 ∀m ∈M (4.20b)
f(qm,−m) ≤ km,−m ∀m ∈M (4.20c)
qν ≥ 0 (4.20d)
The spot market clearing is done by the TSO by maximizing the welfare over quantities q
(Equation 4.20a) subject to the market balance (Equation 4.20b) and the transmission
constraints (Equation 4.20c). If ν is identical to m (implying that real transmission
scarcities are visible in the market), the spot market outcome is at the same time the
optimal dispatch and the problem is physically feasible. This setting corresponds to a
nodal pricing regime. The function f then maps power injections and withdrawals to
load flows on lines. If ν is not identical to m and hence, transmission scarcities are only
incompletely considered, f represents trade flows, restricted by some trading capacity
offered to the market. This corresponds to a zonal pricing regime, wherein the zone
definition depends on the mapping of nodes to markets. A subsequent optimization
to ensure physical feasibility has to be performed.60 The problem is formulated as
cost minimization representing a redispatch of power plants which does not alter the
profits obtained in the spot market. One implicit assumption is that the TSO has full
information about the cost functions of the producers.
Redispatch
min
q
ν∈NP
R =
[ ∑
ν∈NP
qν∫
0
cν(qν)dqν
]
(4.21a)
s.t.
∑
ν∈NP
qν −
∑
ν∈NR
qν = 0 (4.21b)
f(qν) ≤ kν,ν′ (4.21c)
The system balance constraint (equation 4.21b) is defined over all zones, i.e., implying
a coordinated cross-border redispatch. Equation 4.21c now represents the real trans-
mission constraints by indexing over ν instead of m. The objective value of this cost
minimization is given by the redispatch costs R, which are part of the TSO’s profit
function (Equation 4.18).
60The sequential optimization approach ensures that the TSO has no means to actively profit from
redispatching power plants.
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The total welfare of the spot market is computed as the sum of producer, retailer and
TSO profits plus the end consumer rent retrieved over the demand function.
W s =
∑
ν∈N
pisν + pi
s
so + cr
r (4.22)
4.3.1.3 The forward market
The forward market is cleared before the realization of the spot market. On the forward
market the market participants optimize their profits as stated before. The TSO emits
FTRs and acts as the ultimate counterparty for transmission forward contracts. The
market is cleared if no further forward quantity is traded, i.e., retailers, producers and
the TSO have optimized their forward contracting. The forward market clearing can be
defined by the sum of the single optimization problems plus some market clearing and
bid-ask-spread constraint. Index ν is slightly abused by including the TSO to reduce
the complexity of the formulation.
Forward market clearing
max
xν
∑
ν∈{N,TSO}
{∑
ω
probω
[
(1− βν)Πων − βνα−1ν Uων
]}
(4.23a)
s.t.
∑
ν
xbidν,c −
∑
ν
xaskν,c = 0 (4.23b)
f(xbidtso,c − xasktso,c) ≤ km,n (4.23c)
pbidc − paskc ≥ χc (4.23d)
While Equation 4.23a simply sums up the optimization problems of the single players,
Equation 4.23b represents the market clearing condition for all forward contracts. Equa-
tion 4.23c guarantees feasibility of the transmission constraints in the spot market, i.e.,
restricts the TSO’s emission of FTRs to feasible quantities. As in the spot market, the
function f describes a mapping of traded quantities to physical flows, which depends on
the nodal or zonal pricing regime. Considering nodal and zonal pricing the main differ-
ence between the regimes lays in the different number of forward contracts needed. If in
the nodal pricing regime some hubs corresponding to the zones in the zonal pricing are
defined, the number of energy contracts might be the same. The number of transmission
contracts however, is different. In a nodal pricing regime, there are as many transmis-
sion contracts as nodes minus the hub. With zonal pricing, the number of transmission
contracts corresponds to the number of connected zones. Equation 4.23d introduces a
bid-ask-spread, exogenously defined by some value χ.
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Total welfare of the forward market can be computed considering the profit, the addi-
tional capital requirement from unhedged risk and the consumer rent:
W f =
∑
ω
probω
[ ∑
ν∈{N,TSO}
(Πν,ω − α−1ν Uν,ω) + crr,ω
]
(4.24)
4.3.2 Numerical analysis
For the numerical analysis the six-node spot market model introduced by Chao and Peck
(1998) is applied. For the forward market the general setting from de Maere d’Aertrycke
and Smeers (2013), who also use the Chao-Peck model as a basis, is taken. The spot
market model has 3 production and 3 retailer nodes. The structure and the standard
supply and demand functions for these nodes can be seen in Figure 4.5.Das ist eine tolle Grafik und hier steht ein interessanter Text.
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Figure 1: Grafik 4
1
Node Supply functions Cv(qv)
1 10 + 0.05q
2 15 + 0.05q
4 42.5 + 0.025q
Node Demand functions pv(qv)
3 37.5− 0.05q
5 75− 0.1q
6 80− 0.1q
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Figure 4.5: Basic spot market model (Chao and Peck, 1998), taken from de Maere
d’Aertrycke and Smeers (2013)
In the nodal pricing regime, each node represents a spot market, while trading between
these markets is restricted by transmission constraints. For the zonal pricing regime
all nodes are aggregated into one spot market. This allows us to ignore transmission
capacity allocations, which is a rather difficult issue. Due to loop flows the available
transmission capacity depends on the actual dispatch. Hence, the transmission capacity
offered to the market has to be valid for all possible dispatch situations. Furthermore,
contingencies are included when assessing the possible transmission capacity, making
it even more difficult to come up with a reasonable value. One should keep in mind
that this configuration is the worst possible case for zonal pricing and could be relaxed
by, e.g., defining two zones. For our purpose this means that if zonal pricing performs
better in any case, this could also happen with better configuration of bidding zones. To
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ensure physical feasibility, a cost-based redispatch of power plants -as described above-
is applied, which does not affect the profit of the market participants. A risk-neutral
TSO is assumed, i.e, β = 0. This means that in the zonal pricing regime, all congestion
costs are present in the actual redispatch (and do not appear in the forward market).
Drivers for the behavior of market participants in the forward market are costs of risk,
prices and profits. The latter two depend fundamentally on supply and demand charac-
teristics, grid configuration and markup. Furthermore, the bid-ask-spread impacts the
achievable welfare of any market. All the mentioned parameters are varied as shown in
Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Parameter variations
Parameter Variation Steps Scenarios
Demand aων fully correlated,
semi-correlated and
non-correlated (with
different variance)
4
Supply aν between 20% and 180%
at each node
40% 5
Grid k Line 1-6 between 0 and
400 Line 2-5 between 50
and 450
50 9
Markup µ between 0 and 20% for
each retailer
0.05 5
Risk aversion α 0.1, 0.2, 0.4 and 0.8 4
β 0.1, 0.5 and 0.9 3
Bid-ask-spread χ 0, 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 1, 2, 4,
6
8
For each scenario, different dispatch realizations (indicated by ω,
∑
ω prob
ω = 1) with a
varying demand aων are calculated. In the dispatch realizations, the axis intercept of the
demand function is varied between 75% and 125% (respectively 70% and 130% for the
high variance - no correlation scenario) in steps of 12.5 % (30 % for the high variance -
no correlation scenario) at each demand node. The correlation of demand levels at nodes
is differentiated in four demand scenarios, leading to 202 different dispatch situations
in total.61 Beside the demand correlation, additional scenarios consist of variation of
supply costs and grid capacities. There are 180 spot market scenarios with a total of
9,090 different dispatch realizations. For the forward market, scenarios with variation
of the markup of retailers, the costs of risk (α,β) and the bid-ask-spread are calculated.
Together with the spot market scenarios this adds up to 86,400 scenarios in total.
61For each demand scenario, a different number of dispatch realizations is needed, but their probability
always adds up to 1. In the no correlation case, all 125 possible combinations are considered, in the no
correlation - high variance case all 27 combinations are considered. The semi-correlated scenario adds
up to 45 and the fully correlated scenario to 5 dispatch situations.
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The dispatch realization can be computed via an integrated maximization approach for
the nodal pricing regime, while for the zonal pricing regime, the additional redispatch
has to be calculated. For solving the forward market, I follow the solution algorithms
suggested by de Maere d’Aertrycke and Smeers (2013). They solve the forward market as
an iterative linear problem by fixing the forward price and updating it with the marginal
of the equilibrium constraint. The iterative solution algorithm allows us to introduce
the bid-ask-spread χ as the difference between the bid and the ask price in the updating
of the forward prices. With (bid and ask) prices being equal for all market participants
the resulting equilibrium is a global optimum.62 The global optimum property enables
the comparison of the two pricing regimes. The solution algorithm starts with the
initialization of the forward prices, which are then fixed in the forward market clearing.
If the sum  over the marginal of the forward quantities market clearing condition ηc
(equation 4.23b) is smaller than some pre-defined solution accuracy δ, the algorithm
stops.
0: Initialize pf,bidc = 0, p
f,ask
c = 0
1: While ( ≥ δ) do
2: Forward market clearing
3: pf,bidc = p
f,bid
c + ηc
4: pf,askc = p
f,bid
c − χ
5:  = ‖ηc‖
6: end while
4.3.3 Results
4.3.3.1 Efficient transmission forward market
The numerical simulation with the variations presented above confirms the general in-
sights from the previous section. Figure 4.6 shows the delta performance of nodal to
zonal pricing with respect to overall welfare. A positive (negative) number indicates bet-
ter performance of nodal (zonal) pricing. For every parameter variation, the minimum
and average of all scenario combinations are given. The numbers should be interpreted
with care, because the absolute numbers depend highly on the chosen parameter setting.
The shape and behavior of the different parameter variations however, can be used to
gain general insights.
The average welfare lays in between 34,120 e for nodal pricing and 25,229 e for zonal
pricing. In all considered scenarios, the delta is at least zero and clearly positive in most
of the cases. For the varying grid configuration, which implicitly indicates the severity
62The convergence of the algorithm with different starting values indicates that the equilibrium is
unique.
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Figure 4.6: Delta performance of nodal to zonal pricing in the spot market
of bottlenecks, the relative performance of zonal pricing decreases with increasing grid
capacities. Logically, with no bottlenecks both regimes have the same outcome. With
increasing bottlenecks nodal pricing performs better. This is due to the increased costs
of redispatch measures in the zonal pricing regime.63 This effect is similar for the cost
variation. If supply is cheaper, the severity of bottlenecks in terms of costs decreases
due to reduced overall system costs and hence costs of redispatch. If supply becomes
more costly, a decline of the delta can be observed. This effect stems from reduced
quantities due to decreasing demand. If the supply costs increase further, the delta
would decline to zero at the moment when the demanded quantities become zero. The
delta between nodal and zonal pricing depends slightly on the demand volatility, with a
higher correlation of demand increasing the performance of nodal pricing. An increasing
markup has no significant effect on the relative performance of the two pricing regimes.64
63The decline in the scenario with 150 MW below the standard can be explained by the supply and
demand curves as well as the power flows. For the lines 1-6 and 2-5, transmission capacity is reduced
simultaneously. This impacts the welfare or more precisely the delta welfare between nodal and zonal
pricing in a non-linear way, e.g., due to one node not being supplied any more in the nodal pricing
regime or a different redispatch in the zonal pricing regime.
64Some dispatch situations occur, where total welfare is higher for zonal pricing than for nodal pricing.
This is due to the calculation method of the surplus: The profit of the retailer is added ex-post, not part
of the optimization and furthermore depends on the quantities and volatility. In some cases this causes
(minimally) higher welfare for zonal pricing. However, this effect is due the calculation method and not
dependent on the dispatch system. This partly not precise result is ignored in the further analysis.
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As for the spot market, the numerical simulation for the forward market yields the
same overall outcome. Nodal pricing performs better in any parameter combination
supporting again the general insights from before. Figure 4.7 shows the parameter
variation for the forward market. Not very surprisingly, the fundamental parameters
of the spot market have the same influence in the forward market. The reason for
most minima indicating ∆W f = 0 can be explained by the effect of the increased grid
capacities. At some point in the variation +150 MW and +200 MW grid capacity, there
is no more congestion and hence the welfare converges. The two additional parameter
variations impact the costs of risk. A smaller α indicates higher costs and a higher
β more impact of these costs in relation to the expectation value. The variation of α
does not have much influence, which can be explained by the possibility of all market
participants to find a counterpart to hedge their risks. Retailers can perfectly hedge
their risks with the producers. The variation of β seems to affect the delta between the
regimes. However, as for the cost factor, this is mainly due to the variation in the overall
welfare measure.
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Figure 4.7: Relative performance of nodal to zonal pricing in the forward market
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4.3.3.2 Inefficient transmission forward market
Now the case of an inefficient forward market for transmission is considered. Ineffi-
ciency in this context means that the forward contracts for transmission are not fully
tradeable due to a positive bid-ask-spread. Hence, market participants are not able to
hedge their risks up to the desired level. Obviously, an inefficient transmission forward
market reduces the overall welfare in a nodal pricing regime. Unhedged risks of market
participants cause additional capital requirements. The impact on welfare then depends
on the nodal price volatility in the spot market which causes the risks in the first place.
Furthermore, the level of the additional capital required reduces the overall welfare level.
In addition, the reduced traded quantity of transmission forward contracts possibly im-
pacts the traded quantity of energy forwards and intensifies the welfare reduction (also
shown by de Maere d’Aertrycke and Smeers (2013)). If this welfare reduction is larger
than the inefficiencies in the zonal spot market, a zonal performs better than a nodal
pricing regime. This trade-off might appear to be simple, but it is influenced by several
factors, which are fundamental for both effects. The final trade-off then depends on
the structure of demand, cost differences, severity of congestion as well as the level of
inefficiency in the forward transmission market and the capital requirement.
Figure 4.8 shows the number of scenarios wherein zonal pricing performs as good as
or better than nodal pricing for the fundamental factors. The overall number of zonal
pricing performing better is small compared to the overall number of scenarios. Despite
the total percentage of zonal pricing being advantageous is small, some scenarios could
still be highly relevant. Interesting are the general trends where zonal pricing performs
better than nodal pricing. For the grid variation, it can be seen that zonal pricing
comes closer or performs better than nodal pricing, if there is little congestion. On
the one hand this is due to the overall convergence of the pricing regimes in case of no
congestion. On the other hand with little congestion, redispatch costs become smaller
while costs from inefficiency become more relevant. For the costs variation, small costs
induce low redispatch costs and therefore make the inefficiencies of zonal pricing cheaper.
For demand correlation, the results are somehow counter-intuitive at first sight, since
the relative performance of zonal pricing seems to be increasing with correlation. This
can again be explained by the convergence of the market outcomes if congestion is low
which is the case for higher correlation.
Figure 4.9 shows the relative performance between the pricing regimes for each parameter
variation relevant for the inefficiency of the forward transmission market. Increased
markups reduce losses and hence the needs for hedging, leading to the straightforward
result of a stabilized performance of zonal relative to nodal pricing. An increasing
bid-ask-spread leads to a more inefficient market and hence, zonal pricing performance
improves. Also straightforward are the results for risk aversion. With increasing risk
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Figure 4.8: Number of scenarios with zonal pricing performing equally or better than
nodal pricing dependent on parameter variation
aversion and increased weight put on this risk aversion, more hedging is required and it
is more expensive in terms of welfare not to be able to hedge.65
Even a small increase of the bid-ask-spread reduces traded quantities drastically.66 Fur-
thermore, the impact of an inefficient transmission forward market on the traded quan-
tity of the energy forward can be seen in Figure 4.10. A reduced volume of forward
transmission trades induces a lower quantity of energy forward trades. Retailers try to
hedge their local risk, for which they have to buy an energy forward at the hub and
a transmission forward. If transmission forwards become less attractive due to an in-
creased bid-ask-spread, they also reduce the number of energy forwards for their hedging.
While the reduction of volumes is drastic when introducing a bid-ask-spread, the impact
on prices is lower as shown in Table 4.2.67 Prices increase slightly with decreasing
efficiency. Of course, this stems partly from averaging the values. Simulations with
higher risk aversion induce higher price reductions, e.g., for α = 0.1, β = 0.9 an energy
65The slight peak of β = 0.5 can again be explained by non-linearities caused by the underlying
fundamental values.
66The quantities in the liquid case are significantly higher as in de Maere d’Aertrycke and Smeers
(2013) which is due to a high trading activity of the TSO, which is assumed to be risk neutral.
67The negative value for FTR4 from node 4 to node 6 indicates that with a higher bid-ask-spread the
direction of the FTR changes.
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Figure 4.9: Number of scenarios with zonal pricing performing equal or better than
nodal pricing dependent on parameter variation
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Figure 4.10: Average forward quantities of nodal pricing
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price difference of 5 occurs between the efficient transmission market and a bid-ask-
spread of 4. No shifting from one FTR to another seems to take place when looking at
the prices. The reason for this however is that the bid-ask-spread is equal for all FTR,
keeping the general relationships stable.
Bid-Ask-Spread
0,0 0,1 0,25 0,5 1,0 2,0 4,0 6,0
Energy (6) 44,4 44,4 44,4 44,5 44,5 44,7 44,9 45,1
FTR1 (6-1) 20,9 21,0 21,1 21,2 21,3 21,7 22,1 22,5
FTR2 (6-2) 16,7 16,8 16,8 17,0 17,1 17,5 18,2 18,8
FTR3 (6-3) 19,1 19,2 19,3 19,4 19,6 19,9 20,6 21,1
FTR4 (4-6) 1,8 1,8 1,7 1,6 1,4 1,0 0,4 -0,1
FTR5 (6-5) 4,1 4,1 4,2 4,3 4,4 4,7 5,4 5,9
Table 4.2: Average prices for forward contracts with nodal pricing [e]
4.4 Conclusions
The literature has shown the theoretical superiority of nodal pricing compared to zonal
pricing in efficient markets. Zonal pricing is inherently inefficient due to hidden scarcities
of transmission constraints. Empirical work, however, showed that forward markets for
financial transmission rights in nodal pricing regimes might lack efficiency impacting the
performance of nodal compared to zonal pricing.
In this paper, a zonal and nodal pricing regime were compared and the impacts of
an inefficient transmission forward market were analyzed. The general effects have
been shown in a simple two node model. The conclusions for efficient markets were
confirmed. The trade-off between an inefficient transmission forward market (in a nodal
pricing regime) and the inherent inefficiencies of redispatch (in a zonal pricing regime)
have been formalized. Comparative statics were performed with a model incorporating
more nodes, loop flows as well as energy and transmission forwards. For this, the nodal
pricing spot and forward market model by de Maere d’Aertrycke and Smeers (2013) was
extended by a zonal pricing approach and a producer-only redispatch. Furthermore, the
volume constraint reducing efficiency was replaced by a formulation via a bid-ask-spread.
The relative performance of the pricing regimes has been tested for a wide range of
scenarios with varying demand volatility, supply costs, grid configurations, markups
and risk aversion. The results for the spot market showed that nodal pricing is always
performing at least as good as zonal pricing (and better in nearly all considered cases).
This holds also for the case of an efficient forward market, regardless of the parameter
setting. Inefficiencies in the forward transmission market, in terms of a positive bid-ask-
spread and risk aversion of market participants, lead to situations wherein zonal pricing
outperforms nodal pricing. Given all considered parameter variation this happens only
91
4 Is an inefficient transmission market better than none at all?
in a relatively small number of cases. Nevertheless, this matters if these cases are the
most relevant ones. It seems plausible that each pricing regime performs better, if the
respective weaknesses, i.e., the inefficiency of the forward transmission market or the
inherently inefficient redispatch, are highly relevant: A nodal pricing regime performs
better, if congestion within a zone is severe and costly. In turn, a zonal pricing regime
performs better, if the bid-ask-spread and the risk aversion are high.
The results imply that the trade-off between the respective weaknesses of the pricing
regimes should be considered carefully. In larger electricity systems such as the European
one, some sort of in-between solution might be favorable, i.e., by properly defining
bidding zones by considering the respective inefficiencies. However, other factors such
as market adaptation to newly defined zones and transaction costs have to play a role
within such considerations.
Further research should clarify whether or not the findings of the rather simple nu-
merical setting can be transferred to a more complex one. In addition, the effects of
strategic behavior, different preferences, portfolio effects or uncertainty are worthwhile
considering.
92
Regulation of non-marketed outputs and
substitutable inputs
5.1 Introduction
Numerous goods and services are provided by regulated firms with a monopolistic status.
For instance, uninterrupted electricity transmission services - being a textbook example
of a natural monopoly - are usually provided by a single firm. Currently, an increasing
deployment of renewable energy sources leads to substantially changing requirements to
secure an uninterrupted electricity transmission, while multiple substitutable measures
may exist to cope with it, such as grid expansion or sophisticated grid operation.68 Due
to the fact that an uninterrupted electricity transmission is crucial for society, the regu-
lator will be well aware of whether or not it has been provided effectively.69 In contrast,
however, electricity systems are highly complex, such that interdependent activity levels
as well as related cost figures are hard to assess. Hence, it may be difficult for the regula-
tor to judge the efficiency of the firm’s underlying measures. Technically speaking, this
situation may be seen as a production process involving multiple substitutable inputs,
incorporating two adverse selection problems: First, the regulator may have a hard time
estimating the necessary overall level of the firm’s activity, determined by the marginal
rate of technical substitution (MRTS), i.e., the isoquant function describing the rela-
tion of inputs needed to produce the requested output. Second, the regulator may have
difficulties verifying the unit costs of one or multiple inputs. This multi-dimensional
asymmetric information increases the complexity of finding an adequate regulation.
In theory as well as in practice, problems of information asymmetry between the regula-
tor and the firm have been tackled by different forms of regulation. Typical approaches
in regulatory practice range from cost-based regulation to widely applied incentive regu-
lation (discussed, e.g., in Joskow (2014)), or a linear combination of those two extremes
(e.g., Schmalensee (1989)). For instance, the German regulator offers one single contract
68The German Transmission System Operators estimate the necessary investments into grid reinforce-
ments and expansion to be around 22 bn. e for the period 2013-2022 (Netzentwicklungsplan, 2013),
which doubles the annual figures for 2012 and quadruples the value for 2006 (Bundesnetzagentur, 2013c).
69For instance, in Germany the regulator has defined five observable, quantifiable dimensions for
measuring grid quality.
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to electricity transmission firms, dependent on grid expansion, which corresponds to a
cost-based regulation of capital.70 The academic discussion has not yet fully covered the
specific multi-dimensional problems of asymmetric information regarding the level and
mix of inputs, but more recent theoretical approaches suggest that the best theoretical
solution consists of the regulator offering the firm a menu of contracts, such that the
firm reveals her private information (e.g., Laffont and Tirole (1993)). Even though the
dichotomy between such Bayesian models of regulation (which tend to dominate the
academic discussion) and simpler non-Bayesian models (which are closer to regulatory
practice) is well perceived, corresponding explanations are rather vague. For instance,
as Armstrong and Sappington (2007) note, ”[...] regulatory plans that encompass options
are ’complicated’, and therefore prohibitively costly to implement”.
The goal of this paper is twofold: First, to identify and investigate the optimal Bayesian
regulation for the multi-dimensional problem at hand, and second, to bridge the gap
between the theoretically optimal solution and simpler regimes applied in regulatory
practice.
To derive an optimal regulation strategy, we build on the theory of incentives and con-
tract menus. It is well known that in a simple setting with two types of the firm, the
efficient type is incentivized via a contract with first best (price) levels along with some
positive rent, while the inefficient type’s contract includes prices below the first best and
no rent (e.g., Laffont and Tirole (1993)). This analysis has been extended to represent
multiple dimensions of information asymmetry in terms of adverse selection, e.g., by
Lewis and Sappington (1988b), Dana (1993), Armstrong (1999) or Aguirre and Beitia
(2004). While Dana (1993) analyzes a multi-product environment, Lewis and Sapping-
ton (1988b), Armstrong (1999) and Aguirre and Beitia (2004) consider two-dimensional
adverse selection with only one screening variable. Specifically, the latter three derive
optimal regulation strategies in a marketed-good environment (in the sense of Caillaud
et al. (1988)) with unknown cost and demand functions. In our paper, unlike Lewis and
Sappington (1988b) and Armstrong (1999), we consider shadow costs of public funding
instead of distributional welfare preferences. Despite technical differences, this is largely
in line with the analysis of Aguirre and Beitia (2004).71 However, in contrast to all these
papers, we solve the two-dimensional adverse selection problem for a non-marketed good
environment and a production process that involves two substitutable inputs with an
uncertain isoquant and input factor costs.72
70In Germany, transmission system operators formulate a network expansion plan for which they get an
allowed investment. In line with economic theory, the chosen levels may be suspected to be inefficiently
high (see Footnote 1 for related cost figures). This regulation corresponds to a cost-based regulation for
the input factor grid expansion, while neglecting any other possible input, such as better operational
measures. Obviously, this triggers some sort of Averch-Johnson-effect and leads to suboptimal distortions
of the input levels.
71Aguirre and Beitia (2004) show the difference between shadow costs of public funding and distribu-
tional welfare preferences based on a model with continuous probability distribution, while we assume
a discrete distribution.
72Noticeably, with the (discrete) two-dimensional adverse selection problem, our problem setting is
technically closest to the model discussed by Armstrong (1999).
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For the novel setting of multi-dimensional inputs and a non-marketed output, we are
able to confirm the general insights from the above literature. We find that expected
social welfare necessarily includes positive rents for some types of the firm, such that
the first best solution cannot be achieved. While the efficient type is always set to first
best input levels, the other contracts’ (observable) input levels are distorted upwards.73
Separation of at least three types is always possible, while bunching of two types may
be unavoidable in case of a very asymmetric distribution of costs or very flat isoquants.
We compare the obtained optimal Bayesian regulation to the results of a non-Bayesian
regulation that we obtain by restricting our regulation problem to one single contract.
We find that despite the general inferiority a non-Bayesian cost-based regulatory regime
may indeed be close to the optimal Bayesian solution for specific circumstances. This
especially holds true if the overall input level probably needs to be high, and shadow
costs of public funding are large. Considering current circumstances observed in the
electricity sector, i.e., substantial changes in the supply structure and ongoing intense
discussions about grid tariffs, these conditions may indeed prevail.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 5.2 introduces the model, Section 5.3 presents
the optimal regulation strategy, Section 5.4 compares the optimal regulation to simpler
regimes, and Section 5.5 concludes.
5.2 The model
Consider a single firm that is controlled by a regulator. The firm uses two inputs to
provide an output in terms of a good or service level q that is requested by the regulator.
The regulator’s choice of q could, for instance, result from counterbalancing the economic
value of the provided with the related social costs. For simplicity, however, we assume q
to be invariant throughout the paper. Although this assumption might seem restrictive
at first sight, it may indeed fit a number of relevant cases very well. For instance, due
to the very high societal value of uninterrupted electricity transmission, changes in costs
will hardly affect the desired level of the transmission service quality q.
In our model, probability µ (respectively 1− µ) leads to a low (high) aggregated input
that is necessary to reach the same requested output q. This could, e.g., be an exogenous
shock induced by the increased deployment of renewable energies, triggering a changing
spatial distribution of supply and hence impacting the necessary overall activity level in
the grid sector to achieve secure electricity transmission. From the firm’s perspective, an
73Upwards distorted observable input levels coincide with upwards distorted prices for the inefficient
type as shown in Laffont and Tirole (1993). They also agree with the results in a setting with unknown
cost and demand functions as long as shadow costs of public funding are considered (Aguirre and Beitia
(2004)). Noticeably, the case of prices below marginal costs, as found in Lewis and Sappington (1988b)
and Armstrong (1999), is mainly triggered by using a distributive social welfare function instead of
shadow costs of public funding.
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output level q can be provided by means of two different inputs, one of which is observ-
able (x) and one non-observable (y) by the regulator. Stressing again our introductory
example of electricity transmission services, x could be the level of grid expansion that is
easily observable by the regulator, even by people unfamiliar with the details of electric-
ity transmission. Utilization and measures of sophisticated grid operation, especially as
a partial substitute to grid expansion, however, are hardly observable. The tradeoff be-
tween those two inputs needed to reach output q is commonly described by a production
function q = f(x, y) which can be illustrated by means of isoquants. We assume smooth
and decreasing marginal returns of both inputs, such that the isoquants are downward
sloping, convex and differentiable. Noticeably, two different isoquants can never cross.
An example fulfilling these requirements is a Cobb-Douglas-type production function.
The inverse production function g(q, x) reflects the necessary level of the non-observable
input y needed to reach output q, given a level of x. We will mostly use this inverse
function hereafter. Due to the exogenous shock leading to a low (l) or high (h) aggre-
gated input necessary for the envisaged output level q, the inverse function takes one of
two possible functional forms, i.e., gi(q, x), with i ∈ [l, h] and gl(q, x) < gh(q, x).
The optimal rate of substitution between the two inputs minimizing total costs for
reaching the requested output depends on the cost functions of the inputs. We consider
the cost function cx(x) of the the observable input to be fixed and common knowledge,
while the cost function of the non-observable input cyj (y) is subject to a nature draw,
which leads with probability ν (respectively 1 − ν) to a low (high) cost function (i.e.,
j ∈ [l, h]). For simplicity, we assume constant factor costs of both inputs, i.e., cx(x) = cx
and cyj (y) = c
y
j . The realization of c
y
j influences the isocost line of the two inputs and
hence, the optimal rate of substitution.74 Hence, depending on the two random draws for
the isoquant and the costs of the non-observable input, there are four possible first best
bundles of inputs, which we denote by {xfbll , yfbll }, {xfblh , yfblh }, {xfbhl , yfbhl } and {xfbhh, yfbhh}.
As a last precondition, we require the expansion path, i.e., the curve connecting the
optimal input combinations of the different isoquants, to be pointing rightwards as the
necessary aggregated input increases.75 In terms of the first best input levels, this
requires xfbll > x
fb
hl and x
fb
lh > x
fb
hh, which again holds true for a wide range of possible
production function specifications, including the above mentioned Cobb-Douglas type.
Under optimal Bayesian regulation, the goal of the regulator is to incentivize the firm via
a suitable contract framework to choose the welfare-optimizing bundle of inputs, which
we will derive based on classic mechanism design entailing truthful direct revelation.
Contrary to the firm, the regulator cannot observe the realizations of the two random
draws, although the possible realizations as well as the occurrence probabilities are
74As it is well known from production theory, the optimal rate of substitution is determined by equating
the marginal rate of technical substitution between the factors (i.e., the slope of the isoquant) with the
relative factor costs (i.e., the slope of the isocost line).
75For an analysis involving continuous variables, this would require the expansion path to behave like
a function with a unique function value y for each x, or, in other words, an expansion path that is not
bending backwards.
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Figure 5.1: Problem setting with double adverse selection
common knowledge. She knows the cost function of the observable input and can observe
the corresponding input level. The output is also observable and verifiable.76 For an
optimal regulation, the regulator offers the firm a menu of four contracts, each with
a level of the observable input xij and a corresponding transfer Tij . Naturally, the
contracts can be conditioned on observable parameters only, i.e., the output as well as
the amount of the observable input used. Both are enforceable by means of suitably
high penalties in case the firm deviates from the requested/contracted level.
The timing – as shown in Figure 5.2 – is as follows. First, the random draws are realized
and the cost function of the non-observable input and the necessary aggregated input
relation (isoquant) are observed by the firm. The firm then chooses between several (in
our case, four) contracts offered by the regulator. She then realizes the input levels to
produce the requested output. The regulator observes one input level (x) and whether
the output is as requested; if those are as agreed upon, the contract is executed and the
transfer realized.
time
t = 1
Firm learns the
realization of the
two random draws
t = 2
Firm chooses
one of the contracts
offered by the regulator
t = 3
Firm realizes
input levels;
Output is realized;
Contract is executed
Figure 5.2: Timing
The rent of the firm Rij given a realization i ∈ [l, h] and j ∈ [l, h], results from the
transfer Tij minus the private cost of the firm’s activities:
77
Rij = Tij − cxxij − cyjgi(q, xij) (5.1)
76Stochastic deviations due to force majeure are supposed to be detectable and excludable from the
contract framework.
77It goes without saying here that the firm is characterized such that she tries to maximize her rent.
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The regulator maximizes expected social welfare, defined as the sum of expected social
utility and firm surplus, by adjusting the observables, i.e.:
max
xij ,Tij
W = E
Sq − (1 + λ)Tij︸ ︷︷ ︸
Net social utility
+ (Tij − cxxij − cyjgi(q, xij))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Firm’s rent (Rij)
 (5.2)
where Sq is the gross social utility from reaching output q, and λ denotes the shadow
costs of public funding, i.e., the costs due to raising and transferring finances through
public channels (for a discussion, see, e.g., Laffont and Tirole (1993)). As discussed
previously, we assume q – and hence also gross social utility Sq – to be invariant and
independent of the random draws, yielding78
max
xij ,Tij
W = Sq − E
 (1 + λ)Tij︸ ︷︷ ︸
Transfer costs
− (Tij − cxxij − cyjgi(q, xij))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Firm’s rent (Rij)
 (5.3)
As an important consequence of Equation (5.3), we see that the optimization problem of
the regulator can be reformulated in terms of a cost-minimization problem, essentially
stating that the desired output shall be reached at minimal expected social costs:
min
xij ,Tij
C = E [Cij ] = E
λ Rij︸︷︷︸
Firm’s rent
+(1 + λ)( cxxij︸ ︷︷ ︸
Costs of
observable input
+ cyjgi(q, xij)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Costs of
non-observable input
)
 (5.4)
While choosing xij and Tij such that social costs are minimized, the regulator is restricted
by several participation and incentive constraints for the firm’s rent:
Rij ≥ 0 ∀i, j (5.5)
Rij ≥ Ri′j′ + cyj′gi′(q, xi′j′)− cyjgi(q, xi′j′) ∀ pairs i, j and i′, j′ (5.6)
Equation (5.5) ensures that all types of firms have a non-negative profit and therefore
participate.79 In line with the revelation principle, Equation (5.6) provides the firm with
the incentive to truthfully report the realized isoquant and non-observable input costs.
78This is the reason why q appears as a subscript here. In case of a more complex analysis involving
q as a variable, Sq would be replaced by S(q, x) to reflect the counterbalancing of the economic value of
the provided output with the related social costs.
79Hence, we implicitly assume zero liability for the firm.
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Written explicitly, the four participation constraints for the four possible firm types
become
Rll ≥ 0 (5.7a)
Rlh ≥ 0 (5.7b)
Rhl ≥ 0 (5.7c)
Rhh ≥ 0, (5.7d)
and the twelve incentive constraints (each of the four types might be tempted to choose
a contract of one of the other three types)
Rll ≥ Rlh + cyhgl(q, xlh)− cyl gl(q, xlh) (5.8a)
Rll ≥ Rhl + cyl gh(q, xhl)− cyl gl(q, xhl) (5.8b)
Rll ≥ Rhh + cyhgh(q, xhh)− cyl gl(q, xhh) (5.8c)
Rlh ≥ Rll + cyl gl(q, xll)− cyhgl(q, xll) (5.8d)
Rlh ≥ Rhl + cyl gh(q, xhl)− cyhgl(q, xhl) (5.8e)
Rlh ≥ Rhh + cyhgh(q, xhh)− cyhgl(q, xhh) (5.8f)
Rhl ≥ Rll + cyl gl(q, xll)− cyl gh(q, xll) (5.8g)
Rhl ≥ Rlh + cyhgl(q, xlh)− cyl gh(q, xlh) (5.8h)
Rhl ≥ Rhh + cyhgh(q, xhh)− cyl gh(q, xhh) (5.8i)
Rhh ≥ Rll + cyl gl(q, xll)− cyhgh(q, xll) (5.8j)
Rhh ≥ Rlh + cyhgl(q, xlh)− cyhgh(q, xlh) (5.8k)
Rhh ≥ Rhl + cyl gh(q, xhl)− cyhgh(q, xhl). (5.8l)
5.3 Optimal regulation
5.3.1 Preparatory analysis
As a first preparatory step in the analysis we shall check whether the contract variable
x is actually suitable to provide incentives to the firm to reveal her true type. To this
end, we investigate whether the incentive to choose another type’s contract (motivated
by a potential increase in rent) regarding one of the two random draws is impacted by
an adjustment of x. This is often referred to as “single crossing” conditions. For the
incentive to choose another type’s contract regarding the realized input cost, we find
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that80
∂
∂x
(Rih(x)−Ril(x)) = (cyl − cyh)g′i(q, x) for i = l, h, (5.9)
which is clearly greater than zero due to ch > cl and g
′
i(q, x) < 0. Hence, by an upwards
distortion of x, we are able to reduce the incentive for the firm to choose the contract
of a high cost type instead of truly revealing the realized low cost type.
Similarly, for the incentive to choose a contract for an isoquant different from the realized
one, we find that
∂
∂x
(Rhj(x)−Rlj(x)) = cyj (g′l(q, x)− g′h(q, x)) for j = l, h (5.10)
which is greater than zero as long as g′h(q, x) < g
′
l(q, x). Recalling from Section 5.2
that we have assumed rightwards pointing expansion paths (a property exhibited by a
wide range of possible production function specifications, including the Cobb-Douglas
type), this condition will always hold true. Hence, upwards distorting x will provide
a possibility to reduce the incentive for the firm to choose the contract with a high
isoquant instead of truly revealing the realized low isoquant.
The effect of changing incentives following a distortion of x helps us to derive a first
characterization of the optimal solution of our regulatory problem. In fact, in order to
comply with the incentive constraints (5.8a)-(5.8l) (which need to be fulfilled for the
optimal solution anyway), input levels xij need to follow a certain ordering. Note that
for each pair of types there are two relevant incentive constraints (e.g., Equations (5.8a)
and (5.8d) for the types ll and lh). Adding those and using the above single crossing
conditions, the necessary ordering can be obtained as follows:81
xll ≤ xlh ≤ xhh (5.11)
xll ≤ xhl ≤ xhh (5.12)
Moreover, from the incentive constraints (5.8a) and (5.8i) it follows that only the par-
ticipation constraints (5.7b) and (5.7d) (i.e., limited liability of the lh and the hh-type)
remain relevant for further analyses. In contrast, the other two participation constraints
(those of the low-cost types) are implicitly fulfilled if these two incentive constraints
hold.
So far unclear from the above analysis, however, is the ordering of the intermediate
cases xlh and xhl, which depends on whether the term Rhl(x)− Rlh(x) is increasing or
80Here and in the following, a prime denotes derivation with respect to x.
81For instance, adding Equations (5.8a) and (5.8d) yields (cyl −cyh)g′l(q, xlh) ≥ (cyl −cyh)g′l(q, xll), which,
together with (5.9), implies that xlh ≥ xll.
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decreasing in x. Differentiating with respect to x yields
∂
∂x
(Rhl(x)−Rlh(x)) = (cyhg′l(q, x)− cyl g′h(q, x)) (5.13)
which is increasing in x as long as
cyh
cyl
<
gh(q, x)
gl(q, x)
, (5.14)
and decreasing in x otherwise. Together with incentive constraints (5.8e) and (5.8h)
we infer that if the cost variation is small compared to the isoquant variation, then
xlh ≤ xhl. If the aggregated input level variation is small compared to the cost variation,
then xlh ≥ xhl. For an intuition, recall Figure 5.1. If the aggregated input level variation
and hence the distance between the isoquants is large, xfbhl is larger than x
fb
lh . If the cost
variation, and hence, the vertical distance between the corresponding first best solutions
is large, xfblh is larger than x
fb
hl .
The results of our preparatory analysis are summarized in the following two Lemmas.
Lemma 5.1. Limited liability is only an issue for the high-cost types. Hence, the only
relevant participation constraints are (5.7b) and (5.7d), whereas (5.7a) and (5.7c) are
implicitly fulfilled.
Lemma 5.2. In order to reach incentive compatibility, input levels xij must be ordered
as follows:
(A) If the cost variation is small compared to the isoquant variation, then Rhl(x) −
Rlh(x) is increasing in x and requires
xll ≤ xlh ≤ xhl ≤ xhh. (5.15)
(B) If the cost variation is large compared to the isoquant variation, then Rhl(x) −
Rlh(x) is decreasing in x and requires
xll ≤ xhl ≤ xlh ≤ xhh. (5.16)
5.3.2 Full information benchmark
If the regulator had no information deficit, she would observe the realized isoquant as
well as the realized isocost line. Differentiating all possible realizations of the social cost
function Cij with respect to the observable input levels xij shows that all of them are
single-peaked with a unique minimum at g
′
i(q, xij) = − c
x
cyj
, which is necessarily realized
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at xij = x
fb
ij . The regulator would easily derive the first best levels of inputs to supply
the requested output at minimal social costs, i.e., {xfbij , yfbij }, by equating the known
realized marginal rate of technical substitution of the inputs with the realized isocost
line. Moreover, she would be able to enforce the implementation of the first best due to
the full observability. The corresponding optimal transfers would be T fbij = c
xxfbij +c
y
jy
fb
ij ,
leaving all types of the firm with zero rent. In the case of full information, social costs
amount to Cfbij = (1 + λ)T
fb
ij = (1 + λ)(c
xxfbij + c
y
jy
fb
ij ), corresponding to the welfare-
optimizing first best solution that could thus be obtained.
5.3.3 Asymmetric information
In the case of asymmetric information, the only two observables for the regulator are
the output q and the observable input x. In addition, she can choose an appropriate
level of transfer payment T . As q is invariable and observable, its implementation can
be enforced by means of suitably high penalties in case the firm deviates. Hence, x and
T are the two variables the regulator will condition her contracts on. The general idea
for the regulator’s optimal regulation strategy is to offer a menu of contracts with op-
timized variables {x∗ij , T ∗ij}, such that expected social costs are minimized (as stated in
Equation (5.4)), and participation (Equation (5.5)) and incentive constraints (Equation
5.6) fulfilled. Hence, we restrict our attention to incentive compatible contracts ensuring
that the firm always reveals her true type. Under these conditions, the revelation prin-
ciple requires that the solution found (if any) is a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium (Myerson
(1979), Laffont and Martimort (2002)).
5.3.3.1 One-dimensional asymmetric information
We shall first investigate a simplified problem with one-dimensional asymmetric infor-
mation only, i.e., isoquant or cost uncertainty. Eliminating the isoquant uncertainty (by
setting µ = 0, µ = 1 or glj = ghj), we are left with two constraints binding: the partici-
pation constraint of the high cost type (5.7b or 5.7d) and the incentive constraint from
the low to the high cost type (5.8a or 5.8i). This leads to the simplified cost function:
C =ν
[
λ
(
gi(xih)(c
y
h − cyl )
)
+ (1 + λ)
(
cxxil + c
y
l gi(xil)
)]
(5.17)
+ (1− ν) [(1 + λ) (cxxih + cyhgi(xih))]
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Derivating with respect to xij , j ∈ l, h yields the following first order conditions:
∂C
∂xil
= 0⇔ g′i(x∗il) = −
cx
cyl
, (5.18)
∂C
∂xih
= 0⇔ νλ(cyh − cyl )g′i(x∗ih)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+ (1− ν)(1 + λ)(cx + cyhg′i(x∗ih))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0 for xih=x
fb
ih
<0 for xih<x
fb
ih
>0 for xih>x
fb
ih
= 0 (5.19)
Similarly, in case of no cost uncertainty, the observable input levels of the low isoquant
types are first best, whereas the high isoquant types are distorted upwards:82
Lemma 5.3. In case of asymmetric information about either costs or isoquants, the
respective l-type is set to first best, while the h-type is distorted upwards compared to its
first best.
Note that the result of an adverse selection problem with one-dimensional information
asymmetry on costs is well-known from the literature (e.g., Baron and Myerson (1982) or
Sappington (1983)). Also note that the results concerning isoquant uncertainty are strik-
ingly different compared to the one-dimensional demand uncertainty (which essentially
corresponds to the isoquant in our setting) studied by Lewis and Sappington (1988a) or
Armstrong (1999). In contrast to our model – due to neglecting shadow costs of public
funding – they find that the first best can be achieved in the one-dimensional case of
demand uncertainty.
5.3.3.2 Two-dimensional asymmetric information
Solving the full optimal regulation problem requires minimization of social costs, subject
to all imposed four participation and twelve incentive constraints. Due to the large
number of constraints, we approach the optimization by solving a relaxed problem where
only a subset of the constraints is considered. To this end, we need to come up with
an educated guess about the binding constraints in the optimum. If we can later show
that the remaining constraints are fulfilled at the solution of the relaxed problem, we
will have obtained the solution of the full problem.
We already know from Lemma 5.1 that the participation constraints of the high-cost
types are the only relevant ones. Furthermore, it generally seems to be a good approach
to assume the “upwards” incentive constraints, i.e., from low to high isoquant, and
from low to high costs, to be binding. Moreover, it seems plausible to assume binding
incentive constraints from the most efficient to an intermediate type (i.e., lh or hl), and
from an intermediate type to the least efficient type. If we consider the isoquant variation
82Due to the obvious symmetry of the problem, we omit the detailed calculation here.
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more relevant than the cost variation, assuming the incentive constraints according to
the ordering shown in Lemma 5.2, Case (A), to be binding appears to be the most
educated guess we can come up with.83 Hence, we assume that incentive constraints
(5.8a) (ll → lh), (5.8e) (lh → hl), and (5.8i) (hl → hh) are fulfilled with equality. In
addition, we assume the participation constraint of the hh-type to bind since this is the
only type remaining that is not attracted by any other type. Figure 5.3 illustrates with
arrows the binding incentive constraints, such that the former type is not attracted by
the latter type-contract. Diamonds mark the binding participation constraints.
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Figure 5.3: Constraints considered binding for Case (A)
We find that this set of assumptions does indeed lead us to the optimal regulation
strategy. The results are summarized in the following Proposition 5.4.
Proposition 5.4. For Case (A),
(i) Optimal regulation is achieved under the following set of observable input levels:
x∗ll = x
fb
ll (5.20)
x∗lh ≥ xfblh (5.21)
x∗hl ≥ xfbhl (5.22)
x∗hh ≥ xfbhh, (5.23)
while respecting x∗ll < x
∗
lh ≤ x∗hl ≤ x∗hh.
(ii) The most efficient (ll) type can always be separated. Moreover, separation of at
least three types is always possible, while bunching of the lh and hl types is un-
avoidable in case of ν → 1. The hl and hh types may need to be bunched in case
of g′l(q, x)→ 0 together with cyl being large.
83The ordering and solution of Case (B) is reversed, but similar. The corresponding discussion can
be found in the appendix.
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Proof. See Appendix.
Corollary 5.5. For λ = 0, the optimal solution is first best. All input levels amount to
x∗ij = x
fb
ij , and expected social costs to C = C
fb.
Proof. Follows immediately from the solution of Case (A) when setting λ = 0.
According to Corollary 5.5, with no shadow costs of public funding, all input levels x∗ij
are first best. The regulator optimizes overall welfare, but has no preference regarding
the distribution of social surplus. Hence, she can give the firm an arbitrarily high budget
at no social costs, and the firm maximizes her rent by setting efficient input levels. In
this case, the maximization of the firm and the maximization of social welfare coincide,
i.e., there is no problem of aligning the activities of the firm with social interests. Of
course, larger parts of the welfare are then given to the firm.
For the general case of λ > 0, observable input levels of all types besides the ll-one are
distorted above first best levels, leading to a second best solution only. Naturally, the
overall level of inefficiency increases in λ, but also for decreasing µ and ν (i.e., when
there is a high probability for “costly” outcomes of the random draws) as well as for
cyh − cyl and gh(q, x) − gl(q, x) getting large. In contrast, however, the less significant
the cost variation becomes compared to the isoquant variation, the more efficient the
solution will be.
Due to keeping the most efficient (ll) type at first best level combined with the ordering
according to Lemma 5.2, the type can always be separated in the contract framework.
Moreover, we find that at least three types can always be separated, while bunching
of two types may be unavoidable in case of vanishing isoquant or cost uncertainties,
or if the isoquant variation becomes extremely large. As a last remark, it is worth
mentioning that the ordering of rents is (and must be) as depicted in Figure 5.3, i.e.,
0 = R∗hh < R
∗
hl < R
∗
lh < R
∗
ll.
The results for Case (B) are symmetric but structurally identical to Case (A), i.e.,
the ll-type is incentivized to first best input levels while the other types show upwards
distortions of xij . However, roles of isoquants and costs are interchanged, reflected in
the inverse occurrence of the terms gi ↔ cyj and µ←→ ν. At the same time, as imposed
by Lemma 5.2, Case (B), the sequence of the “intermediate” types is now hl → lh.
Hence, the ordering of observable input levels xlh and xhl as well as rents Rlh and Rhl
need to be reversed to obtain an optimal regulatory contract framework.84
84See the appendix for a detailed discussion and the corresponding proposition and proof.
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5.4 Comparing the optimal regulation to simpler regimes
In contrast to the optimal Bayesian menu of contracts studied in the previous section,
regulatory authorities often apply alternative, simpler approaches. In fact, in the case
of electricity transmission grids, it appears that they mostly offer a non-Bayesian, i.e.,
single, contract, while the application of Bayesian contracts in terms of menus of con-
tracts, has been very rare.85 For instance, regulatory practice in Germany is such that
TSOs formulate a grid expansion plan, which is then reviewed and approved by the
regulator. For the approved measures, the TSOs get their costs reimbursed. This corre-
sponds to a cost-based regulation for the input factor grid expansion, while neglecting
any other possible input, such as better operational measures. Meanwhile, driven, e.g.,
by social acceptance issues, the regulator is expected to limit the approval of extensive
grid expansion to some ”reasonable” level.
Transferring such a simple non-Bayesian approach into our model, we need to limit the
set of regulatory choice variables to one single contract with contract variables x¯ and T¯ ,
such that the objective function of the regulator (in contrast to Equation (5.4) as in the
case of optimal regulation) becomes:
min
x¯,T¯
C¯ = E
λ R¯ij︸︷︷︸
Firm’s rent
+(1 + λ)( cxx¯︸︷︷︸
Costs of
observable input
+ cyjgi(q, x¯)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Costs of
non-observable input
)
 (5.24)
In contrast to the solution of the optimal regulation, this minimization is only subject to
the participation constraints (5.5). With a sole contract and hence, only one observable
input x¯ for all types, the regulator has no possibility to separate types, which makes the
incentive constraints obsolete. As before, the only participation constraint holding with
equality is the one of the hh-type. Considering that this type gets full cost reimbursement
but cannot be distinguished from the other types, it becomes clear that all other types
must then necessarily receive a positive rent. The following proposition summarizes the
solution of this non-Bayesian regulatory approach.86
Proposition 5.6. Under a single contract cost-based regulation with quantity restriction,
the optimal input level x¯∗ represents an expected average of the first best solutions of the
four possible types, adjusted by some upwards distortion in case of λ > 0. As an expected
average, it lies between the extreme types’ first best input levels, i.e., xfbll < x¯
∗ < xfbhh.
85The system operator for England and Wales and the electric distribution companies in the UK are
the only two examples for menus of contracts being applied in regulatory practice Joskow (2014).
86Note that the solution for a pure cost-based regulation without quantity restriction would simply
reimburse the costs of the observable input. This would incentivize the firm to choose infinitely high
values of x (known as the gold-plating effect). Assuming that the regulator restricts her set of choices by
an upper level of x¯ = xfbhh in order to limit excessive (socially costly) rents, all types would then choose
this level. In contrast to this very simple approach, the regulatory regime considered in this section
makes use of being able to use the observable input x as a contracting variable.
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Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 5.7. Compared to a single contract, the regulatory approach based on a
menu of contracts is superior with respect to expected social welfare.
Proof. It is easy to show that the optimal solution of the single contract is a feasible
solution of the menu of contracts problem. Due to the fact that the solution for the
menu of contracts, as stated in Proposition 5.4, is both optimal and different from the
one in Proposition 5.6, it must necessarily be superior.
As stated in Proposition 5.7, the solution of the single contract regime is always inferior
to the one obtained with the menu of contracts. Nevertheless, the characteristics of the
different regimes can be compared and deserve a closer look. We contrast the outcome
of the optimal menu of contracts with the one of the single contract regime considering
three aspects: input levels, cost-efficiency of the input levels, and rents of the firm.
Input levels for the different types have been characterized in Proposition 5.4 for the
menu of contract, stating that all types besides the ll-one are distorted above first best
levels. According to Proposition 5.7, the optimal input level for the single contract
regime, x¯∗, represents an expected average of the first best solution of the four possible
types, adjusted by some upwards distortion in case of λ > 0. Hence, chosen input levels
are generally different. However, x¯∗ may get close to x∗hl in case of λ being large and µ
small (i.e., for a high probability of realizing a high isoquant). At the same time, it will
never be as high as x∗hh, due to x¯
∗ < xfbhh < x
∗
hh.
Cost-efficiency of the input levels is closely connected to the input levels and their
deviation from the first best optimal solution. The optimal menu of contracts approaches
first best cost-efficiency of the input levels for λ → 0, as input levels then converge
towards first best levels, i.e., {x∗ij , y∗ij} → {xfbij , yfbij }. In contrast, cost-efficiency is poor
for the single contract regime under this condition. However, first best input levels may
also be reached, but only under very restrictive conditions, namely if λ → 0 and the
occurrence probability for one specific type is particularly large (e.g., if µ, ν → 1). Type-
specific as well as expected cost-efficiency of input levels is (only) then approaching first
best optimality for both contracting frameworks. For the general case of λ ≥ 0, it is
clear that cost-efficiency of the input levels is inferior for the ll type in the single contract
regime, while the ordering is ambiguous for all other types, depending on the optimal
choice of x¯∗ in comparison to x∗ij .
Regarding rents of the firm, remember that they are only an issue for social welfare
if there are shadow costs of public funding, i.e., if λ > 0. Then, however, the well
known trade-off for rent-extraction and efficiency becomes relevant. For both contracting
regimes, the rent of the inefficient hh type is set to zero. Moreover, for both regimes it
holds true that 0 = R∗hh < R
∗
hl  R∗lh < R∗ll (respectively, 0 = R¯∗hh < R¯∗hl  R¯∗lh < R¯∗ll),
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if isoquant variation is more relevant than cost variation. For the rent of specific types,
we find that R∗hl < R¯
∗
hl, while the ordering of other types’ rent is generally ambiguous.
Interestingly, however, if g′i(x) is small in the relevant range, R
∗
ij < R¯
∗
ij for all i, j.
Based on the above comparative statics, a singular interesting constellation can be iden-
tified for which the two contracting frameworks effectively approach each other.
Proposition 5.8. For λ being large and µ small, the performance of the single contract
is close to the one of the menu of contracts.
Proof. For λ being large, x¯∗ is distorted upwards (see Proposition 5.6), while x∗hl ≈ xfbhl
for µ small. Hence, in this case, x¯∗ ≈ x∗hl. Moreover, due to the fact that we consider
Case (A) where cost uncertainty is relatively low, we know that the upwards distortion
of x∗hh is low (see Equation (5.29)), such that x
∗
hl is not far from x
∗
hh. Under these
conditions, C¯∗ ≈ C∗.
Transferring Proposition 5.8 to our example of electricity transmission services and the
regulation of the German TSOs, one may indeed come to the conclusion that the prac-
tically applied non-Bayesian regulatory approach could be close to the optimal second-
best strategy. In fact, a high overall input level appears to be likely due to the strongly
changing supply infrastructure, while ongoing intense discussions about the burden of
electricity costs and grid tariffs for consumers could indicate high shadow costs of public
funding. In the end, however, reasons for the chosen regulation are probably manifold,
and might also include an explicit disutility of grid expansion, a commitment prob-
lem,87 or the prohibitively high costs of implementing a ’complicated’ regulatory regime
(Armstrong and Sappington, 2007).
5.5 Conclusion
We considered a regulated firm providing a non-marketed output with substitutable
inputs. We presented the optimal Bayesian regulation in terms of a menu of contracts
when the regulator faces information asymmetries regarding the aggregated input level
needed to provide the output as well as the realized optimal marginal rate of substitution
between the inputs. Finally, the optimal Bayesian regulation was compared to a simpler
non-Bayesian approach which appears to be closer to regulatory practice.
87Noticeably, a commitment problem of the regulator might impede the implementation of an
incentive-based approach, which would be welfare-superior compared to a cost-based regulation. If the
firm gets an unconditional payment representing the pay-off of the hh-type, i.e., T˜ = cxxfbhh+c
y
hgh(q, x
fb
hh),
she will realize first best input quantities {xfbij , yfbij }. In this case, the realized rent of the firm becomes
Rij = c
xxfbhh + c
y
hgh(q, x
fb
hh)− cxxfbij − cyj gi(q, xfbij ). However, due to the (observable) separation of types
via the realized input x, the regulator might be tempted to adjust the regulatory contract ex-post, and
hence, jeopardize the regulatory success if the firm anticipates this behavior.
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We found that in the optimal Bayesian regulation, the first best solution cannot be
achieved under the considered information asymmetries and shadow costs of public fund-
ing. This implies a strictly positive rent for the firm. The second best solution that we
then characterized depends on the relative importance of the information asymmetries.
However, the most efficient type is always set to first best, while the levels of the observ-
able input are distorted upwards for all other types. At least three types can always be
separated, while bunching of two types may be unavoidable in case of a very asymmetric
distribution of costs or very flat isoquants. These results are structurally similar to the
solutions for multi-dimensional adverse selection problems in the literature (e.g., Lewis
and Sappington (1988b), Armstrong (1999) or Aguirre and Beitia (2004)). However, in
contrast to existing results, our model explains upwards distortions of input levels rather
than prices. Hence, we obtained important insights regarding the optimal mechanism
design in the context of a regulated monopolistic firm producing a non-marketed good
with multi-dimensional inputs.
The comparison to a single contract cost-based approach, as it is often applied in regula-
tory practice, showed that the menu of contracts is welfare superior. However, there are
situations in which the performance of the approaches converge, namely if the overall
input level probably needs to be high, and shadow costs of public funding are large.
Given our motivating example of electricity transmission services and the current situa-
tion, e.g., in Germany, these circumstances may indeed prevail, possibly explaining the
gap between the theoretically optimal Bayesian approach and the simpler non-Bayesian
regulation applied in practice.
Lastly, we note that our general approach as well as our insights might also be ap-
plicable to other industries that show similar characteristics, such as public works or
administrative services. Besides investigating such areas of application, future research
could relax the limited liability assumption and hence, allow for a shut down of firms.
Another expansion could allow the good to be marketed, which would trigger a demand
reaction of the regulator (or consumers) and possibly lead to interesting variations of
the conclusions derived in this paper.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. (i) Under the constraints considered binding for Case (A) – as discussed and
shown in Figure 5.3 – the social cost function (5.4) becomes
C =
µν[λ
(
gh(xhh)(c
y
h − cyl ) + cyl gh(xhl)− cyhgl(xhl) + gl(xlh)(cyh − cyl )
)
+ (1 + λ)
(
cxxll + c
y
l gl(xll)
)
]
+ µ(1− ν)[λ (gh(xhh)(cyh − cyl ) + cyl gh(xhl)− cyhgl(xhl))
+ (1 + λ)
(
cxxlh + c
y
hgl(xlh)
)
]
+ (1− µ)ν [λ (gh(xhh)(cyh − cyl ))+ (1 + λ) (cxxhl + cyl gh(xhl))]
+ (1− µ)(1− ν) [(1 + λ) (cxxhh + cyhgh(xhh))] . (5.25)
To derive the optimal observable input levels, we need to derive the above equation
with respect to each of the four possible xij . Minimizing C with respect to xll yields
g′l(x
∗
ll) = −
cx
cyl
, (5.26)
which implies that x∗ll = x
fb
ll . Derivations of C with respect to xlh, xhl and xhh
take the following forms:
∂C
∂xlh
= µνλ(cyh − cyl )g′l(xlh)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+µ(1− ν)(1 + λ)(cx + cyhg′l(xlh))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0 for xlh=x
fb
lh
<0 for xlh<x
fb
lh
>0 for xlh>x
fb
lh
(5.27)
∂C
∂xhl
= µλ(cyl g
′
h(xhl)− cyhg′l(xhl))︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+ (1− µ)ν(1 + λ)(cx + cyl g′h(xhl))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0 for xhl=x
fb
hl
<0 for xhl<x
fb
hl
>0 for xhl>x
fb
hl
(5.28)
∂C
∂xhh
= (µ+ (1− µ)ν)λg′h(xhh)(cyh − cyl )︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+ (1− µ)(1− ν)(1 + λ)(cx + cyhg′h(xhh))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0 for xhh=x
fb
hh
<0 for xhh<x
fb
hh
>0 for xhh>x
fb
hh
.
(5.29)
From Equation (5.27), we see that ∂C∂xlh is strictly smaller than 0 for xlh = x
fb
lh and
monotonically increasing in xlh, which implies that x
∗
lh > x
fb
lh must always hold.
The same logic applies for x∗hl and x
∗
hh.
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(ii) From the fact that xfbll < x
fb
lh and the strict upwards distortion of all other types,
it follows that the ll-type can always be separated. In order to investigate whether
the types lh, hl and hh can be separated or need to be bunched, we proceed as
follows: For each of the possible pairs lh− hl, hl − hh and lh− hh, we check the
derivative of C with respect to the former type at the optimal level of x∗ of the
latter type (derived from the first order condition). If the change in C is greater
than 0 we can conclude that we have already surpassed the optimal level of the
former type, which then must be smaller than the optimal level of the latter type.
In other words, we check the level of upwards distortion for the lh, hl and hh types
while considering the necessary ordering of the types according to Lemma 5.2. For
the pair lh-hl, we find that x∗lh may surpass x
∗
hl in case of ν → 1, while they are
otherwise clearly separated from each. For the pair hl-hh, bunching may occur
for g′l(q, x)→ 0 together with cyl being large. Furthermore, we find that lh-hh can
always be separated, implying that at most two types (i.e., either lh-hl or hl-hh)
may be bunched under certain parameter constellations.
Lastly, it is straightforward to check that the remaining constraints are satisfied under
the obtained solution of the relaxed problem. Hence, we have indeed obtained to optimal
solution for the full regulatory problem we are facing in Case (A).
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Written explicitly, Equation (5.24) becomes
C¯ =µν
[
λ
(
cyhgh(x¯)− cyl gl(x¯)
)
+ (1 + λ)
(
cxx¯+ cyl gl(x¯)
)]
+ µ(1− ν) [λ (cyhgh(x¯)− cyhgl(x¯))+ (1 + λ) (cxx¯+ cyhgl(x¯))]
+ (1− µ)ν [λ (cyhgh(x¯)− cyl gh(x¯))+ (1 + λ) (cxx¯+ cyl gh(x¯))]
+ (1− µ)(1− ν) [(1 + λ) (cxx¯+ cyhgh(x¯))] . (5.30)
Deriving the above with respect to x¯ yields, after a few calculations, E(g′i(x¯∗))E(c
y
j ) +
cx + λ(cyhg
′
h(x¯
∗) + cx) = 0. Hence, for λ = 0, E(g′h(x¯∗)) = − c
x
E(cyj )
.
Two-dimensional asymmetric information, Case (B): Cost variation large
compared to isoquant variation
To solve the second case following from Lemma 5.2, we need to apply a different educated
guess with respect to the binding constraints. However, we apply a similar reasoning
as in Case (A), but take account of the fact that now, cost variation is more relevant
than isoquant variation. Hence, we choose a symmetric setting and imply incentive
constraints (5.8b) (ll → hl), (5.8h) (hl → lh) and (5.8f) (lh → hh) to be binding.
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Again, we assume the participation constraint of the hh-type to be binding. Figure 5.4
illustrates this setting.
After having determined the results and checked all remaining constraints, we find the
setting of binding constraints as in Figure 5.4 indeed to be optimal for Case (B). Results
are summarized in the following Proposition 5.9.
Proposition 5.9. For case (B),
(i) Optimal regulation is achieved under the following set of observable input levels:
x∗ll = x
fb
ll (5.31)
x∗lh ≥ xfblh (5.32)
x∗hl ≥ xfbhl (5.33)
x∗hh ≥ xfbhh, (5.34)
while respecting x∗ll < x
∗
hl ≤ x∗lh ≤ x∗hh.
(ii) The most efficient (ll) type can always be separated. Moreover, separation of at
least three types is always possible, while bunching of the hl and lh types is un-
avoidable in case of µ→ 1.The lh and hh types may be bunched in case of cyl being
small and g′h(q, x) large.
Isoquant (gi(q, x))
In
p
u
t
co
st
s
(c
y j
)

l h
l
h
Figure 5.4: Constraints considered binding for Case (B)
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Proof. (i) Under the constraints considered binding for Case (B) – as discussed and
shown in Figure 5.4 – the social cost function (5.4) becomes
C =
µν[λ
(
cyh(gh(xhh)− gl(xhh)) + cyhgl(xlh)− cyl gh(xlh) + cyl (gh(xhl)− gl(xhl))
)
+ (1 + λ)
(
cxxll + c
y
l gl(xll)
)
]
+ µ(1− ν) [λ (cyh(gh(xhh)− gl(xhh)))+ (1 + λ) (cxxlh + cyhgl(xlh))]
+ (1− µ)ν[
λ
(
cyh(gh(xhh)− gl(xhh))
)
+ cyhgl(xlh)− cyl gh(xlh) + (1 + λ)
(
cxxhl + c
y
l gh(xhl)
)]
+ (1− µ)(1− ν) [(1 + λ) (cxxhh + cyhgh(xhh))] . (5.35)
Minimizing C with respect to xll yields
g′l(x
∗
ll) = −
cx
cyl
, (5.36)
which implies that x∗ll = x
fb
ll . Derivation of C with respect to xlh, xhl and xhh
yields:
∂C
∂xlh
= µλ(cyhg
′
l(xlh)− cyl g′h(xlh)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+µ(1− ν)(1 + λ)(cx + cyhg′l(xlh))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0 for xlh=x
fb
lh
<0 for xlh<x
fb
lh
>0 for xlh>x
fb
lh
(5.37)
∂C
∂xhl
= µνλ(cyl g
′
h(xhl)− cyl g′l(xhl))︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+ (1− µ)ν(1 + λ)(cx + cyl g′h(xhl))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0 for xhl=x
fb
hl
<0 for xhl<x
fb
hl
>0 for xhl>x
fb
hl
(5.38)
∂C
∂xhh
= (µ+ (1− µ)ν)λcyh(g′h(xhh)− g′l(xhh))︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+ (1− µ)(1− ν)(1 + λ)(cx + cyhg′h(xhh))︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0 for xhh=x
fb
hh
<0 for xhh<x
fb
hh
>0 for xhh>x
fb
hh
.
(5.39)
From Equation (5.37), we see that ∂C∂xlh is strictly smaller than 0 for xlh = x
fb
lh and
monotonically increasing in xlh, which implies that x
∗
lh > x
fb
lh must always hold.
The same logic applies for x∗hl and x
∗
hh.
(ii) From xfbll < x
fb
lh and the strict upwards distortion of all other types, it follows that
the ll-type can always be separated. x∗hl may surpass x
∗
lh in case of µ→ 1. If the
low costs cyl are small and g
′
h(q, x) becomes large, lh and hh types may need to be
bunched, without impacting the separation of the other types.
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The remaining constraints are satisfied under the obtained solution.
As in Case (A), the first best solution can be obtained for λ = 0, while the solution is
second best and incurring an increasing level of inefficiency for increasing levels of λ.
Also again, the most efficient type can always be separated, while bunching of the hl
and lh types (lh and hh types) may occur for very high occurrence probability of low
isoquants, or if gh(q, x) is very steep and c
y
l small.
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